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REMOVING THE LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS TO OFFERING
LIFETIME ANNUITIES IN PENSION PLANS*
JONATHAN BARRY FORMAN†

***

Longevity risk—the risk of outliving one’s retirement savings—is
probably the greatest risk facing current and future retirees in the United
States. At present, for example, a 65-year-old man has a 50 percent chance
of living to age 82 and a 20 percent chance of living to age 89, and a 65year-old woman has a 50 percent chance of living to age 85 and a 20 percent
chance of living to age 92. The joint life expectancy of a 65-year-old couple
is even more remarkable: there is a 50 percent chance that at least one 65year-old spouse will live to age 88 and a 30 percent chance that at least one
will live to 92. In short, many individuals and couples will need to plan for
the possibility of retirements that can last for 30 years or more. There were
48.6 million retirees in the United States in 2014, but there are expected to
be 66.4 million retirees in 2025 and 82.1 million in 2040.
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One of the best ways to protect against longevity risk is by securing
a stream of lifetime income with a traditional defined benefit pension plan
or a lifetime annuity. Over the years, however, there has been a decided shift
away from traditional pensions and towards 401(k) plans and other defined
contribution plans that typically distribute benefits in the form of lump sum
distributions rather than as lifetime annuities. When given the choice, people
rarely choose to receive annuity distributions, nor is it common for people
to buy annuities in the retail annuity market. All in all, Americans will have
longer and longer retirements, yet fewer and fewer retirees will have secure,
lifetime income streams.
This Article considers how changes in the laws and regulations
governing pensions and annuities could help promote secure, lifetime
income streams. More specifically, this Article explores how the laws
governing annuities could be changed to make voluntary annuitization more
attractive and how pension laws could be changed to incentivize plan
sponsors to offer more lifetime income options and to encourage plan
participants to select those options.
After a brief introduction, Part II of this Article provides an overview
of Social Security, pensions, annuities, and other lifetime income
mechanisms in the United States. Next, Part III focuses on the legal rules
that govern annuities and pension distributions, and Part IV discusses the
role for pensions, annuities, and other lifetime income mechanisms in
providing secure, lifetime income streams. Finally, Part V considers some
options for statutory and regulatory changes that would promote greater
annuitization of retirement savings.
***
I.

INTRODUCTION

Longevity risk—the risk of outliving one’s retirement savings—is
probably the greatest risk facing current and future retirees in the United
States.1 At present, for example, a 65-year-old man has a 50 percent chance
See, e.g., Youngkyun Park, Retirement Income Adequacy with Immediate and
Longevity Annuities, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. (Issue Brief No. 357, 2011),
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_05-2011_No357_Annuities.pdf; Peter
Nakada, Chris Breux, Mehrdad Honarkhah, Chris Hornsby, Dean Tolla & Rebecca
Vessenes, The Fundamentals of Longevity Risk, 17 J. ALT. INV. 55 (2014); Diane
Oakley, Retirement Security Risks: What Role can Annuities Play in Easing Risks in
Public Pension Plans?, NAT’L INST. ON RET. SEC. 6 (Issue Brief, Aug. 2015),
http://www.nirsonline.org/storage/nirs/documents/Annuities/annuities_aug_2015.p
1
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of living to age 82 and a 20 percent chance of living to age 89, and a 65-yearold woman has a 50 percent chance of living to age 85 and a 20 percent
chance of living to age 92.2 The joint life expectancy of a 65-year-old couple
is even more remarkable: there is a 50 percent chance that at least one 65year-old spouse will live to age 88 and a 30 percent chance that at least one
will live to 92.3 In short, many individuals and couples will need to plan for
the possibility of retirements that can last for 30 years or more. There were
48.6 million retirees in the United States in 2014, but there are expected to
be 66.4 million retirees in 2025 and 82.1 million in 2040.4
One of the best ways to protect against longevity risk is by securing
a stream of lifetime income with a traditional defined benefit pension plan5
or a lifetime annuity.6 Over the years however, there has been a decided shift
df; The Challenge of Longevity Risk: Making Retirement Income Last a Lifetime,
AUSTL. ACTUARIES INST., INST. AND FACULTY OF ACTUARIES [U.K.], & AM. ACAD.
OF ACTUARIES (Oct. 2015), http://www.actuary.org/files/The-Challenge-ofLongevity-Risk.pdf.
2
Calculations from the Soc’y of Actuaries, Life Expectancy Calculator (last
visited Aug. 2, 2016), https://www.soa.org/Files/Xls/research-life-expect-calc.xls
(based on the Social Security Administration’s 2010 mortality tables for the general
U.S. population; an individual’s life expectancy is the average number of years until
death). See also AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, Risky Business: Living Longer Without
Income for Life 4–8 (Discussion Paper, June 2013), https://www.actuary.org/
files/Risky-Business_Discussion-Paper_June_2013.pdf (showing the probability of
living from age 65 to various ages and discussing various factors that can affect that
probability); SOC. SEC. ADMIN., Retirement & Survivors Benefits: Life Expectancy
Calculator (last visited Mar. 22, 2016), https://www.socialsecurity.gov/
oact/population/longevity.html (a calculator that can be used to estimate individual
and joint life expectancies).
3
Soc’y of Actuaries, Life Expectancy Calculator, supra note 2.
4
Robert A. Kerzner (President and CEO, LIMRA, LOMA, LL Global),
Presentation to Federal Advisory Committee on Insurance 4 (Aug. 2015),
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fio/Documents/LIMRA8.6.15.pdf.
5
As more fully discussed in Part II.C.1.a, infra, in a defined benefit plan, an
employer promises employees a specific “benefit” at retirement. For example, a
traditional defined benefit plan might promise to pay a long-time employee a pension
equal to 60 percent of her final pay for the rest of her life.
6
As more fully discussed in Part II.D.2, infra, an annuity is a financial
instrument (i.e., an insurance contract) that converts a lump sum of money into a
stream of income payable over a period of years, typically for life. See, e.g., U.S.
SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, Annuities, http://www.sec.gov/answers/annuity.htm (last
updated Apr. 6, 2011); Annuities, INVESTOR.GOV, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N,
http://m.investor.gov/investing-basics/investment-products/annuities (last visited

34

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 23

away from traditional pensions and towards 401(k) plans7 and other defined
contribution plans8 that typically distribute benefits in the form of lump sum
distributions rather than as lifetime annuities.9 When given the choice,
people rarely choose to receive annuity distributions,10 nor is it common for
people to buy annuities in the retail annuity market.11 All in all, Americans
will have longer and longer retirements, yet fewer and fewer retirees will
have secure, lifetime income streams.
This Article considers how changes in the laws and regulations
governing pensions and annuities could help promote secure, lifetime
income streams. More specifically, this Article explores how the laws
governing annuities could be changed to make voluntary annuitization more
attractive and how pension laws could be changed to incentivize plan
sponsors to offer more lifetime income options and to encourage plan
participants to select those options.
Part II of this Article provides an overview of Social Security,
pensions, annuities, and other lifetime income mechanisms in the United
States. Next, Part III focuses on the legal rules that govern annuities and
pension distributions, and Part IV discusses the role for pension, annuities,
and other lifetime income mechanisms in providing secure, lifetime income
streams. Finally, Part V considers some options for statutory and regulatory
changes that would promote greater annuitization of retirement savings.

July 19, 2016); American Council of Life Insurers, Glossary (“Annuity”),
https://www.acli.com/Tools/Pages/Glossary.aspx (last visited Mar. 20, 2016); Life
Annuity, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/lifeannuity.asp (last
visited July 19, 2016). The person holding an annuity is called an annuitant. See,
e.g., Annuitant, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/annuitant.asp
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/annuitant.asp (last visited July 19, 2016).
7
As more fully discussed in Part II.C.1.b, infra, 401(k) plans are retirement
savings plans that are authorized by I.R.C. § 401(k) (2014).
8
As more fully discussed in Part II.C.1.b, infra, in a defined contribution plan,
the plan sponsor promises to make a specific “contribution” into an individual
investment account for each employee. For example, an employer might contribute
10 percent of annual compensation each year to each employee’s account, and, at
retirement, each employee would be entitled to a benefit based on all those
contributions plus investment earnings.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
See infra Parts II.D.2 & IV.A.
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AN OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL SECURITY, PENSIONS, AND
OTHER LIFETIME INCOME MECHANISMS IN THE UNITED
STATES

Elderly Americans can generally count on Social Security benefits
to cover at least a portion of their retirement income needs. In addition,
retirees use pensions, annuities, and a variety of other mechanisms to ensure
that they have adequate incomes throughout their retirement years. These are
discussed in turn.
A.

SOCIAL SECURITY

Social Security provides monthly cash benefits to retirees and their
families.12 A worker builds Social Security protection by working in
employment that is covered by Social Security and paying the applicable
payroll taxes. At retirement, disability, or death, monthly benefits are paid to
insured workers and to their eligible dependents and survivors. While “full
retirement age” was once age 65, it is currently age 66, and it is gradually
increasing to age 67 for workers born after 1959 (who reach age 67 in or
after 2027).13 In January of 2016, Social Security paid retirement benefits to
more than 40.2 million retired workers, and the average monthly benefit paid
to a retired worker was $1343.68.14
Social Security retirement benefits are financed primarily through
payroll taxes imposed on individuals working in employment or selfemployment that is covered by the Social Security system.15 Workers over
the age of 62 generally are entitled to Social Security retirement benefits if
See, e.g., HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE, GREEN BOOK:
BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF
THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, Chapter 1: Social Security Introduction and
Overview (2014), http://greenbook.waysandmeans.house.gov/2014-green-book.
13
SOC. SEC. ADMIN., Retirement Planner: Full Retirement Age,
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/retire2/retirechart.htm (last visited July 19, 2016).
14
SOC. SEC. ADMIN., Monthly Statistical Snapshot, January 2016 2 tbl.2,
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/quickfacts/stat_snapshot/2016-01.pdf (last visited
July 19, 2016).
15
For 2017, employees and employers each pay a Social Security payroll tax of
6.2 percent on up to $127,200 of wages, for a combined Old-Age and Survivors and
Disability Insurance (OASDI) rate of 12.4 percent. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 2017 Social
Security Changes, https://www.ssa.gov/news/press/factsheets/colafacts2017.pdf
(last visited Nov. 19, 2016). Self-employed workers pay an equivalent OASDI tax
of 12.4 percent on up to $127,200 of net earnings. Id.
12
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they have worked in covered employment for at least 10 years.16 Benefits are
based on a measure of the worker’s earnings history in covered
employment.17 The benefit formula is highly progressive,18 and, as a result,
the Social Security retirement system favors workers with low lifetime
earnings relative to workers with higher lifetime earnings.19 These
redistributive Social Security retirement benefits play an important role in
reducing poverty among the elderly.20 Roughly two-thirds of aged Social
Security beneficiaries receive at least half of their income from Social
Security.21
42 U.S.C. § 402(a) (2015); 42 U.S.C. § 414(a)(2) (2004).
SOC. SEC. ADMIN., Social Security Benefit Amounts, http://www.ssa.gov/
oact/cola/Benefits.html (last visited July 19, 2016).
18
Benefits for retired workers are based on a measure of the worker’s earnings
history in covered employment known as the “average indexed monthly earnings”
(AIME). Id. The starting point for determining the worker’s AIME is to determine
how much the worker earned each year through age 60. Once those “benefit
computation years” and “covered earnings” for those years have been identified, the
worker’s earnings are indexed for wage inflation, using the year the worker turns 60
to index the earnings of prior years. The highest 35 years of earnings are then
selected, and the other years are dropped out. The AIME is then computed as the
average earnings for the remaining 35 years (420 months). The AIME is then linked
by a progressive formula to the monthly retirement benefit payable to the worker at
full retirement age, a benefit known as the “primary insurance amount” (PIA). For a
worker turning 62 in 2016, the PIA equals 90 percent of the first $856 of the worker’s
AIME, plus 32 percent of the AIME over $856 and through $5157 (if any), plus 15
percent of the AIME over $5157 (if any). Id.; SOC. SEC. ADMIN., Primary Insurance
Amount, http://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/piaformula.html (last visited July 19, 2016).
19
See, e.g., Michael Clingman, Kyle Burkhalter & Chris Chaplain, Money’s
Worth Ratios Under The OASDI Program For Hypothetical Workers, SOC. SEC.
ADMIN., OFF. OF THE CHIEF ACTUARY (Actuarial Note No. 2015.7, Mar. 2016),
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/NOTES/ran7/index.html.
20
See, e.g., Kathleen Romig, Social Security Lifts 21 Million Americans Out of
Poverty, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES (Nov. 9, 2015),
http://www.cbpp.org/blog/social-security-lifts-21-million-americans-out-ofpoverty-0. See also Kathleen Short, The Supplemental Poverty Measure: 2014 9
tbl.4a, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS (Report No. P60-254, Sept. 2015),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/demo/p60254.pdf (showing that with Social Security, just 14.4 percent of elderly Americans
were poor in 2014, but without it 50.0 percent would have been); NAT’L ACAD. OF
SOC. INS., The Role of Benefits in Income and Poverty, https://www.nasi.org/learn/
socialsecurity/benefits-role (last visited July 19, 2016).
21
SOC. SEC. ADMIN., Fast Facts & Figures About Social Security, 2015 ii
(Publication No. 13-11785, Sept. 2015), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/
16
17
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Benefits may be increased or decreased for several reasons. Most
importantly, benefits are indexed each year for inflation as measured by the
consumer price index.22 Also, the “retirement earnings test” can reduce the
monthly benefits of individuals who have not yet reached full retirement age
but who continue to work after starting to draw Social Security retirement
benefits.23
In addition, workers who retire before their full retirement age have
their benefits actuarially reduced.24 On the other hand, benefits payable to
workers who choose to retire after their full retirement age are actuarially
increased (but only up to age 70).25 In effect, beneficiaries can buy additional
annuity protection by delaying retirement.26 For example, consider a worker
who reached age 62 in January 2016 and earned the maximum taxable
amount under Social Security for every year of her working life. If she
claimed her Social Security benefits at 62, she would get a starting benefit
of $2102 per month, but if she instead waited until she is 65 to start drawing
her benefits, she would get $2491 per month, and if she waited until age 70,
she would get $3576 per month—and she could get even more when costof-living increases and extra earnings are factored in.27
In addition to Social Security benefits, a means-tested Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) program provides monthly cash benefits to certain
low-income elderly, disabled, or blind Americans.28 In 2016, the maximum
federal benefit for a single individual is $733 per month, and the maximum

chartbooks/fast_facts/2015/fast_facts15.pdf (64 percent of aged beneficiaries
received at least half of their income from Social Security in 2013).
22
See, e.g., SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 2017 Social Security Changes, supra note 15.
23
42 U.S.C. § 403(f) (2000).
24
42 U.S.C. § 402(q) (2015).
25
42 U.S.C. § 402(w) (2015).
26
See, e.g., Kenn Beam Tacchino, David A. Littell & Bruce D. Schobel, A
Decision Framework for Optimizing the Social Security Claiming Age, 28 BENEFITS
Q. 40 (2012), https://www.iscebs.org/Documents/PDF/bqpublic/bq212f.pdf;
Melissa A. Z. Knoll & Anya Olsen, Incentivizing Delayed Claiming of Social
Security Retirement Benefits Before Reaching the Full Retirement Age, 74 SOC. SEC.
BULL. 21 (2014), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v74n4/v74n4p21.pdf.
27
SOC. SEC. ADMIN., Workers with Maximum-Taxable Earnings,
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/COLA/examplemax.html (last visited July 19, 2016).
28
See, e.g., HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE, GREEN BOOK:
BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF
THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 12, at Chapter 3: Supplemental
Security Income.
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for a couple is $1,100 per month.29 In January of 2016, almost 2.2 million
elderly Americans received SSI benefits from the federal government, and
the average monthly benefit was $434.68.30
B.

A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF RETIREMENT SAVINGS

Before delving into the details of pensions, annuities, and other ways
of providing lifetime retirement income, it is worth taking a brief look at the
magnitude and nature of household retirement savings. According to the
Federal Reserve Board, Americans had $27.3 trillion in household retirement
assets at the end of 2015, including $11.3 trillion in defined benefit plans,
$6.3 trillion in defined contribution plans, $7.4 trillion in individual
retirement accounts (IRAs), and $2.3 trillion in annuities.31 While Americans
can also use their other financial assets, and even their houses,32 to help
provide them with retirement income, the primary focus of this Article is on
the household retirement saving items identified by the Federal Reserve
Board. Of the $8.5 trillion in private-sector pension plans, $3.1 trillion was
held by defined benefit plans, and $5.4 trillion was held by defined
contribution plans.33 On the other hand, of the $5.6 trillion in state and local
pension plans, $5.2 trillion was held by defined benefit plans, and just $478
billion was held by defined contribution plans.34 Similarly, of the $3.8 trillion
SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
SSI
Federal
Payments
for
2016,
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/SSI.html (last visited July 19, 2016).
30
SOC. SEC. ADMIN., Monthly Statistical Snapshot, January 2016, supra note
14, at 3 tbl.3.
31
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF
THE UNITED STATES: FLOW OF FUNDS, BALANCE SHEETS, AND INTEGRATED
MACROECONOMIC ACCOUNTS: FOURTH QUARTER 2015 (Mar. 10, 2016),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1.pdf, at tbl.L.117. See also
INV. CO. INST., Quarterly Retirement Market Data, https://www.ici.org/
research/stats/retirement (last visited July 19, 2016) (providing data on retirement
savings assets in the United States for the most recent quarter). For a discussion of
IRAs, see Part II.C.1.d, infra.
32
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., Frequently Asked Questions
About HUD’s Reverse Mortgages, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/
program_offices/housing/sfh/hecm/rmtopten (last visited July 19, 2016).
33
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF
THE UNITED STATES: FLOW OF FUNDS, BALANCE SHEETS, AND INTEGRATED
MACROECONOMIC ACCOUNTS: FOURTH QUARTER 2015, supra note 31, at
tbls.L.118, L.118.b & L.118.c.
34
Id. at tbls.L.120, L.120.b & L.120.c.
29
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in federal government pension plans, $3.3 trillion was held in defined benefit
plans, and just $430 billion was held in defined contribution plans.35
C.

PENSION PLANS

The United States has a “voluntary” private pension system, and
employers can decide whether and how to provide pension benefits for their
employees.36 However, when employers do provide pensions, those pensions
are typically subject to regulation under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).37 Overall, in March of 2016, 66 percent of
private-sector workers had access to ERISA retirement plans, and 49 percent
of them participated.38
To encourage Americans to save for retirement in our voluntary
pension system, the government relies on two major approaches. First, most
pension plans qualify for favorable tax treatment. Basically, employer
contributions to a pension are not taxable to the employee;39 the pension
fund’s earnings on those contributions are tax-exempt;40 and employees pay
Id. at tbls.L.119, L.119.b & L.119.c. A little bit of caution is warranted here,
as the federal government includes both its funded and unfunded obligations to the
plans as “assets” of the plans. For example, of the $3.8 trillion “held” by federal
pensions, $1.7 trillion is identified as marketable and nonmarketable Treasury
securities, and $1.8 trillion represent claims of the pension funds on the sponsor. Id.
at tbl.L.119.
36
See, e.g., Jonathan Barry Forman & George A. (Sandy) Mackenzie, The Cost
of “Choice” in a Voluntary Pension System, N. Y. U. REV. OF EMP. BENEFITS &
EXEC. COMP. 6-1, 6-4–6-5 (2013).
37
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 864. See generally STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG.,
PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT
SAVING AND CERTAIN RELATED LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS (Comm. Print 2016),
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=download&id=4865&chk=4865&no_
html=1.
38
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Employee Benefits in
the United States—March 2016 5 tbl.1 (New Release No. USDL-16-1493, July 22,
2016), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ebs2.pdf.
39
I.R.C. § 402 (2014).
40
I.R.C. § 501(a) (2015). Most pensions hold assets in a trust. I.R.C. § 401(a)
(2014); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., A Guide to Common Qualified Plan
Requirements,
https://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/A-Guide-to-CommonQualified-Plan-Requirements (last updated June 6, 2016) (“A trust is a medium
under which the retirement plan assets are accumulated. The employer or employees,
or both, contribute to the trust, which forms part of the retirement plan. The assets
35
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tax only when they receive distributions of their pension benefits.41
Nevertheless, the employer is allowed a current deduction for its
contributions (within limits).42 Distributions from a pension plan may
generally be rolled over tax-free to another pension plan or to an IRA. 43
Second, employers and workers are given great flexibility in designing their
pension plans, in making contributions, and in making (or taking)
distributions.44
Despite these retirement savings incentives, pension coverage and
participation rates are low. At any point in time, only about one out of two
American workers have pension plans. For example, of the 157.3 million
Americans workers in 2013, just 80.7 million (51.3 percent) worked for an
employer (or union) that sponsored a retirement plan, and just 64.2 million
(40.8 percent) participated in that plan.45 The probability of pension coverage

are held in the trust until distributed to the employees or their beneficiaries according
to the plan’s provisions.”). In passing, however, it should be noted that so-called
“qualified annuity plans” are invested in annuity contracts rather than held in a trust.
I.R.C. §§ 403(a) (2008), 404(a)(2) (2014); STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION,
114TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX-FAVORED
RETIREMENT SAVING AND CERTAIN RELATED LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, supra note
37, at 18.
41
I.R.C. §§ 72 (2015), 402 (2014). See generally INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
Pension and Annuity Income (Publication No. 575, 2016), http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-pdf/p575.pdf. As distributions are generally taxed at ordinary income tax
rates of up to 39.6 percent, retirement accounts are, in effect, “smaller than they
appear.” Richard L. Kaplan, What Now? A Boomer’s Baedeker for the Distribution
Phase of Defined Contribution Retirement Plans, N.Y.U. REV. OF EMP. BENEFITS &
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 4-1, 4-4 (2013).
42
I.R.C. § 404 (2014).
43
I.R.C. § 402(c) (2014); STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG.,
PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT
SAVING AND CERTAIN RELATED LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, supra note 37, at 21;
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Rollovers of Retirement Plan and IRA Distributions,
https://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/Plan-Participant,-Employee/Rollovers-ofRetirement-Plan-and-IRA-Distributions (last updated Feb. 19, 2016).
44
Forman & Mackenzie, The Cost of “Choice” in a Voluntary Pension System,
supra note 36, at 6−18.
45
Craig Copeland, Employment-Based Retirement Plan Participation:
Geographic Differences and Trends, 2013 9 fig.1, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. (Issue
Brief No. 405, Oct. 2014), https://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_405_
Oct14.RetPart.pdf.
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is greater for older workers, for whites, for highly educated workers, for fulltime workers, for higher-income workers, and for workers at larger firms.46
Participation in IRAs is even lower than participation in pensions.
For example, while 32 percent of U.S. households had an IRA in 2015, only
around 14 percent of households made contributions to their IRAs (in
2014).47
1. Types of Pension Plans
Pension plans generally fall into two broad categories based on the
nature of the benefits provided: defined benefit plans and defined
contribution plans.
a. Defined Benefit Plans
In a defined benefit plan, an employer promises employees a specific
benefit at retirement.48 For example, a plan might provide that a worker’s
annual retirement benefit (B) is equal to 2 percent times the number of years
of service (yos) times final average compensation (fac) (B = 2 percent × yos
× fac). Under this traditional, final-average-pay formula, a worker who
retires after 30 years of service with final average compensation of $50,000
would receive a pension of $30,000 a year for life ($30,000 = 2 percent × 30
yos × $50,000 fac).49
Id. at 10 fig.2.
Sarah Holden & Daniel Schrass, The Role of IRAs in U.S. Households’ Saving
for Retirement, 2015, 22(1) ICI RES. PERSP. 2, 19 (Feb. 2016),
https://www.ici.org/research/retirement. See also Craig Copeland, Individual
Retirement Account Balances, Contributions, and Rollovers, 2013; With
Longitudinal Results 2010–2013: The EBRI IRA Database, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST.
(Issue Brief No. 414, May 2015), https://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/
EBRI_IB_414.May15.IRAs.pdf.
48
STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND
BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT SAVING AND CERTAIN
RELATED LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, supra note 37, at 10–11. To provide that benefit,
the employer typically makes payments into a trust fund, contributed funds grow
with investment returns, and eventually the employer withdraws funds from the trust
fund to pay the promised benefits. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
Employer contributions are based on actuarial valuations, and the employer bears all
of the investment risks and responsibilities.
49
Final average compensation is often computed by averaging the worker’s
salary over the last three or five years prior to retirement. Alternatively, some plans
46
47
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The default benefit for defined benefit plans is a retirement income
stream in the form of an annuity for life.50 While many defined benefit plans
allow for lump sum distributions, most retirees receive lifetime annuities.
According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, 67.8 percent of
workers who left employment and retired with a defined benefit pension
from 2000 through 2006 took the defined benefit plan annuity.51 For married
participants, defined benefit plans (and some defined contribution plans) are
required to provide a qualified joint-and-survivor annuity (QJSA) as the
normal benefit payment, unless the spouse consents to another form of
distribution.52 Defined benefit plans generally cannot make in-service
distributions to a participant before age 62, but they may permit loans to
participants.53
b. Defined Contribution Plans
Under a typical defined contribution plan, the employer simply
withholds a specified percentage of the worker’s compensation, which it
use career-average compensation instead of final-average compensation. Under a
career-average earnings formula, benefits are based on a percentage of an average
of career earnings for every year of service by the employee. See, e.g., William J.
Wiatrowski, The last private industry pension plans: a visual essay, 135(12)
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 13 (2012), http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2012/
12/art1full.pdf; Olivia S. Mitchell, with Erica L. Dykes, New Trends in Pension
Benefit and Retirement Provisions, in BENEFITS FOR THE WORKPLACE OF THE
FUTURE 110 (Olivia S. Mitchell, David S. Blitzstein, Michael Gordon & Judith F.
Mazo, eds.); EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST., Fundamentals Chapter 4 - Pension Plans,
https://www.ebri.org/publications/books/index.cfm?fa=fund04 (last visited July 19,
2016).
50
In the United States, defined benefit plans are generally designed to provide
annuities, i.e., “definitely determinable benefits . . . . over a period of years, usually
for life after retirement.” Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1) (2016).
51
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-400, RETIREMENT INCOME:
ENSURING INCOME THROUGHOUT RETIREMENT REQUIRES DIFFICULT CHOICES 26
(2011), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11400.pdf.
52
ERISA § 205, 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (2014); I.R.C. § 401(a)(11) (2014). A QJSA
is an immediate annuity for the life of the pension plan participant and a survivor
annuity for the life of the participant’s spouse. ERISA § 205(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. §
1055(d)(1) (2014); I.R.C. § 417(b) (2014).
53
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Choosing a Retirement Plan: Defined Benefit
Plan,
https://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/Choosing-a-Retirement-Plan:Defined-Benefit-Plan (last updated Oct. 20, 2015).
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contributes to an individual investment account for the worker.54 For
example, contributions might be set at 10 percent of annual compensation.
Under such a plan, a worker who earned $50,000 in a given year would have
$5,000 contributed to an individual investment account for her ($5,000 = 10
percent × $50,000). Her benefit at retirement would be based on all such
contributions plus investment earnings.55 Many defined contribution plans
also provide for loans to participants,56 and some plans can also provide inservice “hardship” distributions.57
Unlike defined benefit plans, defined contribution plans usually
make distributions as lump sum or periodic distributions rather than as
lifetime annuities.58 Indeed, relatively few defined contribution plans even
offer annuity options, and, in any event, relatively few participants elect

STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND
BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT SAVING AND CERTAIN
RELATED LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, supra note 37, at 10.
55
Defined contribution plans are also known as “individual account” plans
because each worker has her own account, as opposed to defined benefit plans,
where the plan’s assets are pooled for the benefit of all of the employees. ERISA §
3(34), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (2008).
56
I.R.C. § 72(p) (2015); STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG.,
PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT
SAVING AND CERTAIN RELATED LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, supra note 37, at 31–33;
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Retirement Topics - Plan Loans, https://www.irs.gov/
Retirement-Plans/Plan-Participant,-Employee/Retirement-Topics-Loans
(last
updated May 26, 2016); Many Have Access to 401(k) Loans, Few Have Outstanding
Balances, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. (Fast Fact No. 264, Jan. 16, 2014),
https://www.ebri.org/pdf/FF.264.K-loans.16Jan142.pdf (87 percent of participants
in the 2012 EBRI/ICI 401(k) database were in plans offering loans at year-end
2012); see also Jack VanDerhei, Sarah Holden, Luis Alonso, Steven Bass &
AnnMarie Pino, 401(k) Plan Asset Allocation, Account Balances, and Loan Activity
in 2013, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. (Issue Brief No. 408, 2014),
https://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_408_Dec14.401(k)-update.pdf.
57
See, e.g., STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., PRESENT LAW
AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT SAVING AND
CERTAIN RELATED LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, supra note 37, at 31–33.
58
See, e.g., WILLIS TOWERS WATSON, INTERNATIONAL PENSION PLAN SURVEY:
REPORT
2016,
at
14
(2016),
https://www.willistowerswatson.com/
en/insights/2016/02/international-pension-plan-survey-report-2015 (indicating that
lump sums distributions are “by far the most prevalent” form of distribution for
defined contribution plans).
54
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those annuity options.59 There are exceptions like TIAA—which reports that
around 75 percent of its beneficiaries receive annuity payments.60 Also, some
In 2010, just 18 percent of private industry workers in defined contribution
plans had annuities available to them. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., National
Compensation Survey: Health and Retirement Plan Provisions in Private Industry
in the United States, 2010 tbl.21 (Bulletin 2770, 2011), http://www.bls.gov/
ncs/ebs/detailedprovisions/2010/ebbl0047.pdf. See also John E. Foster & David C.
Zook, Selected characteristics of savings and thrift plans for private industry
workers, 4(11) BEYOND THE NUMBERS: PAY & BENEFITS cht.3 (July 2015),
http://www.bls.gov/opub/btn/volume-4/selected-characteristics-of-savings-andthrift-plans-for-private-industry-workers.htm (showing that just 17 percent of
participants in private-sector thrift and savings plans had an annuity option available
in 2012); Annual Defined Contribution Benchmarking Survey Ease of Use Drives
Engagement in Saving for Retirement, 2015 Edition, DELOITTE 32 ex.5.1 (2015),
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/human-capital/ushc-annual-defined-benchmarking-survey-2015.pdf (only 5 percent of 401(k) plan
sponsors included an in-plan retirement income product in the menu of options
presented to participants); Michael J. Brien & Constantijn W.A. Panis, Annuities in
the Context of Defined Contribution Plans 12–14 (Nov. 2011),
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/deloitte2011.pdf (finding that just 6.1 percent of
workers who retire with a defined contribution plan convert their account balance to
an annuity, although additional annuitization probably takes place among those
retirees who roll their defined contribution balances into IRAs); U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-400, RETIREMENT INCOME: ENSURING INCOME
THROUGHOUT RETIREMENT REQUIRES DIFFICULT CHOICES, supra note 51, at 28
(also a 6.1 percent election rate); Lawrence A. Frolik, Rethinking ERISA’s Promise
on Income Security in a World of 401(k) Plans, 20(2) CONN. INS. L.J. 371 (2013–
2014); Carlos Figueiredo & Sandy Mackenzie, Older Americans’ Ambivalence
Toward Annuities: Results of an AARP Survey of Pension Plan and IRA Distribution
Choices, TIAA INST. 6 n.9 (2012), https://www.tiaainstitute.org/public/
pdf/institute/events/pdfs/Older+Americans+Ambivalence+Toward+Annuities.pdf
(noting that the 54th Annual Survey of Profit Sharing and 401(k) Plans carried out
by the Plan Sponsor Council of America found that just 16.6 percent offered
annuities as an option, while 60.2 percent offered periodic withdrawals); JOHN J.
TOPOLESKI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40707, 401(K) PLAN AND RETIREMENT
SAVINGS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 25 (2011), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1785&context=key_workplace (only 21 percent of
401(k) plans offered lifetime annuity options in 2007, and fewer than 10 percent of
participants in those plans chose that annuity option); Paul Yakoboski, Retirees,
Annuitization and Defined Contribution Plans, TIAA-CREF INST. 3, 5 (Apr. 2010),
https://www.tiaa-crefinstitute.org/public/pdf/institute/research/trends_issues/ti_
definedcontribution0410.pdf (finding that only around 19 percent of retirees with
significant defined contribution plan assets but little defined benefit pension income
59
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public sector plans allow their retirees to convert the balances in their defined
contribution plans to annuities.61
In the United States, there are a variety of different types of defined
contribution plans, including money purchase pension plans, target benefit
plans, profit-sharing plans, stock bonus plans, and employee stock

annuitized a portion of their retirement savings); Beverly I. Orth, Approaches for
Promoting Voluntary Annuitization, in 2008 Retirement 20/20 Conference (Society
of Actuaries Monograph No. M-RS08-1, 2009), http://www.soa.org/library/
monographs/retirement-systems/retirement2020/2008/november/mono-2008-mrs08-01-orth.pdf; Michael Hurd & Constantijn Panis, The Choice to Cash Out,
Maintain, or Annuitize Pension Rights upon Job Change or Retirement, 90(12) J. OF
PUB. ECON. 2213 (2006) (finding that just 7 percent of workers who retired from a
job with a defined contribution plan converted their retirement savings into an
annuity).
60
Josh B. McGee, Defined-Contribution Pensions Are Cost Effective, CTR. FOR
ST. AND LOC. LEADERSHIP AT THE MANHATTAN INST. 13, (Aug. 2015),
https://www.manhattan-institute.org/download/6361/article.pdf; Josh B. McGee &
Paul J. Yakoboski, Equivalent Cost for Equivalent Benefits: Primary DC Plans in
the Public Sector, TIAA-CREF INST. 3 (Oct. 2013), http://welcomentsa.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/02/equivalent-cost-for-equivalent-benefits.pdf. See also Paul
J. Yakoboski, How Retirees Manage Retirement Savings for Retirement Income?: A
Survey of TIAA-CREF Participants,
TIAA-CREF INST. (Oct. 2015),
https://www.tiaainstitute.org/public/pdf/How_Retirees_Manage_Savings_for_Inco
me_Data_Summary_FINAL.pdf (attitude survey); Yakoboski, Retirees,
Annuitization and Defined Contribution Plans, supra note 59; Paul J. Yakoboski,
Converting Assets to Income in Retirement: What Near-Retirees Are Thinking,
TIAA-CREF INST. (Oct. 2009), https://www.tiaainstitute.org/public/pdf/
institute/research/trends_issues/ti_convertingassets1009.pdf (attitude survey);
Teresa Hassara, The 403(b) lifetime income lesson for 401(k) plans, PENSIONS &
INVESTMENTS (Nov. 30, 2015), http://www.pionline.com/article/20151130/PRINT/
311309998/the-403b-lifetime-income-lesson-for-401k-plans; David P. Richardson,
How do TIAA-CREF Participants Annuitize?, INT’L CTR. FOR PENSION MGMT.
DISCUSSION F. (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.icpmnetwork.com/wp-content/
uploads/2016/04/David_P_Richardson_TIAA-CREF_ICPM_October_2013.pdf.
61
See, e.g., Diane Oakley & Jennifer Erin Brown, Preserving Retirement
Income Security for Public Sector Employees 14, NAT’L INST. ON RET. SEC. (July
2016),
http://www.nirsonline.org/storage/nirs/documents/Portability%20Report/
preserving_security_public_sector_web.pdf (noting that the Colorado Public
Employees’ Retirement Association allows retirees to convert their defined
contribution account balances into annuities “at the PERA assumed rate of return,
which is less costly than purchasing an annuity from an insurance company”).
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ownership plans (“ESOPs”).62 Of particular importance, profit-sharing and
stock bonus plans often include a feature that allows workers to choose
between receiving cash currently or deferring taxation by placing the money
in a retirement account according to Internal Revenue Code Section 401(k).
Consequently, these plans are usually called “401(k) plans,” and they are the
most popular type of retirement plan in the United States.63 The maximum
annual amount of such elective deferrals that can be made by an individual
in 2017 is $18,000, although workers over the age of 50 can contribute
another $6,000 (for a total of up to $24,000).64 Also, since 2006, employers
have been permitted to set up Roth 401(k) plans.65 Section 401(k) plans may
be designed so that the employee automatically makes elective deferrals at a
specified rate unless the employee elects otherwise.66 Such automatic
enrollment features can lead to higher participation rates, and automatically
escalating the participants’ levels of contributions can lead to even greater
retirement savings.67 In passing, it should be noted that 401(k)-type rules also
62
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., Six Ways to Save
for
Retirement,
3(3)
PROGRAM
PERSPECTIVES
1,
2
(2011),
http://www.bls.gov/opub/perspectives/program_perspectives_vol3_issue3.pdf. A
money purchase pension plan is a defined contribution plans that requires fixed
annual contributions from the employer to the employee’s individual account. See,
e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., What You Should Know
About Your Retirement Plan 18, 36 (2013), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/
wyskgreenbook.pdf.
63
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., BLS examines
popular 401(k) retirement plans, 2(6) PROGRAM PERSPECTIVES 1 (Nov. 2010),
http://www.bls.gov/opub/perspectives/program_perspectives_vol2_issue6.pdf; see
infra notes 114-116 and accompanying text.
64
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRS Announces 2017 Pension Plan Limitations;
401(k) Contribution Limit Remains Unchanged at $18,000 for 2017 (IR-2016-141,
Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/uac/newsroom/irs-announces-2017-pensionplan-limitations-401k-contribution-limit-remains-unchanged-at-18000-for-2017.
65
I.R.C. § 402A (2014). Contributions to these plans are not excludable, but
neither the plan’s investment returns nor distributions are taxable.
66
See, e.g., STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., PRESENT LAW
AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT SAVING AND
CERTAIN RELATED LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, supra note 37, at 25–26.
67
See, e.g., OECD, OECD Pensions Outlook 2012 45–76 (2012),
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/oecd-pensions-outlook2012_9789264169401-en; Jack VanDerhei, Increasing Default Deferral Rates in
Automatic Enrollment 401(k) Plans: The Impact on Retirement Savings Success in
Plans with Automatic Escalation, 33(9) EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. NOTES 12 (2012);
Richard H. Thaler & Schlomo Bernartzi, The Behavioral Economics of Retirement
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apply to so-called “403(b) plans” that are used by many tax-exempt
organizations and public schools (including colleges and universities).68
c. Hybrid Retirement Plans
So-called “hybrid” retirement plans mix the features of defined
benefit and defined contribution plans. For example, a cash balance plan is a
defined benefit plan that looks like a defined contribution plan.69
d. Individual Retirement Accounts
Favorable tax rules are also available for individual retirement
accounts (IRAs).70 Almost any worker can set up an IRA with a bank or other
financial institution. In 2017, individuals without pension plans can
contribute and deduct up to $5,500 to an IRA, although individuals over age
50 can contribute and deduct another $1,000 (for a total of up to $6,500); and

Savings Behavior, AARP PUB. POL’Y INST. (Research Report No. 2007-02, 2007),
http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/econ/2007_02_savings.pdf. Of note, the Pension
Protection Act of 2006 made it easier for employers to include automatic enrollment
features in pension plans. Pension Protection Act of 2006 § 902, Public Law No.
109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (adding I.R.C. §§ 401(k)(13), 401(m)(12) & 414(w)).
68
I.R.C § 403(b) (2008); STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG.,
PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT
SAVING AND CERTAIN RELATED LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, supra note 37, at 18–21
(also discussing so-called “457(b) plans” used by State and local government and
tax-exempt employers).
69
See, e.g., Jonathan Barry Forman & Amy Nixon, Cash Balance Pension Plan
Conversions, 25(1&2) OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 379 (2000). Like other defined benefit
plans, employer contributions are based on actuarial valuations, and the employer
bears all of the investment risks and responsibilities. Like defined contribution plans,
however, cash balance plans provide workers with individual accounts (albeit
hypothetical). A simple cash balance plan might allocate 10 percent of salary to each
worker’s account each year and credit the account with 5 percent interest on the
balance in the account. Under such a plan, a worker who earned $50,000 in a given
year would get an annual cash balance credit of $5,000 ($5,000 = 10 percent ×
$50,000), plus an interest credit equal to 5 percent of the balance in her hypothetical
account as of the beginning of the year.
70
I.R.C. § 219 (2014); STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG.,
PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT
SAVING AND CERTAIN RELATED LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, supra note 37, at 36–39.
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spouses can contribute and deduct similar amounts.71 If a worker is covered
by another retirement plan, however, the deduction may be reduced or
eliminated in 2017 if the worker’s income exceeds $62,000 for a single
individual or $99,000 for a married couple.72 Like private pensions, IRA
earnings are tax-exempt, and distributions are taxable.73
Also, since 1998, individuals have been permitted to set up Roth
IRAs.74 Unlike regular IRAs, contributions to Roth IRAs are not deductible.
Instead, withdrawals are tax-free.75 Like regular IRAs, however, Roth IRA
earnings are tax-exempt.76
These days, rollovers from pension plans account for most of the
balances in IRAs. For example, according to one recent study, 14.5 times as
many dollars added to IRAs in 2013 came from rollovers than came from
contributions.77 Another recent study found that the majority (62 percent) of
recent retirees with at least $75,000 in a defined contribution plan at
retirement moved their assets out of those plans, and the overwhelming
majority of them rolled their money into an IRA.78

INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRS Announces 2017 Pension Plan Limitations;
401(k) Contribution Limit Remains Unchanged at $18,000 for 2017, supra note 64.
72
Id.
73
I.R.C. § 408 (2015). Also, so-called “Keogh plans” give self-employed
workers an ability to save for retirement that is similar to plans that employers
sponsor, and Keogh plans allow self-employed workers to contribute more than they
could otherwise contribute to a regular IRA. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Retirement
Plans for Small Business (SEP, Simple, and Qualified Plans) 2, 12 (Publication No.
560, Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p560.pdf.
74
I.R.C. § 408A (2010).
75
STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND
BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT SAVING AND CERTAIN
RELATED LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, supra note 37, at 38–39.
76
Id.
77
Copeland, Individual Retirement Account Balances, Contributions, and
Rollovers, 2013; With Longitudinal Results 2010–2013: The EBRI IRA Database,
supra note 47, at 11.
78
American College of Financial Services, The American College Defined
Contribution Rollover Survey 7, 24 (Jan. 2016), http://retirement.theamerican
college.edu/sites/amcol-nylcri/files/IRA_Rollover_ Research.pdf (online survey
conducted by Greenwald & Associates on behalf of The American College’s New
York Life Center for Retirement Income).
71

2016

LIFETIME ANNUITIES IN PENSION PLANS

49

As more fully discussed in Part III.D below, individuals can use their
IRAs to buy annuities, although data limitations make it hard to get an
accurate estimate of how often that happens.79
e. Other Tax Benefits for Retirement Savings
Also, since 2002, certain low- and moderate-income individuals
have been able to claim a saver’s tax credit of up to $1000 for certain
qualified retirement savings contributions.80 Finally, qualified small firms
may claim a nonrefundable tax credit of up to $500 for certain costs incurred
in setting up a new retirement plan for employees (“start-up credit”).81
2. The Regulation of Employment-based Plans
Since it was enacted more than 40 years ago, the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) has been amended numerous
times, and a whole regulatory system has grown up to enforce its provisions.
The key agencies charged with the administration of ERISA are the U.S.
Department of Labor, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC).82
Brien & Panis, Annuities in the Context of Defined Contribution Plans, supra
note 59, at 14.
80
I.R.C. § 25B (2013); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Retirement Savings
Contributions Credit (Saver’s Credit), https://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/PlanParticipant,-Employee/Retirement-Savings-Contributions-Savers-Credit
(last
updated Feb. 22, 2016). The credit equals a percentage (50 percent, 20 percent, or
10 percent) of up to $2,000 of contributions. In effect, the credit acts like an
employer match: the government matches a portion of the employee’s contributions.
Employer matches encourage workers to contribute, at least up to the match level,
and the saver’s tax credit seems to have similar pro-savings effects. See, e.g., Lisa
Southwirth & John Gist, The Saver’s Credit: What Does It Do For Saving?, AARP
PUB. POL’Y INST. (Insight on the Issues Paper, 2008), http://assets.aarp.org/
rgcenter/econ/i1_credit.pdf.
81
I.R.C. § 45E (2002); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Retirement Plans Startup
Costs Tax Credit, https://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/Retirement-Plans-StartupCosts-Tax-Credit (last updated Aug. 18, 2015). The credit is equal to 50 percent of
up to $1,000 in eligible costs incurred in each of the first three years of the plan’s
existence.
82
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., About the Employee
Benefits Security Administration, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/aboutebsa/main.html
(last visited July 19, 2016); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Tax Information for
79
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Pension plans must be operated for the exclusive benefit of
employees (and beneficiaries).83 To protect the interests of plan participants,
ERISA requires significant reporting and disclosure in the administration
and operation of employee benefit plans.84 ERISA also imposes extensive
fiduciary responsibilities on plan sponsors and the administrators of
employee benefit plans.85
In general, a fiduciary includes any person who: (1) exercises any
authority or control respecting management or disposition of the plan’s
assets; (2) renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation with
respect to any plan moneys or property, or has the authority or responsibility
to do so; or (3) has any discretionary authority or responsibility in the
administration of the plan.86 When acting as a fiduciary, the plan sponsor
must:
(1) operate solely in the best interest of the participants and
beneficiaries and with the exclusive purpose of
providing benefits to them;
(2) carry out its duties prudently;
(3) follow the plan documents (unless inconsistent with
ERISA); and
(4) diversify the plan’s investments; and pay only
reasonable plan expenses.87

Retirement Plans, http://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans (last visited July 19, 2016);
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, About PBGC, http://www.pbgc.gov/about
(last visited July 19, 2016).
83
ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (2008); I.R.C. § 401(a)
(2014).
84
ERISA §§ 101(a) et seq., 29 U.S.C. §1021 et seq. (2015). See also U.S. DEP’T
OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., Reporting and Disclosure Guide for
Employee Benefit Plans (Sept. 2014), https://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/rdguide.pdf.
85
ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2008); I.R.C. § 401(a) (2014).
86
ERISA § 3(21), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (2008).
87
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., Meeting Your
Fiduciary
Responsibilities
2
(2012),
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/
meetingyourfiduciaryresponsibilities.pdf (explaining to employers how to
administer their retirement plans).
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The fiduciary duty under ERISA is the “highest duty known to the law,”88
and fiduciary “decisions must be made with an eye single to the interests of
the participants and beneficiaries.”89
Of note, the U.S. Department of Labor recently extended the
definition of a fiduciary to virtually all retirement advisers who receive
compensation for providing investment advice to plan sponsors, plan
participants, or IRA owners.90 The new fiduciary conflict-of-interest rule will
apply to those who sell annuities to pension plans and IRAs.91
In addition to the fiduciary responsibility rules, so-called “prohibited
transaction” rules prevent parties in interest from engaging in certain
transactions with the plan.92 ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code impose
many other requirements on retirement plans, including rules governing
participation,93 coverage,94 vesting,95 benefit accrual,96 contribution and

Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 272 n.8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1069 (1982).
89
Id. at 680 F.2d at 271.
90
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., Conflict of
Interest Final Rule, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/conflictsofinterest.html (last
visited July 19, 2016); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN.,
Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule-Retirement Investment
Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,945 (Apr. 8, 2016), http://webapps.dol.gov/
FederalRegister/PdfDisplay.aspx?DocId=28806.
91
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., Amendment to and
Partial Revocation of Prohibited Transaction Exemption (PTE) 84-24 for Certain
Transactions Involving Insurance Agents and Brokers, Pension Consultants,
Insurance Companies, and Investment Company Principal Underwriters, 81 Fed.
Reg. 21,147 (Apr. 8, 2016), http://webapps.dol.gov/FederalRegister/
PdfDisplay.aspx?DocId=28810. See also David C. Kaleda, Department of Labor’s
Final “Investment Advice” Regulation and Its Impact on the Retail Investor
Marketplace, 23(7) THE INV. LAW. 1 (July 2016), http://www.groom.com/
media/publication/1719_DOL_Final_Investment_Advice_Regulation_and_Its_Imp
act_on_the_Retail_Investor_Marketplace.pdf; Scott Stolz, How Annuities Will Be
Transformed by DOL Fiduciary Rule, THINKADVISOR (Feb. 1, 2016),
http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2016/02/01/how-annuities-will-be-transformed-bydol-fiduciary.
92
ERISA § 406, 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (1974); I.R.C. § 4975 (2008). For example,
an employer usually cannot sell, exchange, or lease any property to the plan.
93
I.R.C. § 410(a) (2006); ERISA § 202, 29 U.S.C. § 1052 (1989).
94
I.R.C. § 410(b) (2006).
95
I.R.C. § 411(a) (2011); ERISA § 203, 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (2010).
96
I.R.C. § 411(b) (2011); ERISA § 204, 29 U.S.C. § 1054 (2014).
88
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benefits,97 nondiscrimination,98 and funding.99 Also, distributions made
before age 59½ are subject to an additional 10-percent early distribution
penalty unless an exception applies;100 and required minimum distribution
(RMD) rules generally require plan participants to begin taking distributions
soon after they reach age 70½.101
In addition to meeting their funding obligations, defined benefit
plans in the private sector must also pay premiums to the PBGC for plan
termination insurance.102 In the event that an underfunded, private-sector
I.R.C. § 415 (2012).
I.R.C. § 401(a)(4) (2011).
99
I.R.C. § 412 (2016); ERISA § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 1082 (2011). While plan
sponsors are supposed to fully fund their defined benefit plans, for a variety of
reasons, plans can become underfunded. When a private sector defined benefit plans
becomes underfunded, the funding rules generally require them to make up that
shortfall by making level installment payments amortized over seven years. As
ERISA does not apply to governmental plans, however, many such plans are
underfunded. ERISA § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (2012); Alicia H. Munnell, Jean-Pierre
Aubry & Mark Cafarelli, How Did State/Local Plans Become Underfunded?, B.C.
CTR. FOR RET. RES. (State and Local Pension Plans Issue in Brief No. 42, Jan. 2015),
http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/slp_42.pdf.
100
I.R.C. § 72(t) (2012); STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG.,
PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT
SAVING AND CERTAIN RELATED LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, supra note 37, at 43.
101
I.R.C. § 401(a)(9) (2011); STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH
CONG., PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX-FAVORED
RETIREMENT SAVING AND CERTAIN RELATED LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, supra note
37, at 43–47. More specifically, distributions typically must begin no later than April
1 of the calendar year following the calendar year in which the employee attains age
70½. Distributions after the death of a plan participant must also meet certain
minimum distribution requirements. An exception allows older workers with a
pension plan from their current employer to delay distributions until they retire, but
workers with pensions from prior employers and IRA holders must begin taking
distributions from those plans soon after they reach age 70 ½). I.R.C. § 401(a)(9)
(2011). Failure to take the required minimum distribution can result in a 50 percent
excise tax penalty on the excess of the amount required to have been distributed over
the amount that actually was distributed. I.R.C. § 4974 (2007). In addition, a plan
that fails to make the required minimum distributions can be disqualified. INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., Fixing Common Plan Mistakes - Failure to Timely Start Minimum
Distributions, https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/plan-sponsor/fixing-commonplan-mistakes-failure-to-timely- start-minimum-distributions (last updated Jan. 22,
2016).
102
ERISA § 4006, 29 U.S.C. § 1306 (2012); PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP.,
Premium Rates,
97
98
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defined benefit plan terminates (for example, because the employer goes out
of business), the PBGC will pay annual pension benefits of up to $64,432
per participant in 2017 ( $5,369.32 per month).103 The PBGC insures the
benefits of more than 40 million workers and retirees, and it pays benefits to
nearly 840,000 people each month.104
Federal laws outside of ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code can
also impose limits on pension plans. For example, even though women tend
to live longer than men,105 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 bars
pension plans from requiring higher contributions from women than men or
paying women lower benefits than men.106
3. The Shift from Defined Benefit Plans to Defined
Contribution Plans
Over the past few decades, there has been a major shift from
traditional defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans.107 As already
http://www.pbgc.gov/prac/prem/premium-rates.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2016).
103
PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., PBGC Guarantee Limit for SingleEmployer Plans Increases for 2017 (Oct. 28, 2016), http://pbgc.gov/news/press/
releases/ pr16-16.html; PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., Maximum Monthly
Guarantee Tables, http://www.pbgc.gov/wr/benefits/guaranteed-benefits/maximum
-guarantee.html#2017 (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) (noting that the guarantee is lower
for those who retire early or when there is a benefit for a survivor. The guarantee is
increased for those who retire after age 65).
104
2016 ANNUAL REPORT: PRESERVING AND PROTECTING PENSIONS ii, iii
(2016), http://www.pbgc.gov/Documents/2016-annual-report.pdf.
105
See, e.g., supra note 2 and accompanying text.
106
42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2 (2012); Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred
Annuity & Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1074–75 (1983) (per
curiam) (finding that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer
from paying lower monthly retirement benefits to a woman than to a man who has
made the same contributions); City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435
U.S. 702, 711 (1978) (finding that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
an employer from requiring female employees to make larger contributions to its
pension plan than male employees because of mortality table differentials between
the sexes).
107
See, e.g., STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., PRESENT
LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT SAVING AND
CERTAIN RELATED LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, supra note 37, at 56, 57 fig.2. See also
William J. Wiatrowski, Changing Landscape of Employment-based Retirement
Benefits, COMP. AND WORKING CONDITIONS ONLINE (U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau
of Labor Statistics, Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/cwc/changing-
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mentioned, 66 percent of private-sector workers had access to ERISA
retirement plans in 2016, and 49 percent of them participated;108 but defined
contribution plans have come to dominate the pension landscape.109 For
example, just 20 percent of Fortune 500 companies offered salaried
employees a defined benefit plan in 2015, down from 59 percent in 1998.110
According to the most recent complete data from the U.S.
Department of Labor, there were 681,000 ERISA-covered private pension
plans in the United States in 2013.111 Of these ERISA-covered plans, just
44,163 were defined benefit plans, and these defined benefit plans had a total
of $2.9 trillion in assets.112 These defined benefit plans had 39.1 million
participants but just 15.2 million of those were active participants (i.e.,
current employees as opposed to retirees and other separated participants).113
On the other hand, there were 636,991 defined contribution plans in
2013, and these had a total of $5.0 trillion in assets.114 These defined
contribution plans had 92.5 million participants, including 76.7 million
active participants.115 Of these defined contribution plans, 527,000 were
401(k)-type plans.116
As more fully explained in Part III.E below, the current movement
away from defined benefit plans in the private sector is known as “derisking.” All in all, the era of the traditional defined benefit plan in the private
sector is largely behind us.117
landscape-of-employment-based-retirement-benefits.pdf; Wiatrowski, The last
private industry pension plans: a visual essay, supra note 49, at 3.
108
See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
109
See, e.g., STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., PRESENT
LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT SAVING AND
CERTAIN RELATED LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, supra note 37, at 54–57.
110
Brendan McFarland, A Continuing Shift in Retirement Offerings in the
Fortune 500, 26(2) WILLIS TOWERS WATSON INSIDER 1 (Feb. 2016),
https://www.towerswatson.com/DownloadMedia.aspx?media={E60DA978-55D44332-AEAC-C2CBC8A0BD9B}.
111
U.S. DEP’T of LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., DOL-OPS-14-D-0017,
PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN (2015), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/
2013pensionplanbulletin.pdf.
112
Id. at 3 tbl.A1.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 1, 2.
117
See, e.g., GEORGE A. MACKENZIE, THE DECLINE OF THE TRADITIONAL
PENSION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THREATS TO RETIREMENT SECURITY (2010);
Barbara A. Butrica, Howard M. Iams, Karen E. Smith & Eric J. Toder, The
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There has also been a shift from defined benefit plans to defined
contribution plans in the public sector. For example, in 1986, the federal
government replaced much of its traditional defined benefit plan for civilian
employees with the “Thrift Savings” defined contribution plan.118 The shift
from defined benefit to defined contribution plans among state and local
governments has been more modest.119
D.

OTHER SOURCES OF LIFETIME INCOME

In addition to voluntary saving through 401(k) elections and IRAs,
individuals can also save money outside of the retirement system. Investment
income is generally subject to federal income tax rates of up to 39.6 percent
in 2017;120 however, capital gains and dividends are generally taxed at a
preferential tax rate of 0, 15, or 20 percent, depending on the income tax rate
that would be assessed on the same amount of ordinary income.121 Also, there
Disappearing Defined Benefit Pension and Its Potential Impact on the Retirement
Incomes of Baby Boomers, 69(3) SOC. SEC. BULL. 2 (2009); Janice Kay McClendon,
The Death Knell of Traditional Defined Benefit Plans: Avoiding a Race to the 401(k)
Bottom, 80(3) TEMP. L. REV. 809 (2007); EDWARD A. ZELINSKY, THE ORIGINS OF
THE OWNERSHIP SOCIETY: HOW THE DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PARADIGM CHANGED
AMERICA (2004); Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114(3)
YALE L.J. 451 (2004).
118
See, e.g., Wilmer L. Kerns, Federal Employees’ Retirement System Act of
1986, 49(11) SOC. SEC. BULL. 5 (Nov. 1986), https://www.ssa.gov/
policy/docs/ssb/v49n11/v49n11p5.pdf; OFF. OF PERSONNEL MGMT., FERS
Information,
https://www.opm.gov/retirement-services/fersinformation/
(explaining that the Federal Employees Retirement System [FERS] provides
benefits from a basic defined benefit plan, Social Security, and the Thrift Savings
defined contribution plan). See also KATELIN P. ISAACS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL30387, FEDERAL EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM: THE ROLE OF THE THRIFT
SAVINGS PLAN (2015), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/ misc/RL30387.pdf.
119
See, e.g., Alicia H. Munnell, Jean-Pierre Aubry & Mark Cafarelli, Defined
Contribution Plans in the Public Sector: An Update, CTR. FOR STATE & LOCAL GOV’T
EXCELLENCE
(Issue
Brief,
Apr.
2014),
http://www.nasra.org/files/
Topical%20Reports/Plan%20Design/Defined_Contribution_Plans_An_Update.pdf.
120
I.R.C. § 1 (1985); Rev. Proc. 2016-55, 2016-45 I.R.B. 707.
121
I.R.C. § 1(h) (1985); STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG.,
OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AS IN EFFECT FOR 2016 6 (Comm. Print
2016) (“For 2016, the maximum rate of tax on the adjusted net capital gain of an
individual is 20 percent on any amount of gain that otherwise would be taxed at a
39.6-percent rate. In addition, any adjusted net capital gain otherwise taxed at a 10or 15-percent rate is taxed at a zero-percent rate. Adjusted net capital gain otherwise
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are various tax advantages associated with investments in homes,122 state and
local bonds,123 annuities,124 and life insurance.125 This subpart focuses on two
ways that individuals commonly generate lifetime income: 1) systematic
withdrawals from an investment portfolio; and 2) annuities.
1. Phased Withdrawals
One of the simplest and most common strategies for managing
retirement savings is to invest all of the retirement savings in a diversified
portfolio and then use a conservative withdrawal rate and a systematic
withdrawal plan (SWP) designed to have a high probability that the
retirement savings will last for 20 or 30 years.126 This phased withdrawal
strategy can be used with free-standing retirement savings or with retirement
savings in defined contribution plans, IRAs, and those defined benefit plans
that permit periodic withdrawals.
In that regard, financial planners often suggest following the socalled “4 percent rule.127 The basic idea is to set spending at 4 percent of
taxed at rates greater than 15 percent but less than 39.6 percent is taxed at a 15percent rate. These rates apply for purposes of both the regular tax and the alternative
minimum tax. Dividends are generally taxed at the same rate as capital gains.”). In
addition, there is also a 3.8 percent surcharge on the net investment income of certain
individuals with incomes over $200,000, which includes capital gains, dividends,
and other investment income such as rents). I.R.C. § 1411 (2012). Gains on
investments are typically taxed only when they are realized at a sale or exchange.
I.R.C. §§ 61, 1001 (2012).
122
I.R.C. §§ 163(a), 121 (2012) (for example, home mortgage interest is
generally deductible, and gains from the sale of a personal residence are often
excludable).
123
I.R.C. § 103 (2012) (interest exclusion).
124
See I.R.C. § 72 (2012). The individual can exclude a fraction of each annuity
payment from income. That fraction (the “exclusion ratio”) is based on the amount
of premiums or other after-tax contributions made by the individual. The exclusion
ratio enables the individual to recover her own after-tax contributions tax free and
to pay tax only on the remaining portion of benefits which represents income. The
net effect is a deferral of taxation.
125
I.R.C. § 101(a) (2012) (exclusion for insurance proceeds paid by reason of
the death of the insured).
126
See, e.g., Jonathan Barry Forman & Michael J. Sabin, Tontine Pensions,
163(3) U. PA. L. REV. 757, 770–771 (2015).
127
See William P. Bengen, Determining Withdrawal Rates Using Historical
Data, J. OF FIN. PLAN., Oct. 1994, 171, 174–175 (explaining, using historical data,
why retirees should withdraw no more than 4 percent of their retirement savings
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retirement savings and invest those savings in a 50-percent-stock-50percent-bond portfolio.128 Each year thereafter, spending is increased to keep
up with inflation. For example, assuming that an individual has a $1,000,000
nest egg, in the first year of retirement, she would withdraw 4 percent
($40,000), and each year thereafter that dollar amount would increase to keep
up with inflation.129 Assuming a 3 percent annual inflation rate, annual
withdrawals would increase to $41,200 in the second year, $42,436 in the
third year, and so on. While there is a possibility of running out of money
before death, many financial planners believe this strategy can usually work
for 30 years. To minimize the prospect of outliving one’s nest egg in the
recent economic recession, however, some financial advisers advised
retirees to skip their scheduled inflation adjustments or to withdraw less than
4 percent of their new balances.130

each year); see also JANEMARIE MULVEY & PATRICK PURCELL, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RL40008, CONVERTING RETIREMENT SAVINGS INTO INCOME: ANNUITIES
AND PERIODIC WITHDRAWALS 17 (2008), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1571&context=key_workplace (“[A] large body of
research on safe withdrawal rates for individuals has determined that a real
withdrawal rate in the neighborhood of 4 percent of the initial portfolio has a low
chance of running out of money.” [internal quotation marks omitted]); Benjamin
Bridges, Robert Gesumaria & Michael V. Leonesio, Assessing the Performance of
Life-Cycle Portfolio Allocation Strategies for Retirement Saving: A Simulation
Study, 70(1) SOC. SEC. BULL., 23 (2010) (examining the performance of life-cycle
portfolio allocation strategies with varying exposure to stock and bond market risk
based on observed historical U.S. asset returns); Joseph A. Tomlinson, ManagedPayout Funds vs. Annuities: Who Wins?, RET. INCOME J. (Sept. 10, 2015),
http://retirementincomejournal.com/issue/march-3-2016/article/ managed-payoutfunds-vs-annuities-who-wins.
128
Bengen, Determining Withdrawal Rates Using Historical Data, supra note
127, at 175.
129
See Eleanor Laise, A Strategy for a Lifetime of Income, KIPLINGER (Aug. 17,
2011), http://www.kiplinger.com/features/archives/krr-a-strategy-for-a-lifetime-ofincome.html.
130
Id.; see also R. Evan Inglis, The “Feel Free” Retirement Spending Strategy,
in Soc’y of Actuaries, Diverse Risks: 2016 Call for Essays 4 (Apr. 2016),
https://www.soa.org/Library/Essays/2016/diverse-risk/2016-diverse-risksessay.pdf (suggesting that a safe percentage of savings to spend should be
determined by dividing your age by 20; for example, someone who is 70 years-old
could safely spend 3.5 percent of their savings [3.5 = 70/20]); Michael Finke, Wade
D. Pfau & David M. Blanchett, The 4 Percent Rule is Not Safe in a Low-Yield World
(2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2201323; Dirk Cotton, Retirement Savings and
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Another simple withdrawal strategy is for a retiree to base
withdrawals on the retiree’s life expectancy (e). Under the simplest
approach, each year the retiree would withdraw one over her life expectancy
(i.e., 1/e), but then about half of retirees would run out of money.131 A better
approach would be to recalculate the retiree’s life expectancy each year. For
example, a 65-year-old man with a $1-million nest egg and a 17.75 year life
expectancy would withdraw around $56,300 in his first year of retirement
($56,300 = $1,000,000 × 1/17.75 [5.63 percent]).132 If he lives ten years to
age 75, his life expectancy would then be around 11.03 (not 7.75 = 17.75 –
10.00),133 and, accordingly, he would then withdraw just 9.07 percent (9.07
= 1/11.03) of the balance in his retirement savings account. There is still a
sizable chance of outliving his nest egg, but recalculating his life expectancy
makes that risk less likely.
In passing, it should be noted that many pensions and IRAs already
make distributions based on life expectancy. In that regard, the required
minimum distribution rules require that most retirement plan participants
start receiving minimum distributions soon after they reach age 70½, and
these distributions are based on life expectancy.134 In effect, the required
minimum distribution rule is the default distribution rule for many pension

Annual Spending, THE RET. CAFE (Mar. 7, 2016), http://www.theretirement
cafe.com/2016/03/retirement-savings-and-annual-spending.html.
131
See, e.g., AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, Risky Business: Living Longer Without
Income for Life: Information for Current and Future Retirees 1 (Oct. 2015),
http://actuary.org/files/ Retiree_PreRetirees_IB_102215.pdf.
132
See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., Period Life Table, 2013, http://www.ssa.gov/oact/
STATS/table4c6.html (last visited July 19, 2016) (According to the Social Security
Administration, a 65-year- old male in the Social Security area population had a life
expectancy of 17.75 years in 2013.). 0.056338 = 1/17.75.
133
Id. (0.090661 = 1/11.03.)
134
See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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plans and IRAs.135 For example, TIAA has been offering a so-called
“Minimum Distribution Option” since 1991.136
2. Lifetime Annuities and Deferred Income Annuities
Annuities are another common way to provide lifetime income, 137
and, in general, most analysts believe that lifetime annuities offer better
lifetime income security than systematic withdrawals.138 While the market
for annuities is well-developed in the United States, the penetration rate is
fairly low—just 8 percent of retirement assets in 2015—and declining in
recent years.139
See, e.g., Wei Sun & Anthony Webb, Can Retirees Base Wealth Withdrawals
on the IRS’ Required Minimum Distributions?, B.C. CTR. FOR RET. RES. (Issue in
Brief No. 12-19, Oct. 2012), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/IB_1219-508.pdf; John Ameriks, How do Retirees Go from Stock to Flow?, in PENSION
DESIGN AND STRUCTURE: NEW LESSONS FROM BEHAVIORAL FINANCE Chapter 13
(Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen P. Utkus eds., 2004); Steve Vernon, Retirement
Income in DC Plans: The Next Evolution in Plan Design, BENEFITS MAG. 14, 18
(Nov. 2014), http://longevity3.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/BenefitsMag-Vernon-November-2014- copy.pdf.
136
Ameriks, How do Retirees Go from Stock to Flow?, supra note 135; TIAACREF Financial Services, Minimum Distribution, http://www1.tiaa-cref.org/public/
support/forms/topics/Minimum_Distribution.html (last visited July 19, 2016).
137
See, e.g., Farrell Dolan, Applying the 4-Box Strategy to Retirement Income
Planning: Generating a Lifetime of Income, LIMRA’S MARKET-FACTS Q. 84, 88
(Fall 2009), http://pjwalkercommunications.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/
Market-Facts.pdf; Darla Mercado, Making the case for annuities,
INVESTMENTNEWS (Mar. 25, 2012), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/
20120325/REG/303259969&issuedate=20120323&sid=RI0326.
138
See, e.g., Mark Warshawsky, Distribution Methods for Assets in Individual
Accounts for Retirees: Life Income Annuities and Withdrawal Rates, 3(2) J. OF RET.
105 (Fall 2015); but see Michael E. Kitces & Wade D. Pfau, The True Impact of
Immediate Annuities on Retirement Sustainability: A Total Wealth Perspective (July
15, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2296867 (suggesting that immediate annuities
should only be used to hedge significant longevity risk beyond life expectancy).
139
See, e.g., Citi GPS: Global Perspectives & Solutions, The Coming Pensions
Crisis 69–70, 80 (Mar. 2016), https://www.citivelocity.com/citigps/. The
penetration rate can be estimated by dividing the Federal Reserve Board’s estimate
of annuity reserves by its estimate of total retirement savings. For example, the
Federal Reserve Board reported that at the end of 2015, there were $2.3 trillion in
annuities out of a total of $27.3 trillion in household retirement assets, or
approximately 8 percent (0.084249 = $2.3 trillion/$27.3 trillion). See supra note 31
and accompanying text.
135
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a. Types of Annuities
There are various types of annuities. One distinction has to do with
the way the annuity is designed. With a “fixed annuity,” the insurance
company typically promises to make specific dollar payments to the
annuitant for the term of the annuity contract, often for life.140 On the other
hand, variable annuities allow the annuitant to select from a range of
investment options, and she can do better if the underlying investments do
well, or worse if those investments perform poorly.141 It should be noted,
however, that many investors buy variable annuities primarily for their tax
advantages and rarely elect to turn them into lifetime income streams.142
Another distinction has to do with how long the insurance company
makes the annuity payments. For example, term certain annuities pay a given
amount per year for a certain number of years, regardless of what happens to

See, e.g., Fixed Annuity, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/f/fixedannuity.asp (last visited July 19, 2016).
141
See, e.g., Variable Annuity, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/v/variableannuity.asp (last visited July 19, 2016); U.S. SEC. AND EXCH.
COMM’N, Variable Annuities: What You Should Know (Apr. 18, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/varannty.htm.
142
See, e.g., Oakley, Retirement Security Risks: What Role can Annuities Play
in Easing Risks in Public Pension Plans?, supra note 1, at 15; Anthony Webb, The
United States Longevity Insurance Market, in SECURING LIFELONG RETIREMENT
INCOME: GLOBAL ANNUITY MARKETS AND POLICY 63, 68 (Olivia S. Mitchell, John
Piggott & Noriyuki Takayama, eds., 2011); Jose Ruiz & Olivia S. Mitchell, Pension
Payouts in Chile: Past, Present, and Future Prospects, in SECURING LIFELONG
RETIREMENT INCOME: GLOBAL ANNUITY MARKETS AND POLICY 106 (Olivia S.
Mitchell, John Piggott & Noriyuki Takayama, eds., 2011); Monika Bütler & Stefan
Staubli, Payouts in Switzerland: Explaining Developments in Annuitization, in
SECURING LIFELONG RETIREMENT INCOME: GLOBAL ANNUITY MARKETS AND
POLICY 195 (Olivia S. Mitchell, John Piggott & Noriyuki Takayama, eds., 2011);
Hazel Bateman & John Piggott, Too Much Risk to Insure? The Australian (non-)
Market for Annuities, in SECURING LIFELONG RETIREMENT INCOME: GLOBAL
ANNUITY MARKETS AND POLICY 50 (Olivia S. Mitchell, John Piggott & Noriyuki
Takayama, eds., 2011); Edmund Cannon & Ian Tonks, Compulsory and Voluntary
Annuity Markets in the United Kingdom, in SECURING LIFELONG RETIREMENT
INCOME: GLOBAL ANNUITY MARKETS AND POLICY 171 (Olivia S. Mitchell, John
Piggott & Noriyuki Takayama, eds., 2011).
140
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the annuitant over the course of that term.143 This Article is instead primarily
concerned with various types of lifetime annuities, and in this section, we
explain the distinction between level-payment fixed lifetime annuities,
inflation-adjusted annuities, and deferred income annuities.
i.

Fixed Annuities

Annuities are often used to provide lifetime retirement income. For
example, for a 65-year-old man who purchased a $100,000 immediate fixed
(lifetime) annuity without inflation protection on December 1, 2015, the
annual payment would be around $6540 (6.54 percent of the annuity’s
purchase price).144 Because women tend to live longer than men, the annual
payments for a 65-year-old woman who elected an immediate fixed annuity
on December 1, 2015 would be only $6132 (6.13 percent of the annuity’s
purchase price).145 Unlike ERISA-covered pension plans,146 insurance
companies can price the annuities that they offer to men and women
differently.147
In addition to lifetime annuities based on a single life, it is also
possible to buy lifetime annuities that are based on the joint lives of a couple.
For example, for a couple consisting of a 65-year-old man and a 60-year-old
woman who purchased a $100,000 immediate fixed annuity without inflation
protection on December 1, 2015, the annual payment would be around $5112
(5.11 percent of the annuity’s purchase price).148
Many analysts believe that most individuals will get the best value
for their investment if they defer their decision to annuitize until age 75 or
80.149 In that regard, a 75-year-old man who purchased a $100,000
See,
e.g.,
Term
Certain
Annuity,
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/termcertainannuity.asp (last visited July 19,
2016).
144
See ANNUITY SHOPPER, BUYER’S GUIDE 17 tbl.5 (2016),
https://www.immediateannuities.com/pdfs/as/annuity-shopper-2016-01.pdf ($6540
per year = 12 × an average payment of $545 per month).
145
Id. ($6132 = 12 × an average payment of $511 per month).
146
See supra notes 105–106 and accompanying text.
147
But see Mary L. Heen, Nondiscrimination in Insurance: The Next Chapter,
49 GA. L. REV. 1 (2014) (arguing that gender discrimination laws should be
expanded to prevent insurance companies from selling gender-based annuities).
148
ANNUITY SHOPPER, BUYER’S GUIDE, supra note 144, at 25 tbl.11 ($5112 =
12 × an average payment of $426 per month).
149
See, e.g., Moshe A. Milevsky, Optimal Annuitization Policies: Analysis and
Options, 5 N. AM. ACTUARIAL J. 57 (2001); Anthony Webb, Providing Income for
143
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immediate fixed annuity without inflation protection in December of 2015
could get an annuity with an annual payout of $8892; an 80-year-old could
get an annual payout of $10,920 and an 85-year-old could get an annual
payout of $13,812.150 According to the Life Insurance Marketing and
Research Association (LIMRA), 73 is the average age of purchasers of single
premium immediate annuities (SPIAs).151
ii. Inflation-adjusted Annuities
Inflation-adjusted annuities offer an even better way to hedge
against living too long. With inflation-adjusted annuities, annual payments
would start out lower than level-payment fixed annuities but could end up
higher. For example, if our hypothetical 65-year-old man instead chose an
annuity stream with a 3-percent annual escalator, the initial annual payment
would be just $4728, but, eventually, the annual payments would exceed the
$6540 per year under the level-payment fixed lifetime annuity.152
iii. Deferred Income Annuities
Alternatively, retirees can protect against longevity risk by
purchasing deferred income annuities (a/k/a longevity insurance).153 The
a Lifetime: Bridging The Gap Between Academic Research And Practical Advice,
AARP PUB. POL’Y INST. (Research Report No. 2009-11, 2009),
http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/ppi/econ-sec/2009-11.pdf.
150
ANNUITY SHOPPER, BUYER’S GUIDE, supra note 144 at 21 tbl.7 (age 75:
$8892 = 12 × an average payment of $741 per month), at 22 tbl.8 (age 80: $10,920
= 12 × an average payment of $910 per month), and at 23 tbl.9 (age 85: $13,812 =
12 × an average payment of $1151 per month).
151
Kerzner, Presentation to Federal Advisory Committee on Insurance, supra
note 4, at 22.
152
ANNUITY SHOPPER, BUYER’S GUIDE, supra note 144 at 17 tbl.5 (showing
average monthly payments to 65-year-old men with a 3-percent-cost-of-living
adjustment of $394 per month in the first year of his retirement [$4728 in the first
year = 12 × an average payment of $394 per month]).
153
See, e.g., Katherine G. Abraham & Benjamin H. Harris, The Market for
Longevity Annuities, 3 J. OF RET. 12 (2016); Wade Pfau, Why Retirees Should
Choose DIAs over SPIAs, ADVISOR PERSPECTIVES (Sept. 24, 2013),
http://www.advisorperspectives.com/articles/2013/09/24/why-retirees-shouldchoose-dias-over-spias.pdf; Kimberly Lankford, Deferred Income Annuities Offer
Predictability, KIPLINGER (Aug. 2013), http://www.kiplinger.com/article/
retirement/T003-C000-S004-deferred-income-annuities-offer-predictability.html;
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typical approach is to buy a deferred income annuity at age 65 that starts
making annual payments only if the annuitant lives past age 80 or 85. For
example, in February of 2012, a 65-year-old man could invest $100,000 in a
MetLife deferred income annuity; and beginning at age 85, he would receive
a level lifetime income of $25,451.04 per year.154 Companies do not offer
inflation-adjusted deferred income annuities, but some companies do offer
fixed step-ups.155
With a relatively small upfront investment, a retiree can secure an
income stream that starts sometime in the future, and the retiree can then use
the rest of her savings to cover the fixed number of years until the year that
the deferred income annuity payments start.156 There is some risk of running
Anthony Webb, Guan Gong & Wei Sun, An Annuity That People Might Actually
Buy, B.C. CTR. FOR RET. RES. (Issue in Brief No. 7-10, July 2007),
http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2007/07/ib_7-10-508.pdf;
Moshe
A.
Milevsky, Real Longevity Insurance with a Deductible: Introduction to AdvancedLife Delayed Annuities (ALDA), 9 N. AM. ACTUARIAL J. 109 (2005).
154
Memorandum from Hersh L. Stern to author (Feb. 7, 2012) (on file with the
author). Alternatively, he could purchase a deferred income annuity that instead
starts at age 80 that pays $17,069.40 per year; at age 75 that pays $11,649.84 per
year; or at age 70 and pays $8,133.60 per year. Id. See also Abraham & Harris, The
Market for Longevity Annuities, supra note 153, at 16 ex.4, 18 (showing various
2014 quotes for immediate and deferred income annuities and noting that
“approximately two-thirds of the [deferred income] annuities sold had deferral
periods of five years or less, with only 1% having deferral periods in excess of 15
years”).
155
Joseph A. Tomlinson, Income Choices, FIN. PLAN. (May 1, 2011),
http://www.financial-planning.com/fp_issues/2011_5/income-choices-26728011.html (comparing various investment strategies including systematic withdrawals,
immediate annuities, deferred income annuities, and guaranteed lifetime withdrawal
benefits).
156
See, e.g., Michael Kitces, A Fix for Retirement Plan Guessing, FIN. PLAN.
(Feb. 24, 2016), http://www.financial-planning.com/news/portfolio/kitcesplanning-for-the-long-haul-without-a-crystal-ball-2695826-1.html
(discussing
various ways to use deferred income annuities to plan for secure lifetime income and
showing that deferred income annuities offer better returns than bonds); Stephen
Sexauer, Michael W. Peskin & Daniel Cassidy, Making Retirement Income Last a
Lifetime, 68 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 74 (2012) (proposing a “decumulation benchmark”
that would use about 88 percent of retiree savings to purchase a laddered portfolio
of Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities [TIPS] for the first 20 years and would
purchase a deferred income annuity with the remaining 12 percent); Rick Wurster,
DC 20/20: Pathways to a Secure Retirement, 4 ROTMAN INT’L J. OF PENSION MGMT.
54, 58 (2011) (suggesting that an annuity providing 35 percent real income
replacement at age 85 would cost about 7.5 percent of a participant’s average
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out of money before the year that the deferred income annuity starts, but that
is certainly a more manageable risk than trying to manage one’s retirement
savings over the indefinite future.157
Deferred income annuities have gotten a lot more attention since
2014 when the IRS promulgated final regulations authorizing so-called
“qualifying longevity annuity contracts” (QLACs).158 Under the regulations,
pension plan participants and IRA holders can spend up to $125,000 on
QLACs without running afoul of the required minimum distribution rules
that normally require individuals to start taking taxable distributions by age
70½.159 All in all, deferred income annuities could help improve retirement
income security for elderly Americans.160
account balance at retirement).
157
Finally, it is worth noting that workers might be able to buy deferred income
annuities in installments, starting at a young age. For example, a worker could use a
portion of her retirement savings each year to purchase a deferred income annuity
that starts at age 65, or at the advanced ages of 70, 75, 80, 85, or even 90.
Accordingly, this type of deferred income annuity product could be used to provide
retirement benefits that mimic the lifetime pensions provided by traditional defined
benefit plans. Milevsky, Real Longevity Insurance with a Deductible: Introduction
to Advanced-Life Delayed Annuities, supra note 153.
158
Longevity Annuity Contracts, 79 Fed. Reg. 37,633 (July 2, 2014) (to be
codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 602); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.401(a)(9)-5, A-3 & 1.401(a)(9)6, A-12.
159
See also Vorris J. Blankenship, Retiree Tax Planning With Qualified
Longevity Annuity Contracts, THE TAX ADVISER (Nov. 1, 2014),
http://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2014/nov/blankenship-nov14.html.
The
$125,000 will be indexed for inflation in increments of $10,000. Treas. Reg. §
1.401(a)(9)-6 (A-17)(d)(2)(i) (as amended in 2014). Recall that the required
minimum distribution (RMD) rules generally requires plan participants to begin
taking distributions soon after they reach age 70½. See supra note 101 and
accompanying text.
160
See, e.g., Jack VanDerhei, How Much Can Qualifying Longevity Annuity
Contracts Improve Retirement Security?, 36(8) EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. NOTES 10,
14 (2015), https://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_08_Aug15_HSAsQLACs.pdf; David Blanchett, Allocating to a Deferred Income Annuity in a Defined
Contribution Plan, 2 J. OF RET. 54 (2015); Katharine G. Abraham & Benjamin H.
Harris, Better Financial Security in Retirement? Realizing The Promise of Longevity
Annuities, BROOKINGS 18-19 (2015), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/
images/abraham_harris_paper_rev4.pdf; Blankenship, Retiree Tax Planning With
Qualified Longevity Annuity Contracts, supra note 159; John A. Turner & David D.
McCarthy, Longevity Insurance Annuities in 401(k) Plans and IRAs, 29 BENEFITS
Q. 58 (2013), http://www.ifebp.org/inforequest/0163295.pdf.
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b. The Market for Annuities
The market for annuities is fairly complex because there are so many
types of annuities and so many different purchasers. For example, many
companies sell a range of variable annuities, and some of those annuities also
provide a guaranteed payment period or a guaranteed minimum payment
level.161 In any event, Table 1 shows that $236.7 billion in annuities were
sold in the United States in 2015: $133 billion in variable annuities and
$103.7 billion in fixed annuities.162 Most of those annuity policies were
purchased by businesses or plan sponsors. Indeed, individual annuity sales
are a very small portion of the market. In 2015, for example, Table 1 shows
that individuals bought just $11.8 billion worth of fixed annuities ($9.1
billion single premium immediate annuities and $2.7 billion deferred income
Benjamin Goodman & David P. Richardson, Achieving Retirement Income
Security: A Comparison of Guaranteed Lifetime Withdrawal Benefit, Systematic
Withdrawal and Partial Variable Annuity Strategies, TIAA INST. (May 2016),
https://www.tiaainstitute.org/public/pdf/rd_achieving_retirement_income_security.
pdf. For example, many companies sell variable annuities with guaranteed lifetime
withdrawal benefits (GLWB). A GLWB is based on a variable annuity, but it allows
investors to lock in a minimum guarantee for life. Mechanically, the investor or
retiree deposits or rolls over a sum of money into a variable annuity with subaccounts
that are invested in a portfolio of stocks, bonds, and other generic investments.
Depending on market performance, that investment portfolio grows (or shrinks). In
any event, at retirement, the annuitant starts taking guaranteed withdrawals from the
account. Payouts come from the invested funds, but if those funds are ever depleted
due to long life and/or poor investment returns, the guaranteed minimum kicks in.
On the other hand, if the investment portfolio performs well, payouts can be
increased. See, e.g., Jonathan Barry Forman, Supporting the Oldest Old: The Role of
Social Insurance, Pensions, and Financial Products, 21 ELDER L. J. 375, 402–03
(2014) and sources cited therein; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-75,
RETIREMENT SECURITY: ANNUITIES WITH GUARANTEED LIFETIME WITHDRAWALS
HAVE BOTH BENEFITS AND RISKS, BUT REGULATION VARIES ACROSS STATES
(2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/650739.pdf.
162
Life Insurance Marketing and Research Association (LIMRA) Secure
Retirement Institute, Annuity Industry Estimates, http://www.limra.com/
Posts/PR/Data_Bank/_PDF/2015-4Q-Annuity-Estimates.aspx (last visited July 20,
2016). See also Life Insurance Marketing and Research Association (LIMRA),
LIMRA Secure Retirement Institute: Indexed Annuities Break Quarterly and Annual
Sales Records (Feb. 23, 2016), http://www.limra.com/Posts/PR/News_Releases/
LIMRA_Secure_Retirement_Institute__Indexed_Annuities_Break_Quarterly_and
_Annual_Sales_Records.aspx.
161
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annuities), but these individual annuity sales are expected to grow to $21.6
billion in 2019.163
Table 1. Annuity Industry Estimate
Type of Annuities
Variable Annuities
Separate accounts
Fixed accounts
Total Variable
Fixed Annuities
Fixed-rate deferred
Book value
Market value adjusted
Indexed
Fixed deferred
Deferred income
Fixed immediate
Structured settlements
Total Fixed
Total

2015
105.0
28.0
133.0
31.9
21.3
10.6
54.5
86.4
2.7
9.1
5.5
103.7
236.7

c. The Tax Treatment of Annuities
The federal income tax system generally provides favorable tax
treatment of investments in annuities.164 Although the value of an annuity
investment grows over time, no tax is imposed until annuity distributions begin.
In short, there is no tax on the so-called “inside buildup” until the “annuity
starting date.”165 Even then, the annuitant can exclude a fraction of each benefit
Kerzner, Presentation to Federal Advisory Committee on Insurance, supra
note 4, at 19.
164
See I.R.C. § 72 (2016); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Pension and Annuity
Income, supra note 41.
165
I.R.C. § 72(c)(4) (2015) ( “The annuity starting date in the case of any
contract is the first day of the first period for which an amount is received as an
annuity under the contract.”). See also DAVID L. BRUMBAUGH, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RS20923, TAXES AND THE “INSIDE BUILD-UP” OF LIFE INSURANCE: RECENT
ISSUES (2006), https://archive.org/details/RS20923-crs; ANDREW D. PIKE, CONG.
163
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payment from income.166 That fraction (the “exclusion ratio”) is based on the
amount of premiums or other contributions made by the annuitant.167 More
specifically, the exclusion ratio is determined at the annuity starting date by
dividing the “investment in the contract” by the “expected return under the
contract.” The investment in the contract is the annuitant’s premium costs for
the annuity,168 and the expected return is simply the total amount expected to be
received under the annuity.169 This method of taxation allows the annuitant to
recover her own contributions tax-free.
For example, assume that a 65-year old pays a $100,000 to an
insurance company for an immediate fixed annuity that pays $7500 a year
for life. Her investment in the contract is $100,000. According to the
applicable IRS unisex life expectancy tables, 65-year-olds can expect to live
for another 20 years,170 and that means that our 65-year-old will have an
expected return of $150,000 ($150,000 = 20 × $7500). Accordingly, in each
of the first 20 years that our hypothetical annuitant receives $7500, she will
exclude $5000 ($5000 = $7500 × $100,000/$150,000). Accordingly, she will
report $2500 in income in each of the first 20 years ($2500 = $7500 − $5000).
If she lives more than 20 years, all $7500 she receives in year 21 and later
years will be taxable, as she will have already recovered all $100,000 of her
investment in the contract tax-free.171
On the other hand, if an annuitant dies before she recovers her
investment in the contract, she can usually deduct her unrecovered
investment in the year of her death.172 For example, if our hypothetical
annuitant died after receiving seven annual annuity payments, she would
have recovered $35,000 of her original $100,000 investment tax-free
($35,000 = 7 × $5000) (and she would have included $17,500 in income
[$17,500 = 7 × $2500]). As she had not yet recovered her remaining $65,000
investment in the contract, that $65,000 unrecovered investment can be
deducted on the tax return filed for the year that she died.173
RESEARCH SERV., RL32000, TAXATION OF LIFE INSURANCE PRODUCTS:
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES (2003), http://crs.wikileaks-press.org/RL32000.pdf.
166
I.R.C. § 72(b) (2015).
167
Id.
168
I.R.C. § 72(c)(1) (2015).
169
I.R.C. § 72(c)(3) (2015).
170
Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9 tbl.V (1995).
171
I.R.C. § 72(b)(2) (2015).
172
I.R.C. §§ 72(b)(3)-(4) (2015).
173
I.R.C. § 72(b)(3)(A) (2015). Literally, if an annuitant dies after the annuity
starting date, she can deduct her unrecovered investment on her final income tax
return. Id.
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The current tax treatment of annuities results in some odd
consequences. First, if an annuitant outlives her life expectancy, she will
have to pay tax on the full amount of annuity payments that she receives each
year for the rest of her life.174 That greater tax liability in later years may
discourage some people from buying annuities, and that greater tax liability
in later years is not necessarily balanced out by the deduction for those who
die before they have recovered their full investment in the contract.
Second, the rule allowing a deduction for unrecovered investments
in the contract also has a quirk that can make deferred income annuities
relatively unattractive as retirement income investments. The quirk is that
the deduction for unrecovered investments is only available if the annuity
payments “cease by reason of the death of an annuitant” . . . “after the annuity
starting date (emphasis added).”175 For example, consider a 65-year-old man
who buys a deferred income annuity for $100,000 that will pay him $40,000
a year for life starting at age 85, and further assume that his expected return
is $400,000, giving him an exclusion ratio of 25 percent (0.25 = $100,000
investment in the contract/$400,00 expected return). Under the usual
annuity-taxation rules, if he lives to 85, he would exclude $10,000 of the first
$40,000 annuity payment from income and include the remaining $30,000
in income, and he would continue to do so until—after ten years—he would
have recovered his $100,000 investment in the contract (at which point all
future $40,000-a-year payments until he died would be fully taxable). Also,
if he died at 87, having recovered $30,000 tax-free ($30,000 = 3 × $10,000),
he would be allowed to deduct his remaining $70,000 unrecovered
investment. Unfortunately, if he dies before reaching age 85, he would not
be allowed to deduct any portion of his $100,000 investment in the contract
as his death would have occurred before the annuity starting date. In short,
individuals who buy deferred income annuities are unable to deduct their
losses if they die before the annuity starting date, and that makes deferred
income annuities less attractive as retirement income investments. Pertinent
here, just 37 percent of 65-year-old men can expect to live to age 85.176
I.R.C. § 72(b)(2) (2015).
Id.
176
Calculations from the Soc’y of Actuaries, Life Expectancy Calculator, supra
note 2, show that a 65-year-old man has a 37 percent chance of living 20 years to
age 85. In passing, it should be acknowledged that those who buy annuities and
especially deferred income annuities are probably healthier than the general
population, and it may be more appropriate to use a “healthier” life expectancy table.
In that regard, the Society of Actuaries calculator allows us to select such an
alternative mortality table (the 2012 Individual Annuitant Mortality tables that were
developed from a population of people buying individual immediate annuities), and
174
175
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d. The Tax Treatment of Life Insurance Proceeds
Paid after the Insured’s Death
In passing, it is worth noting that a slightly different set of rules
applies when the beneficiary of a life insurance policy elects to take
payments for life rather than taking a lump sum payment. In general, life
insurance proceeds paid to a beneficiary at the death of the insured are
excluded from gross income.177 If the beneficiary instead elects to take
annuity-like payments for the rest of her life, then a pro rata portion of each
payment is excluded,178 and the rest is taxable.179 That pro rata exclusion
continues for as long as the beneficiary lives, but if she dies before
recovering the full amount that she could have received tax-free, no
deduction (or other tax benefit) is allowed for the unrecovered portion.
For example, if a husband dies with a $100,000 life insurance policy
naming his wife as the beneficiary, she could exclude all $100,000 from her
income. If she instead elected to take $7500 per year payments for the rest
of her life—and her life expectancy is 20 years, then she could exclude $5000
each year ($5000 = $100,000/20), and she would report $2500 each year in
her gross income. If she lives more than 20 years, she could continue to
exclude $5000 each year until she dies. On the other hand, if she died before
receiving 20 annual payments, she would not be allowed to take a deduction
or other tax benefit for any of her unrecovered excludable amount. For
example, if she died after seven years, she would have excluded just $35,000
($35,000 = 7 × $5000), but she would not be allowed to claim a deduction
or other tax benefit for the remaining $65,000.

when we do, the results suggest that 60 percent of 65-year-old men who voluntarily
buy annuities can expect to live 20 years to age 85. See also NAT’L ASS’N. OF INS.
COMMISSIONERS [NAIC], NAIC Model Rule for Recognizing a New Annuity
Mortality Table for Use in Determining Reserve Liabilities for Annuities (Jan. 2013),
http://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-821.pdf, at Appendix II. The 2012 Individual
Annuity Reserving (IAR) Mortality Tables are designed for use in determining the
minimum standard of valuation for individual annuity or pure endowment contracts
issued after the effective date of the rule. Id. at § 4.D.
177
I.R.C. § 101(a) (2013).
178
I.R.C. § 101(a) (2013); Treas. Reg. § 1.101-4 (as amended in 1961).
179
I.R.C. § 61(a)(10) (1984).
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CURRENT ESTIMATES OF THE TAX EXPENDITURES
ASSOCIATED WITH SOCIAL SECURITY, PENSIONS, IRAS, AND
ANNUITIES

The special tax rules for Social Security, pensions, IRAs, and annuities
are routinely identified as “tax expenditures” in the tax expenditure budgets
prepared annually by the Office of Management and Budget.180 Policymakers
often use these tax expenditure estimates as a rough guide to the cost of these
special income tax provisions.181 For example, Table 2 reproduces the Office of
Management and Budget’s 2017 Federal Budget estimates of the revenue losses
attributable to the special income tax benefits for Social Security, pensions,
IRAs, and annuities (and life insurance savings).182 All in all, these tax
See, e.g., OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT,
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT,
FISCAL YEAR 2017 228 tbl.14-1 (2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2017/assets/ap_14_expenditures.pdf.
181
Admittedly, however, tax expenditure estimates do not necessarily equal the
increase in Federal revenues that would result from repealing the special provisions.
See, e.g., Jonathan Barry Forman, Comparing Apples and Oranges: Some Thoughts
on the Pension and Social Security Tax Expenditures, 5 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J.
297, 308 n.50 (2001).
182
OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL
PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2017, supra
note 180, at 228–229, 231. There are also tax expenditures associated with the exclusion of
railroad retirement system benefits and veterans’ pensions, not reprinted here.
Most of the items in Table 2 are also identified as tax expenditures in the tax
expenditure budgets prepared annually by the Joint Committee on Taxation;
however, in its most recent iteration, the Joint Committee on Taxation removed the
exclusion for interest on life insurance and annuities from its list. STAFF OF THE J.
COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for
Fiscal Years 2015-2019 (Comm. Print 2015), https://www.jct.gov/
publications.html?func=download&id=4857&chk=4857&no_html=1. While the
Joint Committee on Taxation acknowledged that a broad interpretation tax
expenditures would include the exclusion of investment income on life insurance
and annuity contracts, it noted that the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act of 1974 defined tax expenditures as “revenue losses attributable to
provisions of the Federal tax laws [emphasis added] which allow a special exclusion,
exemption, or deduction from gross income or which provide a special credit, a
preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability.” The Joint Committee on
Taxation then decided that it would no longer include in its tax expenditure budget
items for which no provision of the federal tax law specifically allows an exclusion,
such as (in its opinion) the exclusion of investment income on life insurance and
180
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expenditures are quite large.183 In fact, two of these items are among the top ten
largest tax expenditures each year, and five are in the top 20.184

annuity contracts. Id. at 20. See also Aaron E. Lorenzo, JCT Change on Insurance,
Annuity Inside Buildup Won’t Hurt, 15 BNA DAILY TAX REP. G-1 (Jan. 25, 2016),
http://taxandaccounting.bna.com/btac/T11100/split_display.adp?fedfid=82088380
&vname=dtrnot&wsn=502760000&searchid=27029402&doctypeid=13&type=dat
e&mode=doc&split=0&scm=T11100&pg=0; Warren S. Hersch, AALU to
Congress: Life insurance is not a tax expenditure, LIFEHEALTHPPRO (Apr. 30,
2013), http://www.lifehealthpro.com/2013/04/30/aalu-to-congress-life-insuranceis-not-a-tax-expen; Letter from Kenneth Kies to Mark J. Mazur, Assistant Secretary
for Tax Policy, (Dec. 29, 2015) (on file at Bloomberg BNA),
http://taxandaccounting.bna.com/btac/T11100/split_display.adp?fedfid=81337913
&vname=dtrnot&jd=a0h7h6y1j5&split=0; U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OFF. OF
TAX ANALYSIS, THE TAX EXPENDITURE FOR LIFE INSURANCE INSIDE BUILDUP
(Sept. 28, 2016),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/taxanalysis/Documents/Life-Insurance-Inside-Buildup.pdf (explaining why the
Treasury continues to view the exclusion of inside buildup as a tax expenditure).
183
Admittedly, the government’s tax expenditure estimates are inflated as they
do not take into account the present value of taxes that will be paid on retirement
plan distributions outside of the government’s 10-year budget window. See, e.g.,
Peter J. Brady, How America Supports Retirement: Challenging the Conventional
Wisdom on Who Benefits 39-45, INV. CO. INST. (Jan 20, 2016),
https://www.ici.org/research/retirement/retirement; Peter Brady, Who Benefits from
the U.S. Retirement System, 21(7) ICI RES. PERSP. 1 (Nov. 2015),
https://www.ici.org/research/retirement/retirement (also noting that “[w]hen
evaluating the U.S. retirement system, it is important to assess both the Social
Security system and tax deferral”); Judy Xanthopoulos & Mary M. Schmitt,
Retirement Savings and Tax Expenditure Estimates, AM. SOC’Y OF PENSION
PROFESSIONALS & ACTUARIES (May 2011), https://www.asppa.org/Portals/
2/APerspectiveOnTaxPolicyToPromoteRetirementSavingsMay2011.pdf.pdf.
184
OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL
PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2017,
supra note 180, at 243.
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Table 2. Estimates of Total Income Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years
2016, 2017, 2016–2025 (In millions of dollars)
2016

2017

2016–25

Exclusion of social security benefits:
Social Security benefits for retired workers
26,900 28,280
315,420
Social Security benefits for disabled workers
8,490
8,580
94,920
Social Security benefits for spouses, dependents & survivors
4,160
4,310
48,010
Net exclusion of pension contributions & earnings:
Defined benefit plans
66,600 66,760
622,530
Defined contribution plans
64,710 65,620
921,480
IRAs
16,850 16,970
197,420
Self-Employed plans
28,030 30,800
155,530
Low and moderate income savers credit
1,280
1,270
13,120
370,840
Exclusion of interest on annuities (and life insurance savings) 18,870 23,380
Source: EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2017 228 tbl.14-1 (2016).

F.

RETIREMENT INCOME ADEQUACY

Social Security is the most common source of income for households
aged 65 or older. For example, in 2014, 84.2 percent of households aged 65
or older received Social Security benefits.185 Moreover, Social Security
provided more than half of total income for 47.8 percent of aged beneficiary
couples that year and 70.7 percent of total income for aged single
beneficiaries.186 Only 43.8 percent of households received retirement
benefits from sources other than Social Security, and only 61.8 percent
received income from other assets.187
SOC. SEC. ADMIN., INCOME OF THE POPULATION 55 AND OLDER, 2014, 34
(SSA Publication No. 13-11871, 2016), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/
statcomps/income_pop55/2014/incpop14.pdf. See also SOC. SEC. ADMIN., INCOME
OF THE AGED CHARTBOOK, 2012, (SSA Publication No. 13-11727, 2014),
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/chartbooks/income_aged/2012/iac12.pdf;
U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVICES, A PROFILE OF OLDER AMERICANS: 2015,
http://www.aoa.acl.gov/aging_statistics/profile/2015/docs/2015-Profile.pdf
(last
visited July 22, 2016).
186
SOC. SEC. ADMIN., INCOME OF THE AGED CHARTBOOK, supra note 185, at 9.
See also SOC. SEC. ADMIN., Fast Facts & Figures About Social Security, 2015,
supra note 21 (64 percent of aged beneficiaries received at least half of their income
from Social Security in 2013).
187
SOC. SEC. ADMIN., INCOME OF THE AGED CHARTBOOK, supra note 185, at
34.
185
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All in all, Social Security provided 33.2 percent of personal income
of households aged 65 or older in 2014.188 Earnings accounted for another
32.2 percent of their income, pensions 20.9 percent, and asset income 9.7
percent.189 Of course, as people age, earnings decline, and their inflationadjusted Social Security benefits become an even larger portion of their
incomes.190 Still, Social Security alone cannot ensure that Americans will
have adequate incomes throughout their retirement years.
Unfortunately, retirement savings may be inadequate for many
retirees.191 As already mentioned, at any point in time, only about one out of
two American workers has a pension plan.192 Over their lifetimes, most
households will accumulate some retirement savings through current or past
work.193 Moreover, as households get closer to retirement age, they are even
more likely to have accumulated some retirement assets, and recent cohorts
of retirees tend to have more retirement assets than previous cohorts.194 Still,
Id. at 16.
Id.
190
See, e.g., Forman, Supporting the Oldest Old: The Role of Social Insurance,
Pensions, and Financial Products, supra note 161, at 382–384 and sources cited
therein; Sudipto Banerjee, A Look at the End-of-Life Financial Situation in America,
36(4) EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. NOTES 2 (2015), https://www.ebri.org/
pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_04_Apr15_EoL-PolFor.pdf (showing the importance of
Social Security to older households).
191
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-408, RETIREMENT SECURITY:
LOW DEFINED CONTRIBUTION SAVINGS MAY POSE CHALLENGES (2016),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/676942.pdf; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
GAO-15-419, RETIREMENT SECURITY: MOST HOUSEHOLDS APPROACHING
RETIREMENT HAVE LOW SAVINGS (2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/
680/670153.pdf. See also Nari Rhee & Ilana Boivie, The Continuing Retirement
Savings
Crisis,
NAT’L
INST.
ON
RET.
SEC.
(2015),
http://www.nirsonline.org/storage/nirs/documents/RSC%202015/final_rsc_2015.p
df.
192
See Copeland, Employment-Based Retirement Plan Participation:
Geographic Differences and Trends, 2013, supra note 45 and accompanying text.
193
See, e.g., Jesse Bricker, Arthur B. Kennickell, Kevin B. Moore & John
Sabelhaus, Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2007 to 2010: Evidence from the
Survey of Consumer Finances, 98 FED. RES. BULL. 37 (2012),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2012/pdf/scf12.pdf (finding that, in
2010, 55.1 percent of families had rights to some retirement plan other than Social
Security through current or past work of the family head or that person’s spouse or
partner).
194
Peter Brady, Kimberly Burham & Sarah Holden, The Success of the U.S.
Retirement System 12, INV. CO. INST. (2012), https://www.ici.org/
188
189
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low participation rates in pension plans, in general, and low contributions
rates to 401(k) plans, in particular, have led many analysts to wonder whether
current and future generations of retirees will have adequate retirement
incomes.195 Indeed, according to a recent study by the U.S. Government
Accountability Office, about 29 percent of households age 55 and older had
no retirement savings in 2013 (nor a defined benefit plan).196 Even among
those households that had some retirement savings, the median amount of
those savings was just $104,000 for households age 55–64 and $148,000 for
households age 65–74, which amounts could be used to purchase modest
inflation-adjusted annuities of $310 and $649 per month, respectively.197
Similarly, according to recent research by the Employee Benefit Research
Institute, more than 40 percent of Baby-Boomer and Gen-Xer households
are at risk of running short of money in retirement, and more than 15 percent
are projected to have less than 80 percent of what they will need.198 The
pdf/ppr_12_success_ retirement.pdf (finding that households headed by a working
individual aged 55 to 64 are doing especially well: while these near-retiree
households are less likely to be covered by a defined benefit plan than previous
cohorts, about 70 percent of them had defined contribution plans and/or IRAs, and
the median amount of their total retirement accumulations was $101,350 in 2010, up
from just $63,719 in 2001 [in 2010 dollars]).
195
See, e.g., Pension Savings: Are Workers Saving Enough for Retirement?:
Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor & Pensions,
113th Cong., SENATE, (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.help.senate.gov/hearings/
hearing/?id=4cd69c00-5056-a032-52b4-2693a6672740; Melissa M. Favreault,
Richard W. Johnson, Karen E. Smith & Sheila R. Zedlewski, BOOMERS’ RET.
INCOME PROSPECTS (Urban Institute, Program on Retirement Policy, Brief No. 34,
2012),
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412490-boomers-retirement-incomeprospects.pdf (4 out of 10 late baby-boomers will lack sufficient income at age 79
to replace 75 percent of what they earned between ages 50 and 54); Jack VanDerhei,
Retirement Income Adequacy for Boomers and Gen Xers: Evidence from the 2012
EBRI Retirement Security Projection Model®, 33(5) EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST.
NOTES 2 (2012), http://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_05_May12.RSPM-ER.Cvg1.pdf.
196
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-419, RETIREMENT SECURITY:
MOST HOUSEHOLDS APPROACHING RETIREMENT HAVE LOW SAVINGS, supra note
191, at 8, 10.
197
Id. at 11, 15.
198
Jack VanDerhei, What Causes EBRI Retirement Readiness RatingsTM to
Vary: Results from the 2014 Retirement Security Projection Model ®, EMP. BENEFIT
RES. INST. (Issue Brief No. 396, 2014), https://www.ebri.org/pdf/
briefspdf/EBRI_IB_396_Feb14.RRRs2.pdf; see also Jack VanDerhei, Retirement
Savings Shortfalls: Evidence from EBRI’s Retirement Security Projection Model®,
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bottom line is that many Americans are not saving enough in retirement plans
or otherwise.199
III.

THE REGULATION OF ANNUITIES AND PENSION
DISTRIBUTIONS

This Part focuses on the laws and regulations governing retail
annuities and pension distributions. This Part also takes a more detailed look
at the rules governing pension risk transfer transactions in defined benefit
plans.
A.

THE REGULATION OF RETAIL ANNUITIES

Individuals can use their freestanding and IRA savings to buy retail
annuities in the marketplace. In general, companies offering annuities are
subject to comprehensive regulation by state insurance departments.200 With
EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. (Issue Brief No. 410, 2014), https://www.ebri.org/
pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_410_Feb15_RS-Shrtfls.pdf (finding that there is an
aggregate national retirement savings deficit number of $4.13 trillion for all U.S.
households where the head of the household is between 35 and 64 years-old); Alicia
H. Munnell, Wenliang Hou & Anthony Webb, NRRI Update Shows Half Still
Falling Short, B.C. CTR. FOR RET. RES. (Issue in Brief No.14-20, Dec. 2014),
http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/IB_14-20-508.pdf (estimating that, in
2013, some 52 percent of households were expected to have replacement rates that
fall more than 10 percent below the target).
199
See, e.g., CHRISTIAN E. WELLER, RETIREMENT ON THE ROCKS (2016);
CHARLES D. ELLIS, ALICIA H. MUNNELL & ANDREW D. ESCHTRUTH, FALLING
SHORT: THE COMING RETIREMENT CRISIS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2014),
http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/IB_15-7.pdf; Sudipto Banerjee,
Income Composition, Income Trends, and Income Shortfalls of Older Households,
EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. (Issue Brief No. 383, 2013), http://www.ebri.org/pdf/
briefspdf/EBRI_IB_02-13.No383.IncmEld.pdf; Barbara A. Butrica & Mikki D.
Waid, What Are the Retirement Prospects of Middle-Class Americans?, AARP PUB.
POL’Y INST. (Middle Class Security Project Paper No. 2013-01, 2013),
http://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/research/public_policy_institute/security/
2013/retirement-prospects-middle-class-AARP-ppi-sec.pdf; Joelle Saad-Lessler,
Teresa Ghilarducci & Kate Bahn, Are U.S. Workers Ready for Retirement? Trends
in Plan Sponsorship, Participation, and Preparedness, SCHWARTZ CTR. FOR ECON.
POLICY ANALYSIS (2015), http://www.economicpolicyresearch.org/images/docs/
research/retirement_security/Are_US_Workers_Ready_for_Retirement.pdf.
200
See, e.g., State Regulation of Annuities, INSURED RET. INST.,
http://www.irionline.org/government-affairs/annuities-regulation-industry-
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a typical annuity, an insurance company bears the risk of making certain
guaranteed payments, and because insurance companies bear such risks, they
are heavily regulated and must maintain adequate reserves.201 In addition, all
states have state-based guaranty funds that provide protections for annuitants
in case the insurance company that sold them the policy becomes
insolvent.202 While the guarantee limits vary from state to state, every state
provides a minimum of $100,000 in benefit protection for annuities, and
most states provide at least $250,000 in protection.203 These guarantees apply
regardless of whether the annuities are in deferred or payout status at the time
of the insurance company’s insolvency.204
B.

THE REGULATION OF ANNUITIES IN DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS

As mentioned, the default benefit for defined benefit plans is a
lifetime pension in the form of an annuity.205 Defined benefit plans typically
information/state-regulation-of-annuities (last visited July 28, 2016). Both the U.S.
Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) and state insurance departments regulate
variable annuities; however, the SEC does not view fixed annuities as securities, and
so it does not regulate them. Annuities, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (Apr. 6,
2011), http://www.sec.gov/answers/annuity.htm.
201
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners’ Model Standard
Valuation Law generally requires insurance companies to maintain annuity reserves
according to the Commissioners’ Annuity Reserve Method (CARVM). See, e.g.,
AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, Special Issues for Variable Annuities 2 (1999),
https://www.actuary.org/files/publications/Practice_Note_Special_Issues_for_Vari
able_Annuities_july1999.pdf; NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMMISSIONERS, Standard
Valuation Law 820, §§ 5a, 6 (July 2010), http://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL820.pdf. See also Kush Kotecha, Ben Yahr & James Collingwood, Statutory
Reserving for Fixed Indexed Annuities with Guaranteed Lifetime Withdrawal
Benefits, 90 FIN. REP. 4 (Sept. 2012), https://www.soa.org/library/
newsletters/financial-reporter/2012/september/frn-2012-iss90-kotecha.aspx; Keith
P. Sharp, Commissioners Annuity Reserve Valuation Method, 7 J. OF ACTUARIAL
PRAC. 107 (1998), http://www.jofap.org/documents/vol7/v7_sharp.pdf.
202
See, e.g., NAT’L ORG. OF LIFE & HEALTH INS. GUAR. ASSOCIATIONS, The
Nation’s Safety Net (2014), https://www.nolhga.com/resource/file/NOLHGA%
20Safety%20Net%202014.pdf; NAT’L ORG. OF LIFE & HEALTH INS. GUAR. ASSOC.,
Policyholder Information: Frequently Asked Questions (July 20, 2016),
https://www.nolhga.com/policyholderinfo/main.cfm/location/questions.
203
NAT’L ORG. OF LIFE & HEALTH INS. GUAR. ASSOCIATIONS, The Nation’s
Safety Net, supra note 202, at 3.
204
Id.
205
See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text.
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manage a portfolio of investment assets in a trust and pay those lifetime
pension benefits directly from the trust.206 Alternatively, defined benefit
plans sometimes purchase retail annuities in order to meet their pension
obligations. While defined benefit plans must offer pension benefit in the
form of a lifetime annuity, the plans may also offer lump sum distributions
and other payment options at retirement or job separation.207
1. Rules Governing Lump Sum Distributions
As mentioned, the default benefit for defined benefit plans is a
lifetime pension in the form of an annuity, and for married participants, the
default benefit is a qualified joint-and-survivor annuity (QJSA).208 These
days, most defined benefit plans also offer participants some type of lump
sum distribution option.209 Participants who can take a lump sum distribution
can generally take that distribution when they terminate employment, or they
can defer the distribution until a later date.210
When a lump sum alternative is offered to a participant, the
minimum lump sum amount must be determined in accordance with certain
actuarial “relative valuation” rules.211 The minimum lump sum must have a
value equal to the actuarially-determined present value of the participant’s
expected stream of lifetime pension benefits.212 Those rules ensure that any
lump sum distribution is the actuarial equivalent of the promised lifetime
pension benefit. Basically, the Internal Revenue Code and related guidance
specify the applicable interest rates and mortality tables that must be used to
determine the minimum value of the lump sum.
See supra note 40 and accompanying text. Alternatively, a defined benefit
pension plan can be designed to invest directly in annuity contracts. Id.
207
See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
208
See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text. In general, these paybenefits-in-the-form-of-an-annuity rules also apply to defined contribution plans
that are money purchase pension plans. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP.
BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., What You Should Know About Your Retirement Plan, supra
note 62, at 18, 36.
209
Sudipto Banerjee, Annuity and Lump-Sum Decisions in Defined Benefit
Plans: The Role of Plan Rules, 381 EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. 1, 4 (Issue Brief No.
381, Jan. 2013), https://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_01-13.No381.
LSD2.pdf.
210
Id.
211
I.R.C. § 411(c)(3) (2016); Treas. Reg. § 1.411(c)-1(e) (2016).
212
For an explanation of the mathematics of these present value determinations,
see infra Part IV.B.
206

78

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 23

The plan sponsor must also provide an explanation of the “relative
value” of the lump sum when compared to the participant’s lifetime pension
benefit.213 While plan sponsors have a good deal of flexibility about how to
convey this information, the explanations “must be expressed to the
participant in a manner that provides a meaningful comparison of the relative
economic values of the two forms of benefit without the participant having
to make [her own] calculations.”214 For example, if a lump sum is offered,
participants must be shown how that lump sum compares with the present
value of the lifetime pension benefit.
The Pension Protection Act of 2006 raised the interest rates that
defined benefit plans use to determine lump sum distribution amounts and
so made lump sum distributions significantly less expensive for plan
sponsors.215 Basically, the Internal Revenue Code used to require plan
sponsors to use low 30-year-Treasury-bill interest rates to determine the
minimum value of the lump sum,216 but now plan sponsors can use higher
interest rates—calculated using three different corporate interest rates based
on segments of the corporate bond yield curve.217
Also, until updated mortality tables are required for 2017 or later,218
plan sponsors can continue to use out-of-date mortality tables that reflect
relatively shorter life expectancies than the new mortality tables will

Treas. Reg. §§ 1.417(a)(3)-1, 1.417(e)-1.
Treas. Reg. § 1.417(a)(3)-1.
215
I.R.C. § 417(e)(3) (2016); Pension Protection Act of 2006, supra note 67, at
§§ 301-303 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.);
as enhanced by the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21),
Pub.L. No. 112-141, 126 Stat. 405, 850-53, §§ 40221-22 (2012).
216
See, e.g., Notice 2002-26, 2002-1 C.B. 743 (requiring rates of interest based
on 30-year Treasury securities during the four-year period ending on the last day
before the beginning of the plan year).
217
See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Minimum Present Value Segment
Rates,
http://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/Minimum-Present-Value-SegmentRates (last visited July 20, 2016).
218
See Notice 2015-53, 2015-33 I.R.B. 1, 2–3 (suggesting new mortality tables
would be required for 2017). But see David B. Brandolph, De-Risking: IRS Window
for 2016 Plan Mortality Table Rules Closing, BLOOMBERG BNA DAILY TAX
REPORTER
(Mar.
17,
2016),
http://benefits.bna.com/bprc/2226/
split_display.adp?fedfid=84832144&vname=pbdnotallissues&jd=a0j0p0e2b3&spli
t=0 (wondering if the IRS will issue mortality table guidance in time for 2017). As
we were going to press, the IRS issued new mortality tables for 2017 that made no
meaningful changes. Notice 2016-50, 2016-38 I.R.B. 371.
213
214
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provide.219 In that regard, as life expectancies increase, pensions will need to
make monthly payments to participants over more years, and that means
lump sum distributions will cost more. Accordingly, shifting to the new
mortality tables is expected to result in a 5 to 7 percent increase in pension
liabilities for the average plan.220
The Internal Revenue Code also generally restricts a defined benefit
plan’s ability to cash out a participant’s benefit without the participant’s
consent.221 The plan generally does not need the participant’s consent if the
present value of her benefit is $5000 or less;222 however, if the accrued
benefit is over $1000, the plan must also offer the employee the option of
rolling such distributions into an IRA or a new employer’s plan.223 If the
participant’s consent is needed and the participant is married, then spousal
consent is also required.224 In any event, when a lump sum distribution is
available, the participant is typically given the opportunity to roll it over to
another pension plan or to an IRA.225

219
To get an idea of the improved mortality experience that the IRS will
incorporate in its future sets of required mortality tables, see RP-2014 Rates, Soc’y
of Actuaries, Total Dataset (2014), https://www.soa.org/Files/Research/ExpStudy/research-2014-rp-mort-tab-rates.xlsx; RP-2014 Mortality Tables, Soc’y of
Actuaries
(2014),
https://www.soa.org/Research/Experience-Study/pension/
research-2014-rp.aspx; RP-2014 Mortality Tables Report 5 n.2, Soc’y of Actuaries
(Nov. 2014), https://www.soa.org/Files/Research/Exp-Study/research-2014-rpreport.pdf. See also Selecting and Documenting Mortality Assumptions for Pensions,
AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES (2015), http://actuary.org/files/ Mortality_
PN_060515_0.pdf; Joshua Gotbaum & William G. Gale, Good news for retirement
policy in spite of gridlock, BROOKINGS (Dec. 2015), http://www.brookings.edu/
research/opinions/2015/12/18-good-news-retirement-policy-gale-gotbaum (“IRS
regulations specify the use of outmoded mortality tables . . .”).
220
MetLife, NISA Investment Advisors, L.L.C. & Prudential, Pension Risk
Transfer Comes of Age, PENSION SETTLEMENT STRATEGIES: THE DERISKING
MARKET GROWS APACE 4, 5 (July 27, 2015), https://www.metlife.com/
assets/cao/institutional-retirement/plan-sponsor/defined-benefit/pensionsettlement-strategies-conference-supplement.pdf.
221
I.R.C. § 411(a)(11) (2014); Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-11(c) (2006).
222
Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-11(c)(3) (2006).
223
I.R.C. § 401(a)(31)(B) (2014); I.R.S. Notice 2005-5, 2005-1 C.B. 337.
224
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.417(a)(3)-1 (2006), 1.401(a)-20 (2006).
225
I.R.C. § 402(c) (2014); STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG.,
PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT
SAVING AND CERTAIN RELATED LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, supra note 37, at 21;
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Rollovers of Retirement Plan and IRA Distributions
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While these lump sum distribution rules provide a variety of
protections for plan participants, many analysts worry that employees who
take lump sum distributions will dissipate them too quickly. 226 The worry is
even greater when it comes to younger workers who take and spend their
lump sum distributions when they change jobs.227 Participants may take a
lump sum distribution (or roll over their account balance into an IRA) and
subsequently purchase an annuity in the individual market, but individuals
rarely buy annuities voluntarily.228
2. Rules Governing the Purchase and Monitoring of
Annuities
The selection of an annuity provider is a fiduciary decision, and
under U.S. Department of Labor Interpretive Bulletin 95-1, the plan sponsor
must choose the “safest available” provider.229 The plan sponsor must
evaluate a potential annuity provider’s claims-paying ability and
creditworthiness but cannot rely solely on ratings provided by insurance
rating services. Factors that the plan sponsor should consider include:

(Feb. 19, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/Plan-Participant,-Employee/
Rollovers-of-Retirement-Plan-and-IRA-Distributions.
226
See, e.g., Lori Lucas, Plug the Drain: 401(k) Leakage and the Impact on
Retirement, DEFINED CONTRIBUTION INST. INV. ASS’N (Aug. 1, 2011),
http://www.dciia.org/assets/Publications2/WhitePaper/white%20paper_8.1.2011%
20dciia%20plug%20the%20drain.pdf; Frolik, Rethinking ERISA’s Promise on
Income Security in a World of 401(k) Plans, supra note 59, at 376–82; U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-715, 401(K) PLANS: POLICY CHANGES COULD
REDUCE THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF LEAKAGE ON WORKERS’ RETIREMENT
SAVINGS (2009), http://www.gao.gov/assets/300/294520.pdf.
227
Craig Copeland, Lump-Sum Distributions at Job Change, 30(1) EMP.
BENEFIT RES. INST. NOTES 2 (2009), https://www.ebri.org/pdf/ notespdf/EBRI_
Notes_Jan09_Rollovers.pdf; Hurd & Panis, The Choice to Cash Out, Maintain, or
Annuitize Pension Rights upon Job Change or Retirement, supra note 59.
228
See infra notes 336–339 and accompanying text.
229
29 C.F.R. § 2509.95-1 (2016) (a/k/a Interpretive Bulletin 95-1, Interpretive
bulletin relating to the fiduciary standards under ERISA when selecting an annuity
provider for a defined benefit pension plan); Bussian v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 223 F.3d
286, 298 (5th Cir. 2000) (discussing the “safest available” standard); Riley v.
Murdock, 83 F.3d 415 (4th Cir. 1996) (declining to apply the “safest available”
standard).
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(1) the quality and diversification of the annuity provider’s
investment portfolio;
(2) the size of the insurer relative to the proposed contract;
(3) the level of the insurer’s capital and surplus;
(4) the lines of business of the annuity provider and other
indications of its exposure to liability;
(5) the structure of the annuity contract and guarantees
supporting the annuities, such as the use of separate
accounts; and
(6) the availability of additional protection through state
guaranty associations and the extent of those
guarantees.230
A plan sponsor also has a duty to monitor the appropriateness of the annuity
providers that it selects, but that duty ends when the plan transfers the plan’s
liability with respect to the individual’s benefits to that annuity provider.231
The U.S. Department of Labor’s new fiduciary conflict-of-interest
rule will also apply to financial advisers who sell annuities to defined benefit
plans and plan participants,232 and it will have a transformative impact on the
sales of annuities to defined benefit plans and plan participants.233 The new
rule is almost certain to change the current commission structure of annuities
offered to plans and plan participants, and probably for the better (i.e., lower
and more transparent commissions and fees).234
230
29 C.F.R. § 2509.95-1(c) (2008). See also ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP.
WELFARE AND PENSION BENEFIT PLANS, Report of the Working Group on
Retirement Distributions & Options (2005), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/
publications/AC_1105A_report.html (recommending that the U.S. Department of
Labor revise Interpretive Bulletin 95-1 to clarify the prudent procedures for annuity
selection and monitoring).
231
29 C.F.R. § 2509.95-1(b) (2008).
232
See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.
233
See, e.g., Sean Forbes, Fixed Annuity Sales Surge Amid Fiduciary Rule
Concerns, BLOOMBERG BNA (July 7, 2016), http://www.bna.com/fixed-indexedannuity-n57982076676/; Stolz, How Annuities Will Be Transformed by DOL
Fiduciary Rule, supra note 91.
234
Stolz, How Annuities Will Be Transformed by DOL Fiduciary Rule, supra
note 91. See also Greg Iacurci, DOL fiduciary rule will transform the annuity
industry, INVESTMENTNEWS, (Feb. 21, 2016, 12:01 AM), http://www.investment
news.com/article/20160221/FREE/160219910/dol-fiduciary-rule-will-transformthe-annuity-industry?issuedate=20160221&sid=ANNUITY22016; Michael Kitces,
Why The DoL Fiduciary Rule Won’t Kill Annuities, It Will Make Them Stronger!,
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THE REGULATION OF ANNUITIES IN DEFINED CONTRIBUTION
PLANS

Annuities can also play a role in defined contribution plans. First,
defined contribution plans may offer deferred income annuities among their
investment options. Second, a defined contribution plan may offer
participants the option to annuitize their account balances at retirement or
job separation. Third, almost all defined contribution plan participants may
take a lump sum distribution (or roll over their account balance into an IRA)
and subsequently purchase an annuity.235
1. Rules Governing Lump Sum Distributions
Defined contribution plans are not required to offer annuities, and as
already mentioned, most defined contribution plans make distributions in
lump sum or periodic distributions rather than lifetime annuities.236 In that
regard, defined contribution plans typically allow lump sum distributions
whenever an employee leaves employment—both at retirement or simply
upon job separation.237 Plans are not required to offer departing employees a
lump sum distribution (at least not until they are eligible to retire), but most
plans do.238 If the accrued benefit of the departing employee is under $5000,
the plan is allowed to distribute the accrued amount in a lump sum
distribution without the employee’s consent;239 however, if the accrued
benefit is over $1000, the plan must also offer the employee the option of
rolling such distributions into an IRA or a new employer’s plan.240 All in all,
departing employees can leave the money in the plan, roll it over into an IRA
or other plan, or cash it out and spend it. Many analysts worry about

KITCES.COM (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.kitces.com/blog/why-dol-fiduciarywont-kill-annuities-it-will-make-them-stronger/.
235
Brien & Panis, Annuities in the Context of Defined Contribution Plans, supra
note 59, at 12.
236
See supra Part II.C.1.b.
237
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., What You Should Know
About Your Retirement Plan, supra note 62, at 21.
238
Id.
239
I.R.C. § 411(a)(11) (2014); Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-11(c)(3) (2006).
240
I.R.C. § 401(a)(31)(B); Notice 2005-5, 2005-1 C.B. 337.
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employees dissipating their retirement savings when they receive lump sum
distributions (or loans) and spend them before retirement.241
2. Rules Governing the Purchase and Monitoring of
Annuities
a. Fiduciary Duties Generally
When a defined contribution plan does offer an annuity, the selection
of an annuity provider is, of course, a fiduciary function.242 The current safe
harbor provides that a defined contribution plan fiduciary satisfies its
fiduciary responsibility if the fiduciary:
(1) engages in an objective, thorough and analytical search
for the purpose of identifying and selecting providers
from which to purchase annuities;
(2) appropriately considers information sufficient to assess
the ability of the annuity provider to make all future
payments under the annuity contract;
(3) appropriately considers the cost (including fees and
commissions) of the annuity contract in relation to the
benefits and administrative services to be provided
under such contract;
(4) appropriately concludes that, at the time of the selection,
the annuity provider is financially able to make all
future payments under the annuity contract and the cost
of the annuity contract is reasonable in relation to the

See, e.g., Lucas, Plug the Drain: 401(k) Leakage and the Impact on
Retirement, supra note 226, at 1; Copeland, Lump-Sum Distributions at Job Change,
supra note 227, at 2; Hurd & Panis, The Choice to Cash Out, Maintain, or Annuitize
Pension Rights upon Job Change or Retirement, supra note 59, at 7.
242
29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-4 (2008) (relating to the safe harbor on defined
contribution annuity distribution options). See also Robert N. Eccles, Gregory F.
Jacob & Wayne Johnson, Guaranteed Lifetime Withdrawal Benefits: Fiduciary
Considerations for Plan Sponsors, 27(2) BENEFITS L. J. 379 (Summer 2014),
http://www.iricouncil.org/docs/BenefitsLawJournalGLWBFiduciaryConsideration
s.pdf; Bruce Ashton, The Retirement Income Dilemma: An In-plan Solution,
DRINKER BIDDLE (Mar. 2016), https://secure02.principal.com/ publicvsupply/
GetFile?fm=HZ2364&ty=VOP&EXT=.VOP.
241
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benefits and services to be provided under the contract;
and
(5) if necessary, consults with an appropriate expert or
experts for purposes of compliance with these
provisions.243
A defined contribution plan sponsor also has a duty to monitor the
appropriateness of the annuity providers that it selects, but that duty ends
when the plan transfers the plan’s liability with respect to the participant’s
benefits to that annuity provider.244
A defined contribution plan is relatively free to impose restrictions
on the amount of assets that may be annuitized, even “unpalatable”
restrictions.245 For example, the plan may require the participant to annuitize
either all or none of her account balance.246
The U.S. Department of Labor’s new fiduciary conflict-of-interest rule
also applies to financial advisers who sell annuities to defined contribution
plans and plan participants.247
b. Annuity Investments within Defined
Contribution Plans
While a defined contribution plan sponsor can select the investments
for its plan, ERISA Section 404(c) generally allows plans to permit
individual participants to direct their own investments (a/k/a, “self-directed”
or “participant-directed” accounts).248 To be eligible for this safe harbor, the

29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-4 (2008). See also Field Assistance Bulletin 2015-2
(U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Jul. 13, 2015), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/fab2015-2.pdf
(clarifying the meaning of “the time of selection”).
244
Field Assistance Bulletin 2015-2, supra note 243; 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-4
(2008).
245
Brien & Panis, The Choice to Cash Out, Maintain, or Annuitize Pension
Rights upon Job Change or Retirement, supra note 59, at 14.
246
Id. (noting plan limits may also make it difficult to wait to select an annuity).
247
See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.
248
ERISA § 404(c), 29 U.S.C. §1104(c) (2008) (providing plans with a “safe
harbor” from liability for losses that a participant suffers in their 401(k) accounts to
the extent that the participant exercises control over the assets in her 401(k) account).
See also U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., Meeting Your
Fiduciary Responsibilities, supra note 87, at 6; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
Retirement Topics - Participant-Directed Accounts (Oct. 7, 2015),
243
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plan must provide the participant with the opportunity “to exercise control
over assets in his individual account” and “to choose, from a broad range of
investment alternatives.”249 The plan must also provide the participant with
“the opportunity to obtain sufficient information to make informed decisions
with regard to investment alternatives available under the plan,” including
information about transaction fees and expenses.250 Also, “the act of
designating investment alternatives in an ERISA Section 404(c) plan is a
fiduciary function,” and “in deciding whether and to what extent to invest in
a particular investment, or to make a particular fund available as a designated
investment alternative, a fiduciary must ordinarily consider only factors
relating to the interests of plan participants and beneficiaries in their
retirement income.”251 Defined contribution plans can include fixed and
variable annuities among their investment alternatives.252
When a plan sponsor allows participants to direct their own
investments, the plan sponsor must also choose a default investment for
workers who do not otherwise direct their own investments.253 Historically,
plan sponsors used low-yield, stable-value bond funds for that purpose, but
the Pension Protection Act of 2006 amended ERISA Section 404(c) to
improve the default investments for workers who do not otherwise direct
their own investments.254 That law—and the U.S. Department of Labor’s
regulation—encouraged employers to replace their low-yield, stable-value
bond funds with balanced funds (funds with an unchanging mix of stocks
https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/plan-participant-employee/retirement-topicsparticipant-directed-accounts.
249
29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(1) (2010).
250
29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(i)(B) (2010).
251
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, PENSION AND WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., OFF. OF
REG. AND INTERPRETATIONS, ADVISORY OPINION NO. 98-04(A) (May 28, 1998).
252
See, e.g., TIAA-CREF FINANCIAL SERVICES, Defined Benefit vs. Defined
Contribution Plans, http://www1.tiaa-cref.org/public/support/help/ask-tiaa-cref/dbvs-dc/index.html (last visited July 19, 2016) (noting TIAA defined contribution
plans have both fixed and variable annuity options that the plan sponsor can include
in its offerings). See also Raimond Maurer, Olivia Mitchell, Vanya Horneff & Ralph
Rogalla, Variable Annuities, Lifetime Income Guarantees, and Investment Downside
Protection, TIAA INST., 1 (Mar. 2016), https://www.tiaainstitute.org/ public/pdf/ti_
variable_annuities_lifetime_income_guarantees.pdf; TIAA-CREF FINANCIAL
SERVICES, The Case for Guaranteed Annuities in Defined Contribution Plans (Oct.
2010), https://www.tiaa.org/public/pdf/case_guaranteed_annuities.pdf.
253
ERISA § 404(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(5) (2008).
254
Pension Protection Act of 2006, supra note 67 (amending ERISA § 404(c),
29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2008)).
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and bonds) and life-cycle funds (funds that gradually shift their investments
from stocks towards bonds as workers age).255 More specifically, the final
regulation provides for four types of so-called “qualified default investment
alternatives” (QDIAs) and also clarifies that a QDIA may be offered through
variable annuity contracts or other pooled investment funds.256 In response
to these rule changes, defined contribution plans have generally moved away
from stable-value bond funds and towards target date funds,257 but plan
sponsors can also offer annuities.258
Recently issued guidance makes it easier for defined contribution
plan sponsors to offer annuities.259 More specifically, if certain conditions
are satisfied, plan sponsors can offer, as investment options, a series of target
date funds that include deferred income annuities among their assets, even if
some of the target date funds within the series are available only to older
participants.260 In related guidance the U.S. Department of Labor noted that
target date funds that serve as qualified default investment alternatives may
include annuities as part of their investment portfolios.261
255
Id.; 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-5 (2008). See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP.
BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN, Default Investment Alternatives Under Participant Directed
Individual Account Plans, 72 Fed. Reg. 60,452, 60,461 (Oct. 24, 2007),
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/fedreg/final/07-5147.pdf (amending 29 C.F.R. Part
2550); Olivia S. Mitchell, Gary R. Mottola, Stephen P. Utkus & Takeshi Yamaguchi,
The Dynamics of Lifecycle Investing in 401(K) Plans, PENSION RES. COUNCIL 12-13
(Population Aging Research Center Working Paper No. 19, 2008),
http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1018&context=parc_worki
ng_papers.
256
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., Fact Sheet: Regulation
Relating to Qualified Default Investment Alternatives in Participant-Directed
Individual Account Plans (2008), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/fsQDIA.pdf.
257
Andrew Bary, Target-Date Funds Take Over, BARRON’S (Jul. 5, 2014)
http://www.barrons.com/articles/SB5000142405311190454400457965113401926
6274; Meaghan Kilroy, Vanguard finds soaring use of auto enrollment, target-date
funds 10 years after PPA, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (Jun. 8, 2016),
http://www.pionline.com/article/20160608/ONLINE/160609873/vanguard-findssoaring-use-of-auto-enrollment-target-date-funds-10-years-after-ppa
258
See, e.g., TIAA-CREF FINANCIAL SERVICES, The Case for Guaranteed
Annuities in Defined Contribution Plans, supra note 252.
259
Notice 2014-66, 2014-46 I.R.B. 820.
260
Id.; U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, Treasury Issues Guidance to Encourage
Annuities in 401(k) Plans (Oct. 24, 2014), https://www.treasury.gov/presscenter/press-releases/Pages/jl2673.aspx.
261
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., Information letter from
Phyllis Borzi, Assistant Secretary for EBSA, U.S. Department of Labor, to Mark
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Regardless of how participants invest over the course of their
careers, at retirement or job separation, a defined contribution plan can offer
an in-plan annuity distribution option.262 To avoid the fiduciary risks that
come from selecting and monitoring annuity providers, however, plan
sponsors can instead offer annuities outside the plan as an IRA rollover
option.263
D.

THE REGULATION OF ANNUITIES IN INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT
ACCOUNTS

Individuals can also use their IRAs to buy annuities. For example,
an individual might roll over a lump sum pension distribution into an IRA
and then have the IRA purchase an annuity. For that matter, the individual
could roll over the funds directly to an “IRA annuity” offered by an insurance
company.264 Having an IRA purchase an immediate fixed (lifetime) annuity
will usually satisfy the required minimum distribution rules.265 The U.S.
Department of Labor’s new fiduciary conflict-of-interest rule will also apply
to financial advisers who sell annuities to IRA holders.266
E.

PENSION RISK TRANSFERS

Over the years, defined benefit plan sponsors have found it
challenging to manage the risks associated with those plans. This has been
Iwry, Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Retirement
and Health Policy, U.S. Department of the Treasury (Oct. 23, 2014),
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/employers-and-advisers/guidance/informationletters/10-23-2014.
262
See, e.g., Steve Utkus, Annuity—or not?, VANGUARD BLOG FOR INST.
INVESTORS (Nov. 20, 2015), http://vanguardinstitutionalblog.com/2015/11/
20/annuity-or-not/.
263
Id.
264
See, e.g., Hersh Stern, Can I Buy An Annuity With My IRA or 401k?,
IMMEDIATEANNUTIES (Aug. 7, 2016), https://www.immediateannuities.com/rollover-ira-or-401k/.
265
Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-6 (2014). See, e.g., Hersh Stern, Required
Minimum Distribution (RMD), IMMEDIATEANNUTIES (Aug. 10, 2016),
https://www.immediateannuities.com/required-minimum-distribution/ (noting that
the required minimum distribution (RMD) rules generally require plan participants
to begin taking distributions soon after they reach age 70½). See supra note 101 and
accompanying text.
266
See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.
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particularly true since the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
began requiring corporate employers to recognize the funding obligations
associated with their defined benefit plans.267 Also, recent fluctuations in the
national economy have resulted in changes in the value of plan assets and in
market interest rates, which, in turn, have led to volatility in the funded status
of defined benefit plans and in the pension contributions that plan sponsors
are required to make.268 In general, corporate employers have responded by
“freezing,” terminating, or replacing their traditional defined benefit plans.269
Many plan sponsors have also chosen to reduce their risks by managing their
plan assets with so-called “liability driven investing” (LDI).270 Finally, many
plan sponsors are now focused on de-risking their defined benefit plans—
pension risk transfer strategies that transfer risk to insurance companies by
purchasing annuities for participants (insurance annuity risk transfers) or that
transfer risk to participants by making lump sum distributions to the
participants (lump sum risk transfers).271
267
See, e.g., FASB Improves Employers’ Accounting for Defined Benefit
Pension and Other Postretirement Plans, FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD. (Sep. 29,
2016), http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/FASBContent_C/NewsPage&cid=9000000
04155.
268
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-74, PRIVATE PENSIONS:
PARTICIPANTS NEED BETTER INFORMATION WHEN OFFERED LUMP SUMS THAT
REPLACE THEIR LIFETIME BENEFITS 3 (2015), http://www.gao.gov/
assets/670/668106.pdf.
269
See, e.g., Wiatrowski, Changing Landscape of Employment-based
Retirement Benefits, supra note 107; Wiatrowski, The Last Private Industry Pension
Plans: A Visual Essay, supra note 49; Justin Owens & Joshua Barbash, Defined
Benefit Plans: A Brief History, (2014), http://www.russell.com/documents/
institutional-investors/research/defined-benefit-plans-a-brief-history.pdf.;
U.S.
DEP’T OF LAB., BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., “Frozen” Defined-benefit Plans, 2
PROGRAM
PERSPECTIVES
ON
DEFINED
BENEFIT
PLANS
(2010),
http://www.bls.gov/opub/perspectives/program_perspectives_vol2_issue3.pdf;
Pension Freezes, PENSION RIGHTS CTR., http://www.pensionrights.org/
publications/fact-sheet/pension-freezes#sthash.04SP0a6P.dpuf) (last visited July
20, 2016).
270
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE AND
PENSION BENEFIT PLANS, Private Sector Pension De-risking and Participant
Protections, 13–14 (Nov. 2013), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/2013ACreport2.pdf.
271
See, e.g., id. at 14–17; Joanne Sammer, Companies Eye Pension De-Risking,
HR MAGAZINE (Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hrmagazine/pages/0216-pension-de-risking.aspx;
AONHEWITT,
PENSION
SETTLEMENTS THROUGH TERMINATED VESTED LUMP SUM WINDOWS: INSIGHTS
INTO PLAN SPONSOR EXPERIENCE 2 (Feb. 2013), http://www.hekblog.com/wp-
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1. An Overview of Risk Transfer Strategies for Defined
Benefit Plans
Defined benefit plan sponsors can significantly reduce their financial
risks by engaging in lump sum risk transfers and insurance annuity risk
transfers.272 In a lump sum risk transfer, the participant gets a lump sum
distribution that has a value that is the actuarial equivalent of the remaining
expected payments under her pension. In an insurance annuity risk transfer, the
participant gets an insurance company annuity instead of her pension. In both
types of risk transfers, the plan sponsor is able to reduce the size of its pension

content/uploads/2013/03/Pension-Settlements-through-TV-Windows_3_18_13.pdf; CFO Research & Mercer, Taking the Next Step in Pension Risk
Management, CFO.COM (July 2015), http://www.cfo.com/research/index.cfm/
download/14717490; Marcia Wagner, De-Risking Strategies, PLAN SPONSOR (Feb.
2016)
http://www.plansponsor.com/MagazineArticle.aspx?id=6442517918;
Rebecca Moore, Risk Capture, PLAN ADVISER 50 (Jan.–Feb. 2016),
http://www.planadviserdigital.com/planadviser/january_february_2016?sub_id=F0
7mtVh0axU7&folio=50&pg=54#pg54; Timothy J. Geddes, Bradley B. Howard,
Anthony G. Conforti & Allison R. Steinmetz, Pension Risk Transfer: Evaluating
Impact and Barriers for De-Risking Strategies, DELOITTE 6
(2014),
https://www.soa.org/Files/Research/Projects/2014-pension-risk-transfer-study.pdf
(noting that pension de-risking strategies fall under three main categories: plan
design; funding and investment policy; and liability management); Paul M. Secunda
& Brendan S. Maher, Pension De-Risking, 93(3) WASHINGTON U. L. REV. 733
(2016).
272
See, e.g., supra note 271 and accompanying text. Note that defined
contribution plans do not need to engage in risk transfer strategies. A defined
contribution plan sponsor’s principal financial obligation is to fully fund its plan by
making the required (defined) contributions. Thereafter, the plan sponsor is required
to manage the plan’s assets as the individual account balances grow and to make
distributions from those individual accounts when the participants retire or terminate
their employment, but, unlike a defined benefit plan sponsor, a defined contribution
plan sponsor has no further financial obligations (absent a breach of fiduciary
duties). Defined contribution plan sponsors can, however, “outsource” many of their
plan administration duties to third-party administrators, but that is not at all like the
de-risking of financial risks by defined benefit plans). U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE AND PENSION BENEFIT PLANS, Outsourcing
Employee Benefit Plan Services (Nov. 2014), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/
pdf/2014ACreport3.pdf.
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plan and its pension costs, for example, by reducing its PBGC premiums.273 In
short, pension risk transfers reduce risks for defined benefit plan sponsors.
At the same time, however, pension risk transfers generally increase
risks for participants and often push them away from receiving streams of
lifetime income. For example, participants who receive lump sum
distributions must bear all of the longevity risk for making their money last
for the rest of their lives; they must bear all the costs and risks of managing
their investments; and their assets are no longer entitled to the creditor and
other protections of ERISA.274 Participants who receive insurance company
annuities have their PBGC guarantees replaced by the less generous
guarantees of state guaranty funds.275
2. The Recent (and Coming) Increase in Pension Risk
Transfers
See, e.g., PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., Premium Rates, supra note 102
(noting plan sponsors have to pay both per-participant PBGC premiums and a
variable-rate premium that is based on the plan’s level of funding); The Bipartisan
Budget Act of 2015, Public Law No. 114-74, 129 Stat. 584 (providing for significant
increases in PBGC premiums). Id. For example, for single-employer plans, the perparticipant flat premium rate for plan years beginning in 2017 is $69 for singleemployer plans and the variable-rate premium (VRP) for single-employer plans is
$34 per $1000 of unfunded vested benefits (UVBs). PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP.,
Premium Rates, supra note 102.
274
See, e.g., Model Notices and Disclosures for Pension Risk Transfers:
Hearing Before the Advisory Council on Employee Welfare and Pension Benefit
Plans 5 (May 28, 2015) (statement of Roberta Rafaloff, MetLife),
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/erisaadvisorycouncil2015risk8.pdf (“The relative
value statement does not even begin to evaluate the costs and risks assumed by the
participant. In accepting the lump sum, the participant assumes the investment,
mortality and longevity risks. The value of these risks, which the participant will pay
if they attempt to turn the lump sum into lifetime income with a retail annuity, is not
part of the relative value disclosure.”). See also Gotbaum & Gale, Good news for
retirement policy in spite of gridlock, supra note 219 (“Many retirement experts
view lump sum payments that substitute for pensions to be pernicious because they
divert professionally-managed accounts and instead put large sums in the hands of
individuals who have little or no investment expertise.”).
275
See supra Part III.A. Not everyone believes that the state guarantees are less
valuable than PBGC guarantees. See, e.g., Barry Burr, Study finds little difference in
pension guarantee between PBGC and annuities, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (Mar.
21, 2016), http://www.pionline.com/article/20160321/PRINT/160329995/studyfinds-little-difference-in-pension-guarantee-between-pbgc-andannuities?utm_campaign=saxo_rss&utm_source=rss02_rss&utm_medium=rss.
273
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In recent years, we have seen a significant increase in these pension derisking transactions. According to one recent study of private pension plans,
more than one million participants were affected by de-risking from 2009–
2013.276 There were $8.5 billion in pension buy-out transactions in 2014, and
more than $8 billion in the first three-quarters of 2015,277 and de-risking
transactions are expected to continue to rise.278
Increasingly, plan sponsors—especially those with frozen defined
benefit plans—view their defined benefit plans as legacy liabilities that are
no longer a strategic part of their current compensation packages. Through
lump sum risk transfers and insurance annuity risk transfers, plan sponsors
can reduce the number of plan participants. As a result a plan sponsor can
save money by reducing the plan’s administrative costs and its everincreasing PBGC premiums.279 Removing participants from the plan also
reduces the size of the pension and so reduces the impact of market volatility
on pension plan funding and contribution rates (and on corporate balance
sheets). Also, as already-mentioned, until the new mortality table regulations
come into effect in 2017 or later, plan sponsors can still use the currentlyrequired mortality tables to calculate lump sums—tables that reflect shorter
life expectancies than the new mortality tables.280 All in all, it is less
expensive for plans to enter into lump sum risk transfers sooner rather than
later.281
276
Neela Ranade, Armando Saavedra & Tim Rhodes, Risk Transfer Study Plan
Years 2009–2013 25 (2015), http://www.pbgc.gov/documents/Risk-Transfer-withNotes-December-2015.pdf (study of Form 5500 filings compiled by the PBGC for
plans with 1000 or more participants).
277
Rob Kozlowski, More Plans than Ever Solve Liabilities Problem by
Dumping
Them,
PENSIONS
&
INVESTMENTS
(Feb.
22,
2016)
http://www.pionline.com/article/20160222/PRINT/302229979. See also Citi GPS:
Global Perspectives & Solutions, The Coming Pensions Crisis, supra note 139, at
61 fig.41 (listing notable recent pension risk transfer transactions in the United States
and the United Kingdom); Amy Kessler, William McCloskey & Arnaud Benoussan,
The Pension Risk Transfer Market at $240 Billion: Innovation, Globalization, and
Growth, PENSION & LONGEVITY RISK TRANSFER FOR INST. INVESTORS 18 (2015).
278
See, e.g., De-Risking and Rescue Plan Petitions Expected to Rise, 43 BNA
PENSION & BENEFITS REP. 128 (2016).
279
See, e.g., PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., Premium Rates, supra note 102
(showing scheduled increases through 2019).
280
See supra notes 218–220 and accompanying text.
281
On the other hand, there is no similar cost savings for an insurance annuity
risk transfer as insurance companies have already taken the new life expectancy
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Lump sum risk transfers and insurance annuity risk transfers are still
relatively expensive in today’s low-interest-rate environment, and they
present significant challenges for currently-underfunded defined benefit
plans. Pertinent here, higher interest rates generally have a bigger effect on
a plan’s liabilities than on its assets.282 Among other things, that means that
(if and) when market interest rates increase, pension plan funding ratios will
improve.283 As a result, many currently underfunded plans would “become”
fully funded, and once plans are 110 percent funded, many observers believe
that many of those plans would then implement de-risking and termination
strategies.284 As more fully explained in Part III.E.3.a below, it is fairly easy
for a plan sponsor to terminate a fully funded plan, and participants in those
“standard terminations” generally get lump sum distributions or insurance
annuities: there is no way for a participant to stay with a plan that is
terminating.
3. The Current Rules Governing Pension Risk Transfers
A variety of ERISA rules can have an impact on lump sum risk
transfers and insurance annuity risk transfers.
a. Standard Terminations
It is fairly easy for a plan sponsor to terminate a fully funded defined
benefit plan.285 In general, these standard terminations involve purchasing
projections into account in pricing their annuities. Once a plan adopts the new
mortality tables, however, annuities will look relatively better compared to the plan’s
liability.
282
See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY
REPORT: GRAPPLING WITH CRISIS LEGACIES 75 (Sept. 2011), https://www.imf.org/
External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2011/02/pdf/text.pdf.
283
Rich White, Is Your Defined-Benefit Pension Plan Safe?, INVESTOPEDIA
(Feb. 19, 2008), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/retirement/08/safe-dbplan.asp (noting a defined benefit plan’s funding ratio is the ratio of its assets to its
liabilities).
284
See, e.g., Sammer, Companies Eye Pension De-Risking, supra note 271; see
also Taking the Next Step in Pension Risk Management, MERCER 4 (July 2015),
http://www.mercer.com/content/dam/mercer/attachments/global/Retirement/merce
r-cfo-research-pension-risk-survey-2015.pdf (showing that a large percentage of the
213 large companies surveyed were likely or very likely to undertake risk transfers
in 2015 or 2016).
285
See generally ERISA § 4041(b)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1341(b)(1)(D) (2012);
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annuities from an insurer, although participants can also be offered lump sum
distributions.286 A terminating plan can only require a participant to accept a
lump sum if the present value of her benefit is $5,000 or less.287 A typical
standard termination involves numerous steps including: calculating
individual participant benefit amounts and payment form options,
communicating information to plan participants, and distributing the assets.
The whole process typically takes 12 to 18 months.288
Unless the participant elects otherwise, she will receive an insurance
annuity that is equivalent to her pension. As already mentioned, the selection
of an annuity provider is a fiduciary decision, and the plan sponsor must
choose the safest available provider.289 A key step in any standard
termination is providing an individualized notice of plan benefits to each
participant.290 These notices of plan benefits include general information
about the plan and the data used to calculate each participant’s benefit, and
they may also include the plan’s benefit election form. When a lump sum
alternative is offered to a participant, the minimum lump sum amount must
be determined in accordance with the relative valuation rules, and the notice
of plan benefits must explain the relative value of the lump sum when
compared to the participant’s lifetime pension benefit.291
Standard Terminations, PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., http://www.pbgc.gov/
prac/terminations/standard-terminations.html (last visited July 21, 2016);
Retirement Plans FAQs Regarding Plan Terminations, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
http://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/Retirement-Plans-FAQs-regarding-PlanTerminations (last updated Feb. 19, 2016); Harold J. Ashner, PBGC Issues:
Planning a Standard Termination—A Checklist for Practitioners, 16 J. PENSIONS &
BENEFITS 67 (2009), http://www.keightleyashner.com/publications/Pensions
Benefits_012009.pdf; Blaine Brickhouse, Path to Defined Benefit Plan Termination,
FINDLEY DAVIES, http://www.findleydavies.com/images/ServiceLineLeftThumb
nailsAndPDFs/Summary-of-the-Pension-Plan-Termination-Process-3-25-14-withnew-logo.pdf (last visited July 29, 2016); Plan Termination: Getting It Done!,
SOC’Y OF ACTUARIES (Oct. 16-19, 2011), https://www.soa.org/files/pd/annualmtg/2011-chicago-annual-mtg-118-4.pdf; American Bar Association Retirement
Funds, Plan Termination, PLAN ADM’R GUIDE (2015), http://www.aba
retirement.com/ePAG/aba-0h0-plan-termination-web-.html.
286
ERISA § 4041(b)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1341(b)(3)(A) (2012); 29 C.F.R. §
4041.28(c) (2015).
287
I.R.C. § 411(a)(11) (2012). See supra notes 221–225 and accompanying text.
288
Brickhouse, Path to Defined Benefit Plan Termination, supra note 285, at 1.
289
See supra Part III.B.2.
290
29 C.F.R. § 4041.24 (2015).
291
I.R.C. § 411(c)(3) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.411(c)-1(e) (1977). See supra Part
III.B.1.
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b. Lump Sum Risk Transfers
In a typical lump sum risk transfer, the employer amends its defined
benefit plan to provide participants with a choice between the lifetime
pension benefit promised by the plan and a lump sum distribution that has
an actuarially-equivalent present value.292 Usually, the employer makes its
“lump sum window” offer available to separated participants (also known as
terminated deferred vested participants), and they are given a window of time
(e.g., 90 days) to make their choice. For example, a separated participant
who is not yet in pay status could be offered a lump sum that is the actuarial
equivalent of her promised lifetime pension benefit. As more fully explained
in Part V.A.5 below, however, while that lump sum is the actuarial
equivalent of her promised pension, because of the way that retail annuity
markets work, that lump sum could almost never be enough to buy a retail
annuity that would replicate the promised lifetime pension benefit.293
ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code impose a number of limits on
the ability of plan sponsors to engage in lump sum risk transfers. At the
outset, a plan sponsor’s decision to implement a lump sum risk transfer is a
matter of plan design that is viewed as a settlor function rather than a
fiduciary function.294 On the other hand, when the plan sponsor implements
that lump sum risk transfer, the plan sponsor acts as a fiduciary.295
Also, whenever the plan sponsor makes a lump sum distribution, the
plan sponsor must comply with the relative valuation rules.296 Also, as
already-mentioned, until the new mortality table regulations come into effect
in 2017 or later, plan sponsors can still use the currently-required mortality

See, e.g., supra note 271 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-74, PRIVATE
PENSIONS: PARTICIPANTS NEED BETTER INFORMATION WHEN OFFERED LUMP SUMS
THAT REPLACE THEIR LIFETIME BENEFITS, supra note 268, at 25–29.
294
A “settlor” is the person who creates a trust. See, e.g., W.J. Stewart, Settlor,
COLLINS DICTIONARY OF LAW (2006), http://legal dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/
settlor.
295
ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2008); I.R.C. § 401(a) (2016). See also
Dana Muir & Norman Stein, Two Hats, One Head, No Heart: The Anatomy of the
ERISA Settlor/Fiduciary Distinction, 93 N.C. L. REV. 459 (2015); Lee v. Verizon
Communications, Inc., 623 F. App’x. 132, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 14588 (5th Cir.
Aug 17, 2015).
296
I.R.C. § 411(c)(3) (2014); Treas. Reg. § 1.411(c)-1(e) (2016). See supra
notes 211–220 and accompanying text.
292
293
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tables to calculate lump sums—tables that reflect shorter life expectancies
than the new mortality tables.297
The Internal Revenue Code used to require plan sponsors to use low
30-year-Treasury-bill interest rates to determine the minimum value of the
lump sum, but now plan sponsors can use higher interest rates—calculated
using three different corporate interest rates based on segments of the
corporate bond yield curve.298 These higher “applicable interest rates” have
made lump sum distributions less expensive for plan sponsors—and less
generous for participants. In addition, the interest rules permit plan sponsors
to select an applicable interest rate from up to 17 months prior to the month
in which the lump sum offer is made. That means that a plan sponsor can
gain a financial advantage for itself by selecting a so-called “lookback”
interest rate from up to 17 months earlier—when that interest rate is higher
(and so results in lower lump sums) than the rate that prevails at the time the
lump sum offer is made.299
Another rule lets plan sponsors ignore many additional pension plan
benefits when calculating lump sum distribution amounts.300 For example, a
plan sponsor can calculate the lump sum for a separated participant based on
that participant’s normal retirement benefit, even though that participant
might have eventually been eligible for a subsidized early retirement
benefit.301 The Pension Protection Act of 2006 added new benefit restrictions
that generally prohibit pension risk transfers that result in the plan having a
funding ratio after the transaction that is below 80 percent: basically, defined
benefit plans that fall below 80 percent are prevented from paying out lump
sums.302
Historically, plan sponsors have usually implemented a lump sum
strategy by offering the lump sum to separated participants, but more
recently plans were also offering lump sums to retirees already in pay status
(e.g., already receiving monthly pension benefits).303 Now, however, IRS
See supra notes 218–220 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 215–217 and accompanying text.
299
Once an interest rate or other variable is set in a plan, it may later end up
working against the plan sponsor, for example, if interest rates increase after the
lump sum window offer locks in at a relatively lower interest rate.
300
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE AND
PENSION BENEFIT PLANS, Private Sector Pension De-risking and Participant
Protections, supra note 270, at 21.
301
Id.
302
ERISA § 206(g), 29 U.S.C. § 1056 (2014); I.R.C. § 436(c) (2014); Notice
2011-96, 2011-52 I.R.B. 915.
303
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE AND
297
298
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Notice 2015-49 prevents plan sponsors from implementing lump sum risk
transfers for retirees in pay status.304 More specifically, Notice 2015-49
informs taxpayers that the Treasury and the IRS intend to amend the required
minimum distribution rules to prohibit defined benefit plans from replacing
ongoing annuity payments with a lump sum payment or any other form of
accelerated payment.305
All in all, ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code provide a number
of protections and disclosures for participants (and beneficiaries) who are
offered lump sum alternatives to their lifetime pension benefits. The
following disclosures are currently required in a lump sum risk transfer:306
PENSION BENEFIT PLANS, Private Sector Pension De-risking and Participant
Protections, supra note 270, at 16.
304
Notice 2015-49, 2015-30 I.R.B. 79. Notice 2015-49 also provides that, with
certain exceptions, the regulations contemplated will be effective retroactively back
to July 9, 2015. Id. See also Zorast Wadia, De-Risking Your Pension Plan: Do New
Regulations Make 2016 the Best Time to Offer Lump-Sum Distributions?, 28
BENEFITS L.J. 1 (2015), http://us.milliman.com/uploadedFiles/insight/2015/derisking-pension-plan.pdf; Elizabeth Thomas Dold & David N. Levine, Employee
Benefits Corner: IRS Ends Lump Sum Windows for Individuals in Pay Status, 93
TAXES THE TAX MAG. 27 (2015), http://www.groom.com/media/publication/
1622_IRS_Ends_Lump_Sum_Windows_for_Individuals_in_Pay_Status.pdf. Also,
applicants requesting determination letters for their defined benefit (DB) plans now
need to tell the IRS whether the plan has lump-sum risk transfer language in it, and,
if it does, to show how the plan satisfies one of the conditions in Notice 2015-49.
New Process for Defined Benefit Determination Letter Applications, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/new-process-for-definedbenefit-determination-letter-applications (last updated June 29, 2016).
305
I.R.C. § 401(a)(9) generally requires plans to make minimum required
distributions to retirees over age 70½, and it is clear that the regulations
contemplated in Notice 2015-49 will bar lump sum distributions to those retirees
over age 70½ who are in pay status. On the other hand, some analysts wonder
whether those regulations will be broad enough to reach retirees under age 70½. See,
e.g., IRS Shuts Down Pension Plan De-Risking Technique of Offering Lump Sums
to Retirees in Pay Status, VENABLE (July 27, 2015), https://www.venable.com/irsshuts-down-pension-plan-de-risking-technique-of-offering-lump-sums-to-retireesin-pay-status-07-27-2015/. In passing, it should be noted that Notice 2015-49 marks
a reversal of the position that the IRS had taken in a number of private letter
rulings—rulings that, in effect, had permitted plan sponsors to offer lump sum
distributions to participants already in pay status. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
401.06-01 (Apr. 19, 2012); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201228051 (Apr. 19, 2012).
306
This paragraph follows Model Notices and Disclosures for Pension Risk
Transfers: Hearing Before the Advisory Council on Employee Welfare and Pension
Benefit Plans (May 28, 2015) (statement of Robert S. Newman, Covington &
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(1) the material features of the optional forms of benefit
available under the plan;307
(2) the right, if any, to defer receipt of the distribution;308
(3) the consequences of failing to defer;309
(4) a description of the optional forms available under the
plan, including: the amount payable in each form, the
conditions for eligibility for each form, the relative
value of the form compared to the qualified joint and
survivor annuity (QJSA), and an explanation of relative
value;310 and
(5) an explanation of the ability of the participant to roll
over the lump sum distribution to another tax-qualified
retirement plan or individual retirement arrangement,
including the tax effects of doing so (the rollover
notice).311
In addition, plan sponsors and their advisers typically provide additional
communication materials.312 Needless to say, choosing between an annuity
and a lump-sum payout is a “cognitively challenging task.”313
Burling LLP), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/erisaadvisorycouncil2015risk10.pdf.
307
Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-11(c)(2)(i) (as amended in 2006).
308
Id.
309
Notice 2007-7, 2007-1 C.B. 395, Q&A-32, 33; Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)11(c)(2)(vi), 73 Fed. Reg. 59575 (Oct. 9, 2008).
310
Treas. Reg. § 1.417(a)(3)-1(as amended in 2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.417(e)-1
(as amended in 2003).
311
I.R.C. § 402(f) (2014), Treas. Reg. §§ 1.402(f)-1, 31.3405(c)-1 (as amended
in 2007); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.402(f)-1 (as amended in 2007), 31.3405(c)-1 (as amended
in 2007). The IRS has provided safe harbor notices. See Notice 2009-68, 2009-2
C.B. 423, updated by Notice 2014-54, 2014-41 I.R.B. 670.
312
See, e.g., Model Notices and Disclosures for Pension Risk Transfers:
Hearing Before the Advisory Council on Employee Welfare and Pension Benefit
Plans 1–2 (May 28, 2015) (statement of Craig Rosenthal, Mercer, on behalf of the
American
Benefits
Council),
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/erisaadvisory
council2015risk11.pdf (on file with author).
313
Model Notices and Disclosures for Pension Risk Transfers: Hearing Before
the Advisory Council on Employee Welfare and Pension Benefit Plans (May 28,
2015) (statement of Erzo F.P. Luttmer, Dartmouth College), http://www.dol.gov/
ebsa/pdf/erisaadvisorycouncil2015risk1.pdf. See also Michael Kitces, How to
Evaluate the Pension Versus Lump Sum Decision, and Strategies for Maximization,
KITCES.COM (July 22, 2015), https://www.kitces.com/blog/how-to-evaluate-the-
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c. Insurance Annuity Risk Transfers
In an insurance annuity risk transfer, the plan sponsor replaces the
participants’ pension benefits with retail annuities.314 Basically, the plan
sponsor purchases a group annuity contract, and the insurer distributes
annuity certificates to the covered individuals.315 Under the minimum
funding rules, however, the plan cannot purchase the group annuity unless
the plan remains at least 80 percent funded after the transaction.316 As with
standard terminations, the selection of an annuity provider is a fiduciary
function, and the plan sponsor must choose the safest available provider.317
After the distribution of the certificates to individual plan participants, those
individuals cease to be covered by the plan.318 That should also free the plan
sponsor from any further fiduciary responsibilities with respect to those
former participants.319
Insurance annuity risk transfers totaled $14.4 billion in 2015, up 54
percent from the previous year.320 Buy-out products accounted for $13.6
billion (95 percent) of the total group annuity risk transfer market in 2015;
pension-versus-lump-sum-decision-and-strategies-for-maximization/; Annuity or
Lump Sum?, PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP. (July 21, 2016),
http://www.pbgc.gov/wr/benefits/annuity-or-lump-sum.html (offering some advice
for making the choice between taking an annuity or a lump sum).
314
See, e.g., Margaret G. McDonald & Scott E. Gaul, Preparing for Pension
Risk Transfer, PRUDENTIAL RET. INS. AND ANNUITY CO. (2015),
http://pensionrisk.prudential.com/pdfs/prep-for-prt_prtwp004_0263513-0000400_2015-06-15.pdf (outlining the steps involved in buy-out transactions).
315
See, e.g., Private Sector Pension De-Risking and Participant Protections:
Hearing Before the Advisory Council on Employee Welfare and Pension Benefit
Plans 4-5 (June 5, 2013) (statement of Robert S. Newman, Covington & Burling
LLP), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/covingtonburling060513.pdf.
316
Id. at 4; ERISA § 206(g), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(g) (2012); I.R.C. § 436(c) (2012).
317
See supra Part III.E.3.a; see also Ellen Shaer, Pension Plans: To Terminate
or Not to Terminate, CAPTRUST (Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.captrustadvisors.com/
resources/institutional-consulting/to-terminate-or-not-to-terminate/.
318
29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-3(d)(2)(ii) (2015).
319
29 C.F.R. § 2509.95-1(b) (2015).
320
Group Annuity Risk Transfer Sales Top $14 Billion in 2015, LIMRA Secure
Retirement Institute Reports, LIFE INS. MKTG. & RESEARCH ASS’N (LIMRA) (Feb.
29, 2016), http://www.limra.com/Posts/PR/News_Releases/Group_Annuity_Risk_
Transfer_Sales_Top_$14_Billion_in_2015,_LIMRA_Secure_Retirement_Institute
_Reports.aspx.
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and single premium buy-ins accounted for just $7.2 million of risk
transfers.321
4. The ERISA Advisory Council’s Recent Focus on
Model Notices and Disclosures for Pension Risk
Transfers
Building on its prior work,322 the ERISA Advisory Council recently
focused on the information that participants need to make informed decisions
when they are faced with lump sum risk transfers and insurance annuity risk
transfers.323 More specifically, in 2015, the ERISA Advisory Council
developed draft model notices and disclosures that can be used by plan
sponsors, participants, and the public.324 On November 4, 2015, the ERISA
Advisory Council presented its findings to the U.S. Department of Labor,
and its final report includes model notices for lump sum risk transfers and
for insurance annuity risk transfers.325 In the end, the guidance that is
321
Id. See also John Manganaro, Pension Risk Transfers Topped $14 Billion
Last Year, PLANADVISER (Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.planadviser.com/PensionRisk-Transfers-Topped-14-Billion-Last-Year/.
322
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE AND PENSION
BENEFIT PLANS, Private Sector Pension De-risking and Participant Protections,
supra note 270.
323
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE AND PENSION
BENEFIT PLANS, Model Notices and Disclosures for Pension Risk Transfers (2015),
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/ACmodelnotice1.pdf.
324
Id.; U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE AND
PENSION BENEFIT PLANS, Model Notices and Disclosures for Pension Risk Transfers
(Nov. 2015), https://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/2015ACreport2.pdf. See also
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BD., Pension Lump-sum Payouts and Your Retirement
Security (Jan. 2016), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201601_cfpb_pensionlump-sum-payouts-and-your-retirement-security.pdf. The author was privileged to
testify before the Advisory Council. Model Notices and Disclosures for Pension Risk
Transfers: Hearing Before the Advisory Council on Employee Welfare and Pension
Benefit Plans (Aug. 18, 2015) (statement of Jonathan Barry Forman, Univ. of Okla.
Coll. of Law), https://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/FormanRiskTransfer081815.pdf.
325
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE AND PENSION
BENEFIT PLANS, Model Notices and Disclosures for Pension Risk Transfers, supra
note 324, at 34 (lump sum notice) & 40 (insurance company risk transfer notice);
ERISA Advisory Council Presents Recommendations to DOL on Lifetime Plan
Participation, Defined Benefit Plan De-Risking, VOYA (Dec. 2015),
https://investments.voya.com/idc/groups/public/documents/retirement/144575.pdf;
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE AND PENSION
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ultimately issued by the U.S. Department of Labor may have a significant
impact on the size and nature of the defined benefit pension plan system and
on the lifetime incomes of its participants.326
IV.

THE ROLE FOR ANNUITIES AND OTHER LIFETIME
INCOME MECHANISMS
A.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE ROLE OF ANNUITIES

As Part II.C.3 above showed, traditional defined benefit pension
plans have been in decline for decades. Individuals now have the primary
responsibility to participate in, contribute to, and manage their retirement
savings accounts throughout their working years; and they must also manage
all of their retirement savings throughout their retirement years. These are
daunting tasks.327 To have adequate income throughout retirement,
individuals have to make good financial choices through their working years
and beyond. They need to make wise choices about when to retire, when to
claim Social Security benefits, how to plan for an unknown length of
retirement, how to plan for medical expenses and long-term care, how to use
a home to provide retirement income, how to manage a retirement portfolio,
and how to convert accumulated retirement savings into a lifetime income
stream.328
That is where traditional pensions, annuities, and similar lifetime
income products come in. Although estimates vary, it seems that relatively
few retirees receive income from traditional pensions and annuities.329
BENEFIT
PLANS,
Lump
Sum
Notice,
etc.
(Nov.
2015),
http://www.americanbenefitscouncil.org/pub/4d76162e-ca83-84d3-e1c3705cf3b07458.
326
Ideally, those disclosure requirements should be designed to give participants
the information that they need to make informed decisions. At the same time,
however, those disclosure requirements should not be so burdensome on plan
sponsors that it spurs them to terminate their plans.
327
See, e.g., Pamela Perun, Retirement Savings: Confronting the Challenge of
Longevity, THE ASPEN INST. INITIATIVE ON FIN. SEC. (2010),
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/pubs/ConfrontingLon
gevity_AspenIFS.pdf.
328
See, e.g., Retiree Lifetime Income: Choices & Considerations, AM. ACAD.
OF ACTUARIES 1, 1–7 (Oct. 2015), http://actuary.org/files/Retiree_Choices_
IB_102215.pdf.
329
See, e.g., Craig Copeland, Pension Income of the Elderly and Characteristics
of Their Former Employers, 28(3) EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. NOTES 2 (2007),
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According to one estimate, in 2010, 44 percent of retirees received income
from a traditional pension and another 10 percent received income from an
annuity.330 Another study suggests that only around one-third of retirees
receive income from annuities, but for the majority, these instruments
provide just 4 percent of their income.331
It is not altogether clear what the “right” level of annuitization is.332
Studies do show that annuitization helps reduce poverty in old age333 and that
retirees who receive lifetime income from annuities or traditional pensions
were generally more satisfied than those without such lifetime income.334 All
in all, while some individuals with low levels of retirement savings might be
better off using their savings for emergencies rather than annuitizing them,335
https://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/ebri_notes_03-20071.pdf.
330
Steve Nyce & Billie Jean Quade, Annuities and Retirement Happiness,
TOWERS WATSON INSIDER 1, 9 n.1 (Sept. 2012), https://www.towerswatson.com/enUS/Insights/Newsletters/Americas/insider/2012/Annuities-and-RetirementHappiness.
331
Danielle Andrus, One-Third of Retirees Receive Annuity Income,
THINKADVISER (Sept. 23, 2011), http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2011/09/23/onethird-of-retirees-receive-annuity-income.
332
See, e.g., Barry P. Bosworth, Gary Burtless & Mattan Alalouf, Do Retired
Americans Annuitize Too Little? Trends in the Share of Annuitized Income, B.C.
CTR. FOR RET. RES. (Working Paper No. 2015-9, June 2015), http://crr.bc.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2015/06/wp_2015-9.pdf (finding little evidence that the annuitylike share of total income has fallen for aged families).
333
See, e.g., Constantijn W.A. Panis & Michael J. Brien, Implications of
Expanded Annuitization for Old-Age Well-being, DELOITTE (Sept. 4, 2015),
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/implicationsofexpandedannuitizationforoldagewellbei
ng.pdf; Natalia S. Orlova, Matthew S. Rutledge & April Yanyuan Wu, The
Transition from Defined Benefit to Defined Contribution Pensions: Does It Influence
Elderly Poverty?, B.C. CTR. FOR RET. RES. (Working Paper No. 2015-17, July
2015), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/wp_2015-17.pdf (finding that
households with pensions that are annuitized with the joint-and-survivor life option
and that do not take lump sum distributions before age 55 are best able to avoid
income and asset poverty).
334
See, e.g., Panis & Brien, supra note 333; Nyce & Quade, Annuities and
Retirement Happiness, supra note 330; Keith A. Bender & Natalia A. Jivan, What
Makes Retirees Happy?, B.C. CTR. FOR RET. RES. (Issue Brief No. 28, Feb. 2005),
http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2005/02/ib_28.pdf;
Constantijn
Panis,
Annuities and Retirement Well-Being, in PENSION DESIGN AND STRUCTURE: NEW
LESSONS FROM BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 259, 259–274 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen
P. Utkus eds., 2004).
335
See, e.g., Cotton, Retirement Savings and Annual Spending, supra note 130;
STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND
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it seems likely that many individuals would be better off if more of their
retirement savings was annuitized.
Unfortunately, people rarely choose to buy annuities voluntarily.336
The demand for annuities is significantly lower than expected, and this
shortfall has come to be known as the “annuity puzzle.”337 Some of the
reasons for the low demand for annuities include: the existence of alternative
annuities such as Social Security, Supplemental Security Income, and
traditional defined benefit plans; a willingness to rely on phased distributions
from defined contribution plans, IRAs, and other retirement savings
vehicles; the desire to leave bequests; the incompleteness or inefficiencies in
the retail annuity market that lead to poor prices for retail annuities; and the
behavioral and cultural challenges involved in getting individuals to make
decisions about complex investments like annuities.338 There are also
BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT SAVING AND CERTAIN
RELATED LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, supra note 37, at 34 (noting that for some
individuals Social Security benefits may provide sufficient lifetime retirement
income).
336
See, e.g., AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, Risky Business: Living Longer Without
Income for Life: Information for Current and Future Retirees, supra note 131
(explaining the advantage of annuities in generating lifetime income).
337
See, e.g., Shlomo Benartzi, Alessandro Previtero & Richard H. Thaler,
Annuitization Puzzles, 25(4) J. ECON. PERSP. 143, 154-57 (2011) (discussing
behavioral and institutional factors leading to the low demand for annuities, and
noting that only 21 percent of defined contribution plans in the United States offer
annuities as an option); Franco Modigliani, Life Cycle, Individual Thrift, and the
Wealth of Nations, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 3, 297, 307 (1986) (“[I]t is a well-known fact
that annuity contracts, other than in the form of group insurance through pension
systems, are extremely rare.”); Menahem E. Yaari, Uncertain Lifetime, Life
Insurance, and the Theory of the Consumer, 32 REV. ECON. STUD. 2, 137 (1965)
(analyzing the effect of the uncertainty of lifespan on consumer behavior).
338
See, e.g., Robert Holzmann, Addressing Longevity Risk through Private
Annuities: Issues and Options (Revised Draft Mar. 30, 2015), http://internationalpension-workshop.com/papers-pdf/Holzmann.pdf; Lee M. Lockwood, Bequest
Motives and the Annuity Puzzle, 15 REV. ECON. DYNAMICS 2, 226 (2012)
(suggesting that people with bequest motives may be better off not annuitizing any
wealth); Kelli Hueler, Paula Hogan & Anna Rappaport, Public Policy and Consumer
Disclosure for the Income Annuity Market, 46 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 3, 795, 807
(2013) (noting that low annuitization rates may indicate problems in the
marketplace); Pinar Çebi, Can Annuities Enhance Retirement Lifestyles?, AM.
COUNCIL FOR CAP. FORMATION, 4-5 (Apr. 2006), http://accf.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/03/annuitiesWhitepaper.pdf (discussing why individuals do
not purchase annuities).
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constraints on the supply of lifetime annuities, including inefficient
regulation of annuity markets and the limited availability of inflationadjusted and longevity assets that can be matched against insurer annuityrelated liabilities.339
Before moving on to considering options for reforming the legal
rules governing annuities and pension distributions in the United States, this
Part of the Article provides a little bit more background on annuities and
annuitization. At the outset, this Part explains the mathematics of converting
a lump sum into an annuity (and vice versa) and looks at how retail annuities
compare with actuarially fair annuities.340 This Part also explores the role of
annuitization around the world. Finally, this Part explores some of the
cultural and economic challenges to increasing annuitization in the United
States.
B.

THE MATHEMATICS OF CONVERTING A LUMP SUM INTO AN
ANNUITY (AND VICE VERSA)

The mathematics of converting a lump sum into an actuarially fair
lifetime annuity is pretty straightforward. If an individual has a fixed
principal sum to invest today, and we know the interest rate that she can earn
and how long she is expected to live, we can determine the annuity amount

See, e.g., Holzmann, Addressing Longevity Risk through Private Annuities:
Issues and Options, supra note 338, at 11–18. (there is not yet much of a market in
longevity bonds—bonds that would pay returns that would be linked to the
survivorship of a given cohort, say, 65-year-old American males born in 1945. See,
e.g., id. at 16–18; Pablo Antolin & Hans Blommestein, Governments and the Market
for Longevity-Indexed Bonds, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., (2007),
http://www.oecd.org/pensions/insurance/37977290.pdf; David Blake, Tom
Boardman & Andrew Cairns, The Case for Longevity Bonds, B.C. CTR. FOR RET.
RES. (Issue Brief No. 10-10, 2010), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/
2010/06/IB_10-10-508.pdf; Abraham & Harris, The Market for Longevity Annuities,
supra note 153, at 23–24.
340
An actuarially fair annuity is one without insurance agent commissions or
insurance company reserves, risk-taking, and profits. See also Guan Gong &
Anthony Webb, Evaluating the Advanced Life Deferred Annuity—An Annuity
People Might Actually Buy 1 n.1, B.C. CTR. FOR RET. RES. (Working Paper No.
2007-15, June 2007), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2007/09/wp_200715.pdf (defining “an actuarially fair annuity as one whose expected return,
discounted by an interest rate and annual survival probabilities derived from
population mortality tables, equals the premium paid”).
339
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that that person (i.e., the annuitant) will receive each period.341 For example,
if an individual has $100,000 to invest in an annuity today, can earn 5 percent
interest per year, and can expect to receive 20 annual annuity payments (i.e.,
live for 20 years), a simple annuity calculator shows that each annual annuity
payment would be $8024.26.342 Annuities typically make monthly payments,
but the mathematical principles are the same for yearly or monthly annuities.
By the same token, the mathematics of converting a lifetime annuity
into a lump sum is also quite straightforward. Basically, a lump sum value is
determined by converting a stream of projected future benefit payments into
a present value.343 Again, the mathematics is pretty straightforward: we just
need to know the applicable interest rate and the number of future benefit
payments that the individual expects to receive.344 The interest rate (also
known as the discount rate) is the rate of return that can be earned on the
investment, and it is determined by market forces. The number of future
benefit payments that the individual is expected to receive is extrapolated
from a mortality table. In our example, when the discount rate is 5 percent,
the present value of a stream of 20 annual payments of $8024.26

The general formula to solve for the periodic annuity amount is: w = [P(1 +
r) r ] / [(1 + r)Y − 1], where P is the present value (= starting principal) of a stream
of annual withdrawal amounts (w) given an interest rate (r) over a number of Years
(Y). See, e.g., MONEY CHIMP, Annuity, http://www.moneychimp.com/articles/
finworks/fmpayout.htm (last visited July 21, 2016).
342
See MONEY CHIMP, Annuity Calculator, http://www.moneychimp.com/
calculator/annuity_calculator.htm (last visited July 21, 2016) (starting Principal:
$100,000.00; growth rate: 5 percent; years to pay out: 20 years; payouts at: the end
of each year; to get Annual Payout Amount = $8024.26).
343
See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-74, PRIVATE
PENSIONS: PARTICIPANTS NEED BETTER INFORMATION WHEN OFFERED LUMP SUMS
THAT REPLACE THEIR LIFETIME BENEFITS, supra note 268, at 60.
344
Here is a very simple present value example. Suppose you have $1000 today,
and you can earn 10 percent annual interest on an investment. That means you could
earn $100 interest in a year ($100 = 10 percent × $1000), and if you made that
investment and held it for one year, you would have $1100 at the end of the year
($1100 = $1000 + $100), and the present value of the right to receive $1100 in one
year is $1000. Similarly, if you kept your money in that investment for another year
(two years total), it would grow to $1210 ($110 = 10 percent × $1100; $1210 =
$1100 + $110); and the present value of the right to receive $1210 in two years is
$1000. The general formula for the present value of a stream of annuity payments
is: P = w[(1 + r)Y − 1] / [(1 + r)Yr] where P is the present value (= starting principal)
of a stream of annual withdrawal amounts (w) given an interest rate (r) over a
number of Years (Y), see, e.g., MONEY CHIMP, Annuity, supra note 341.
341
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commencing one year from today is $100,000.345 In short, the present value
of a 20-year, $8024.26-per-year annuity is $100,000 (that is, when a 5
percent interest rate and a 20-year life expectancy are the correct actuarial
assumptions). Accordingly, $100,000 would be the minimum actuariallyequivalent lump sum that must be offered to a participant getting a lump sum
distribution instead of an $8024.26 per year pension.346
C.

RETAIL ANNUITIES VERSUS ACTUARIALLY FAIR ANNUITIES

Compared to actuarially fair annuities,347 retail annuities can be quite
expensive. Indeed, experts estimate that the typical insurance company
lifetime annuity has a 12 percent “load” factor due to the combination of
administrative expenses and adverse selection.348 That is, the typical retail
lifetime annuity provides benefits that are worth just 88 percent of an
actuarially fair annuity (i.e., a “money’s worth ratio” of 88 percent).349 Put
differently, the payouts from actuarially fair annuities would be around 15
percent higher than what can actually be purchased in current annuity
markets.350
See MONEY CHIMP, Present Value of an Annuity Calculator,
http://www.moneychimp.com/calculator/present_value_annuity_calculator.htm
(last visited July 21, 2016) (Annual payout: $8024.26; growth rate: 5 percent; years
to pay out: 20 years; make payouts at: the end of each year; calculate and get present
value = $100,000.02).
346
See supra Parts III.B.1 & III.E.3.b (discussing the relative valuation rules
used to compute lump sum payouts).
347
See supra note 340 and accompanying text.
348
See, e.g., MARK J. WARSHAWSKY, RETIREMENT INCOME: RISKS AND
STRATEGIES 66 (2012) (“[D]ue to a combination of administrative costs and
selection effects, the nominal annuity is assumed to have a money’s worth ratio of
0.88, that is, the couple faces a 12 percent load factor on their annuity purchase.”).
349
Id.
350
Id.; see also James Poterba, Steven Venti & David Wise, The Composition
and Drawdown of Wealth in Retirement, 25(4) J. ECON. PERSP. 95, 102 tbl.3 (Fall
2011) (showing that the actuarially fair lifetime annuity for a 65-year-old-man in
2008 was 9.95 percent while the Annuity Shopper price for a retail lifetime annuity
at that time was just 8.46 percent, indicating a load factor of 17.6 percent [17.6
percent = 9.95 percent/8.46 percent – 100 percent]); Jeffrey R. Brown, Olivia S.
Mitchell & James M. Poterba, The Role of Real Annuities and Indexed Bonds in an
Individual Accounts Retirement Program, RISK ASPECTS OF INVESTMENT-BASED
SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM 321, 321–322 (John Y. Campbell & Martin Feldstein,
eds., 2001) (“[T]he expected present value of annuity payouts is typically below the
purchase price of the annuity . . . .”); James M. Poterba & Mark Warshawsky, The
345
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Basically, individuals are rarely able to purchase actuarially fair
annuities in the retail annuities market. In that regard, however, it is worth
emphasizing that, in effect, the Social Security system does allow workers
to buy actuarially fair lifetime annuities merely by delaying retirement
beyond age 62.351
Finally, it is worth noting that there are a few other problems with
annuity markets in the United States. One problem has to do with the rates
of return on annuities. While many analysts believe that stocks do better than
bonds in the long run,352 retail prices for annuities are tied to the relatively
low yields that accompany bond rates.353 That can make annuities relatively
unattractive investments compared to stock-based mutual funds.354
Costs of Annuitizing Retirement Payouts from Individual Accounts, in
ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS OF INVESTMENT-BASED SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM 173,
173–174 (John B. Shoven, ed., 2000) (“The cost of such annuities, including both
administrative and sales costs, the ‘adverse selection’ costs associated with
voluntary purchase behavior, and return on capital for the insurance company
offering the annuity policy, affect the retirement income that the participant receives
for a given level of wealth accumulation.”); Benjamin M. Friedman & Mark J.
Warshawsky, The Cost of Annuities: Implications for Saving Behavior and Bequests,
105(1) Q. J. ECON. 135, 152 (1990) (arguing that actuarially-unfair annuity costs are
a cause of lack of public participation in the individual lifetime annuity market);
Olivia S. Mitchell, James M. Poterba, Mark J. Warshawsky & Jeffrey R. Brown,
New Evidence on the Money’s Worth of Individual Annuities, 89 AM. ECON. REV.
1299, 1309 (1999) (finding that a typical retiree “would perceive a noticeable
‘transaction cost’ when purchasing an annuity from a retail insurance carrier”);
Elizabeth Bauer, Decumulation for a New Generation, in Soc’y of Actuaries,
Diverse Risks: 2016 Call for Essays, supra note 130, at 28.
351
See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text.
352
Jonathan Burton, Stocks or Bonds? The Pros Say..., WALL STREET JOURNAL
(Jan. 9, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240529702047911045771
0837231308403. See generally JEREMY J. SIEGEL, STOCKS FOR THE LONG RUN (5th
ed., 2014).
353
Oakley, Retirement Security Risks: What Role can Annuities Play in Easing
Risks in Public Pension Plans?, supra note 1, at 16–17.
354
Certainly, the prices of fixed annuities are tied to bond prices. On the other
hand, variable annuities typically allow the annuitant to invest in equities, at least
during the accumulation phase. See, e.g., U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, Variable
Annuities: What You Should Know, supra note 141. For example, TIAA’s College
Retirement Equity Funds (CREF) operates eight investment accounts that differ by
objective: stocks, bonds, money market, and social choice. See Prospectus, College
Retirement Equities Fund, TIAA GLOBAL ASSET MANAGEMENT 26 (May 1, 2016).
https://www.tiaa.org/public/pdf/cref_prospectus.pdf).
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Another problem is that there is relatively little disclosure of the fees
that insurance companies and agents charge for annuities.355 In the end that
means that annuities are sold not bought, and the financial advisers and
insurance agents selling annuities “can put their own financial interests ahead
of the interests of the person they are advising.”356 In that regard, agents may
be motivated to sell products that will generate bigger fees, perks, or even
kickbacks.357 The U.S. Department of Labor’s new fiduciary conflict-ofinterest rule should help improve retail annuity prices, at least with respect
to the sale of annuities to pension plan participants and IRA holders.358
D.

THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF LIFE EXPECTANCY

While lifetime pensions and annuities offer a great way to protect
against longevity risk, annuities may be more valuable for some
demographic groups than others. In that regard, life expectancy varies with
such demographic factors as gender, income, educational level, and race and
Hispanic origin.359 Indeed, as already mentioned, women tend to live longer
than men,360 and because of that, insurance companies tend to make smaller
Oakley, Retirement Security Risks: What Role can Annuities Play in Easing
Risks in Public Pension Plans?, supra note 1, at 16; Hueler et al., Public Policy and
Consumer Disclosure for the Income Annuity Market, supra note 338.
356
Memorandum from Office of Senator Elizabeth Warren, Villas, Castles, and
Vacations: How Perks and Giveaways Create Conflicts of Interest in the Annuity
Industry 2 (Oct. 2015) (on file with Office of Senator Elizabeth Warren at
http://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/2015-1027_Senator_Warren_Report_on_Annuity_Industry.pdf).
357
Id. at 2. The report notes that in addition to cash compensation to annuity
sellers, companies “may offer “non-cash compensation” such as merchandise, gifts,
marketing support, sponsorships, seminars, entertainment and travel expenses.” Id.
at 7 n.44 (quoting from a variable annuity contract prospectus of Lincoln National
Life Insurance Company); see also Lincoln National Life Insurance Company,
Lincoln ChoicePlus AssuranceSM (B Share) Individual Variable Annuity Contracts
Lincoln Life Variable Annuity Account N 135 (May 1, 2015) (unpublished
manuscript),
http://vpx.newriver.com/print.asp?clientid=lfgvpx&fundid=53422
E439&doctype=pros.
358
See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.
359
See, e.g., National Center for Health Statistics: Life Expectancy, CTR. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/life-expectancy.htm (last
visited Apr. 27, 2016) (various sources of data related to life expectancy); Forman,
Supporting the Oldest Old: The Role of Social Insurance, Pensions, and Financial
Products, supra note 161, at 384–85 and sources cited therein.
360
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
355
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lifetime annuity payments to women than to same-age men,361 although
pension plans are not permitted to discriminate in that way.362 It is also well
established that people with higher incomes tend to live longer than people
with lower incomes.363 Also, healthy individuals tend to live longer than
unhealthy individuals.364 All in all, policymakers need to bear in mind that
some policies to encourage greater annuitization might have undesirable
distributional consequences.365
E.

WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM OTHER COUNTRIES?

The demand for and supply of lifetime annuities are consistently low
in most of the world, although there are a few notable exceptions.366 The gold
See supra notes 144–147 and accompanying text.
See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
363
See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-354, RETIREMENT
SECURITY: SHORTER LIFE EXPECTANCY REDUCES PROJECTED LIFETIME BENEFITS
FOR LOWER EARNERS 21 (2016) http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/676086.pdf
(discussing studies that show that lower-income men approaching retirement, live
on average 3.6 to 12.7 fewer years than higher-income men). See also Raj Chetty et
al., The Association Between Income and Life Expectancy in the United States,
2001–2014, 315 (16) J. OF THE AM. MED. ASS’N 1750 (2016); Forman, Supporting
the Oldest Old: The Role of Social Insurance, Pensions, and Financial Products,
supra note 161, at 384–385 and sources cited therein.
There is also some evidence that working longer may lead to living longer. See, e.g.,
Chenkai Wu, Michelle C. Odden, Gwenith G. Fisher & Robert S. Stawski,
Association of retirement age with mortality: a population-based longitudinal study
among older adults in the USA, J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH (Mar. 21,
2016), http://jech.bmj.com/content/early/2016/03/21/jech-2015-207097 (suggesting
that early retirement may be a risk factor for mortality and that prolonging working
life may provide survival benefits).
364
For example, mortality tables show that healthy individuals have lower death
probabilities than the general population. See, e.g., Soc’y of Actuaries, RP-2014
Rates; Total Dataset, supra note 219 (comparing death probabilities at various ages
for employees, healthy annuitants, and disabled retirees). An individual’s death
probability is her probability of dying within one year. See, e.g., SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
Period Life Table, 2013, supra note 132.
365
In that regard, for example, life expectancy differences reduce the
progressivity of the Social Security system. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
GAO-16-354, RETIREMENT SECURITY: SHORTER LIFE EXPECTANCY REDUCES
PROJECTED LIFETIME BENEFITS FOR LOWER EARNERS, supra note 363, at 33–35.
366
See, e.g., Holzmann, Addressing Longevity Risk through Private Annuities:
Issues and Options, supra note 338, at 1; Çebi, Can Annuities Enhance Retirement
361
362
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standard is probably the Netherlands, where benefits from occupational
pensions must be paid out in the form of an inflation-indexed annuity to
qualify for tax benefits.367
In many countries, however, participants can choose among lump
sum distributions, phased withdrawals, and annuities, just as they often can
in the United States. Experiences vary, but there are at least a few countries
where participants generally select annuitization. For example, in
Switzerland, around 80 percent of retirement savings accumulations are
converted to lifetime annuities;368 and, in Chile, 70 percent of retirees choose
lifetime annuitization of their public pension benefits over the phasedwithdrawal alternative.369 On the other hand, annuitization in Australia is
extremely rare.370 For example, in 2012, half of those who accessed their
Lifestyles?, supra note 338, at 6; Ken Hohman, Lifetime Income: An International
Worry, BRYAN, PENDLETON, SWATS & MCALLISTER, LLC, DEVELOPMENTS, WELLS
FARGO 2 (Jan./Feb. 2016), https://www08.wellsfargomedia.com/assets/pdf/
commercial/retirement-employee-benefits/bpsm/dev_2016-jan-feb.pdf (discussing
lifetime income in the U.S., Australia, and the United Kingdom  worrying that
“there is an international concern of a cohort of 85-year-old retirees running out of
money”); Mitchell & Piggot, Turning Wealth into Lifetime Income: The Challenge
Ahead, in SECURING LIFELONG RETIREMENT INCOME: GLOBAL ANNUITY MARKETS
AND POLICY, supra note 142, at 1, 3–5; Robert Rocha, Dimitri Vittas & Heinz P.
Rudolph, Annuities and Other Retirement Products: Designing the Payout Phase,
WORLD BANK 179 (2011), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/
10986/2272/600520PUB0ID181rement09780821385739.pdf?sequence=1.
367
John A. Turner & Nari Rhee, Lessons for Private Sector Retirement Security
from Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands, NAT’L INST. ON RET. SEC. (Issue
Brief, Aug. 2013), at 20, http://www.nirsonline.org/storage/nirs/documents/
International%20Paper/final_international_august_2013.pdf.
368
Holzmann, Addressing Longevity Risk through Private Annuities: Issues and
Options, supra note 338, at 2; Monika Bütler & Federica Teppa, The Choice Between
an Annuity and a Lump Sum: Results from Swiss Pension Funds, 91(10) J. PUB.
ECON.
1944
(2007),
http://www.dnb.nl/en/binaries/Buetler_Teppa_JPub_
07_tcm47-172517.pdf; see also Bütler & Staubli, Payouts in Switzerland:
Explaining Developments in Annuitization, in SECURING LIFELONG RETIREMENT
INCOME: GLOBAL ANNUITY MARKETS AND POLICY, supra note 142, at 195.
369
Holzmann, Addressing Longevity Risk through Private Annuities: Issues and
Options, supra note 338, at 2; see also Ruiz & Mitchell, Pension Payouts in Chile:
Past, Present, and Future Prospects, in SECURING LIFELONG RETIREMENT INCOME:
GLOBAL ANNUITY MARKETS AND POLICY, supra note 142, at 106.
370
Julie Agnew, Australia’s Retirement System: Strengths, Weaknesses, and
Reforms, B.C. CTR. FOR RET. RES. (Issue Brief No. 13-5, Apr. 2013),
http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/IB_13-5-508.pdf; The Challenge of
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Superannuation Funds took lump sums, and 98 percent of the rest chose
phased withdrawal over an annuity.371 The United Kingdom used to have
high levels of annuitization, but it recently moved away from requiring
retirees to purchase annuities,372 and even more recently, it gave existing
annuity holders more freedom to sell their existing annuity contracts.373
When coupled with the shift towards more lump sum distributions
that we see in the United States, it seems that the international trend favors
giving individuals more choices about how to manage their retirement
Longevity Risk: Making Retirement Income Last a Lifetime, supra note 1, at 13–16.
371
Agnew, Australia’s Retirement System: Strengths, Weaknesses, and
Reforms, supra note 370, at 4. Lump sum benefit payments were 51.4 percent of
total benefit payments in the year ending June 30, 2015, and 48.6 percent were
pension benefits (including phased withdrawals and annuities). Statistics: Annual
Superannuation Bulletin, AUSTL. PRUDENTIAL REL. AUTHORITY at 2, 7, tbl.4 (June
2015), http://www.apra.gov.au/Super/Documents/2016ASBPDF201506.pdf. See
also Jonathan Barry Forman & Gordon D. Mackenzie, Optimal Rules for Defined
Contribution Plans: What Can We Learn from the U.S. and Australian Pension
Systems?, 66(3) TAX LAW. 613, 645 (Spring 2013); Bateman & Piggott, Too Much
Risk to Insure? The Australian (non-) Market for Annuities, in SECURING LIFELONG
RETIREMENT INCOME: GLOBAL ANNUITY MARKETS AND POLICY, supra note 142, at
50.
372
See, e.g., Dan Hyde, Budget 2014: How Will the New Pensions System
Work?, THE TELEGRAPH (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
finance/personalfinance/pensions/10710606/Budget-2014-How-will-the-newpensions-system-work.html; Pension Flexibility, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS
UK.GOV (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.gov.uk/ government/publications/pensionflexibility-2016/pension-flexibility-2016; Joseph A. Tomlinson, Eyewitness to
History
in
the
UK,
RET.
INCOME
J.
(Mar.
20,
2014),
http://retirementincomejournal.com/issue/march-20-2014/article/eyewitness-tohistory-in-the-uk; HM TREASURY, REMOVING THE REQUIREMENT TO ANNUITISE BY
AGE 75
(2010),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/81232/consult_age_75_annuity.pdf. See also Cannon &
Tonks, Compulsory and Voluntary Annuity Markets in the United Kingdom, in
SECURING LIFELONG RETIREMENT INCOME: GLOBAL ANNUITY MARKETS AND
POLICY, supra note 142, at 171; The Challenge of Longevity Risk: Making
Retirement Income Last a Lifetime, supra note 1, at 17–21.
373
See, e.g., Tanya Jefferies, Five Million Pensioners Given Chance to Offload
Unwanted Annuities for Cash from April 2017, THIS IS MONEY (Dec. 15, 2015),
http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/pensions/article-3360602/Pensioners-givenchance-offload-unwanted-annuities-cash-April-2017.html; Existing pensioners to
be allowed to ‘sell’ annuities from 2016, UK government announces, OUT-LAW.COM
(Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2015/march/existingpensioners-to-be-allowed-to-sell-annuities-from-2016-uk-government-announces/.
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savings, even if those choices result in less annuitization. Still, there is a lot
that the United States can learn from other countries about how to help
Americans get secure streams of lifetime income.374 For example, the United
States can probably learn from the various strategies that other countries use
to increase participants’ knowledge and understanding of their spend-down
options.375 Some countries also make it harder for financial advisers to
charge high commissions or offer inappropriate investment advice.376
Many countries also use incentives and withdrawal rules to help
encourage annuitization.377 For example, in Switzerland, some plans use
annuities as the default form of distribution, although participants can opt
out.378 Several countries require participants to meet certain minimumretirement-income requirements if they want to withdraw all or part of their
defined contribution plan assets as a lump sum.379 Also, while plan sponsors
in the United States have a fiduciary obligation to assess the financial
stability of the insurance companies that sell annuities to the plans, plan
sponsors in many countries have no such obligation.380 Instead, plan
sponsors in those countries can simply rely on insurance regulators and
industry standards to oversee and monitor annuity providers.381
All in all, the international trend seems to be to give participants
access to multiple spend-down options. At the same time, however, many
countries are trying to find strategies to increase participants’ knowledge and
understanding of annuity options, and they are also using withdrawal rules
and limits on lump sum distributions to encourage participants to select those
annuity options.
F.

CHALLENGES TO ANNUITIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES

There are a number of cultural and economic challenges to
increasing annuitization in the United States. In particular, as Part II.F above
showed, many Americans have simply not saved enough in their retirement
374
See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-9, 401(K) PLANS:
OTHER COUNTRIES’ EXPERIENCES OFFER LESSONS IN POLICIES AND OVERSIGHT OF
SPEND-DOWN OPTIONS (Nov. 2013), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/659169.pdf.
375
Id. at 24–32.
376
Id. at 34.
377
Id. at 32–33, 35–37.
378
Id. at 32.
379
Id. at 35.
380
Id. at 37–39.
381
Id.
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plans or otherwise to make annuitization practical. Americans also have a
woefully low level of financial literacy, and that limited financial literacy
makes it hard for them to conduct meaningful retirement planning.382
Annuities are particular hard for individuals to understand and appreciate.383
For example, individuals often underestimate their life expectancies and
overvalue the modest lump sums that they have accumulated.384
V.

OPTIONS FOR REFORM

This Part considers a variety of possible legislative and regulatory
changes that could encourage greater annuitization of retirement savings.
A.

INCREASE AND PRESERVE RETIREMENT SAVINGS
1. Encourage Workers to Save More for Retirement

At the outset, government policies could be designed to encourage
workers to save more for retirement.385 If workers saved more during their
See, e.g., Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, The Economic
Importance of Financial Literacy: Theory and Evidence, 52(1) J. OF ECON. LIT. 5
(2014); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-242, RETIREMENT SECURITY:
BETTER INFORMATION ON INCOME REPLACEMENT RATES NEEDED TO HELP
WORKERS PLAN FOR RETIREMENT 4–5 (2016), http://www.gao.gov/
assets/680/675526.pdf; FINRA Investor Education Foundation, Financial
Capability in the United States 2016 (2016), http://www.usfinancialcapability.org/
downloads/NFCS_2015_Report_Natl_Findings.pdf.
383
See, e.g., John Beshears, James J. Choi, David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian
& Stephen P. Zeldes, What Makes Annuitization More Appealing?, 116 J. PUB.
ECON. 2 (Aug. 2014), http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S004727271300114X.
384
See, e.g., Soc’y of Actuaries, Key Findings and Issues: Longevity: 2011 Risks
and Process of Retirement Survey Report 4, 9 (June 2012),
https://www.soa.org/research/research-projects/pension/research-post-retirementneeds-and-risks.aspx (finding that more than half of survey respondents
underestimated population longevity); Rafaloff, supra note 274 (noting that
“participants tend to underestimate future income needs and overestimate the wealth
effect a lump sum offer conveys”).
385
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-408, RETIREMENT SECURITY:
LOW DEFINED CONTRIBUTION SAVINGS MAY POSE CHALLENGES, supra note 190, at
26–42 (discussing a variety of individual and employer decisions that could
substantially raise defined contribution plan savings rates, especially for low-income
workers).
382
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careers, they would have larger nest eggs at retirement and a greater ability
to buy annuities and other lifetime income products. Perhaps the best way to
increase retirement savings would be for the United States to adopt a
mandatory universal pension system like Australia, Singapore, and Chile
have done.386 A recent proposal would require employees without a pension
plan to contribute 3 percent of pay to new guaranteed retirement accounts
that would provide lifetime annuities.387
A less intrusive federal mandate would be to require employers
without plans to at least offer automatic payroll-deduction IRAs to their
employees.388 The United Kingdom’s new National Employment Savings
See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-642, PRIVATE
PENSIONS: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES COULD ADDRESS RETIREMENT RISKS FACED
BY WORKERS BUT POSE TRADE-OFFS 20-26 (2009), http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d09642.pdf; TERESA GHILARDUCCI, WHEN I’M SIXTY-FOUR: THE PLOT
AGAINST PENSIONS AND THE PLAN TO SAVE THEM 260–92 (2008); Forman &
Mackenzie, Optimal Rules for Defined Contribution Plans: What Can We Learn
from the U.S. and Australian Pension Systems?, supra note 371, at 625; Jonathan
Barry Forman, Should We Replace the Current Pension System with a Universal
Pension System?, 16(2) J. PENSION BENEFITS 48 (2009); Jonathan Barry Forman &
Adam Carasso, Tax Considerations in a Universal Pension System, URBANBROOKINGS TAX POL’Y CTR. (Dec. 20, 2007), http://www.urban.org/
publications/411593.html.
387
See, e.g., GHILARDUCCI, WHEN I’M SIXTY-FOUR: THE PLOT AGAINST
PENSIONS AND THE PLAN TO SAVE THEM, supra note 386; Teresa Ghilarducci &
Hamilton E. James, Opinion, A Smarter Plan to Make Retirement Savings Last, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 2, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/02/opinion/a-smarterplanto-make-retirement-savings-last.html?_r=0.
388
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, General Explanations of the Administration’s
Fiscal Year 2017 Revenue Proposals 134 (Feb. 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2017.pdf;
U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-699, AUTOMATIC IRAS: LOWER-EARNING
HOUSEHOLDS COULD REALIZE INCREASES IN RETIREMENT INCOME (2013),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/657171.pdf; William G. Gale & David C. John, The
President’s 2013 Budget Would Enable Almost All Americans to Save for
Retirement, BROOKINGS (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.brookings.edu/
opinions/2012/0215_budget_retirement_gale_john.aspx; J. Mark Iwry & David C.
John, Pursuing Universal Retirement Security Through Automatic IRAs,
BROOKINGS (July 1, 2009), https://www.brookings.edu/research/pursuinguniversal-retirement-security-through-automatic-iras-2/; Benjamin H. Harris &
Rachel M. Johnson, Economic Effects of Automatic Enrollment in Individual
Retirement Accounts, AARP PUB. POL’Y INST. (Research Report No. 2012-04,
2012),
http://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/research/public_policy_institute/
econ_sec/2012/Economic-Effects-of-Auto-IRA-Research-Report-AARP-ppi-econ386
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Trust (NEST) program is an example of this type of mandate.389 Pertinent
here, the Obama Administration recently rolled out no-fee retirement savings
accounts known as myRAs, short for My Retirement Account.390 A number
of state governments in the United States are also considering requiring
employers to at least offer pension plans to their uncovered workers.391 In
that regard, the U.S. Department of Labor recently issued guidance that will
make it easier for state governments to set up state-managed retirement plans
for private-sector workers.392 In general, automatically enrolling workers
sec.pdf; Benjamin H. Harris & Ilana Fischer, The Population of Workers Covered
by the Auto IRA: Trends and Characteristics, AARP PUB. POL’Y INST. (Research
Report No. 2012-03, 2012), http://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/research/
public_policy_institute/econ_sec/2012/Population-of-Workers-Auto-IRA-Trendsand-Characteristics-Research-Report-AARP-ppi-econ-sec.pdf
(finding
that
between 24 million and 43 million workers—approximately one-quarter of the
workforce—would be eligible for automatic enrollment in the proposals then under
consideration in Congress). The U.S. Government Accountability Office estimates
that if all employees were offered a defined contribution plan by their employees,
savings would go up by around 18 percent. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
GAO-16-408, RETIREMENT SECURITY: LOW DEFINED CONTRIBUTION SAVINGS MAY
POSE CHALLENGES, supra note 190, at 31–33.
389
See, e.g., Steven S. Sass, The U.K.’s Ambitious New Retirement Savings
Initiative, B.C. CTR. FOR RET. RES. (Issue in Brief No. 14-5, Mar. 2014),
http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/IB_14-5-508.pdf.
390
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, myRA, https://myra.gov (last visited
July 21, 2016); U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, U.S. Treasury Launches myRA (my
Retirement Account) to Help Bridge America’s Retirement Savings Gap (Nov. 4,
2015), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0250.aspx.
391
See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-556, RETIREMENT
SECURITY: FEDERAL ACTION COULD HELP STATE EFFORTS TO EXPAND PRIVATE
SECTOR COVERAGE 25–49 (2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672419.pdf; and
sources cited at AARP, State Policy: State Retirement Savings Resource Center,
http://www.aarp.org/ppi/state-retirement-plans/state-policy (last visited July 21,
2016).
392
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., State Retirement
Initiatives Get Guidance from US Labor Department (Press Release No. 15-2218NAT,
Nov.
16,
2015),
https://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/ebsa/
EBSA20152218.htm; U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN.,
Interpretive Bulletin Relating to State Savings Programs That Sponsor or Facilitate
Plans Covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 C.F.R.
Part 2509 (2015), https://webapps.dol.gov/federalregister/PdfDisplay.aspx?DocId=
28540; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-556, RETIREMENT SECURITY:
FEDERAL ACTION COULD HELP STATE EFFORTS TO EXPAND PRIVATE SECTOR
COVERAGE, supra note 391, at 51.
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into these types of individual retirement savings accounts should achieve
higher levels of participation.393 Automatic enrollment and similar
behavioral economics nudges are not likely to solve the problem of
inadequate retirement savings,394 but they are better than nothing.
There are also a variety of other proposals to expand the current
voluntary pension system. For example, both Congress and the Obama
Administration recommended amending ERISA to permit unaffiliated
employers to join multiple-employer plans (MEPs).395 The Obama
Administration also recommended expanding to expand coverage to allow
long-term, part-time workers to participate in existing retirement plans.396
Under the proposal, employees who have worked at least 500 hours a year
for three years for an employer with a 401(k) plan would be allowed to
contribute to the plan.397
The Obama Administration also recommended tripling the
retirement plan start-up tax credit for small businesses—from the current
maximum of $500 per year for three years to a maximum of $1500 per year
for four years.398 Also, many believe that making the $1000 retirement
saver’s tax credit refundable would help encourage low-income workers to
save for retirement.399 Finally, the U.S. Government Accountability Office
Eduardo Porter, Nudges Aren’t Enough for Problems Like Retirement
Savings, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/
2016/02/24/business/economy/nudges-arent-enough-to-solve-societysproblems.html.
394
Id.
395
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, General Explanations of the Administration’s
Fiscal Year 2017 Revenue Proposals, supra note 388, at 147; STAFF OF THE J.
COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING
TO TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT SAVING AND CERTAIN RELATED LEGISLATIVE
PROPOSALS, supra note 37, at 65–71.
396
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, General Explanations of the Administration’s
Fiscal Year 2017 Revenue Proposals, supra note 388, at 140; STAFF OF THE J.
COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING
TO TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT SAVING AND CERTAIN RELATED LEGISLATIVE
PROPOSALS, supra note 37, at 77–80.
397
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, General Explanations of the Administration’s
Fiscal Year 2017 Revenue Proposals, supra note 388, at 140.
398
Id. at 136–37.
399
See, e.g., William G. Gale, David C. John & Spencer Smith, New Ways to
Promote Retirement Savings, AARP PUB. POL’Y INST. 19–24 (Research Report No.
2012-9, Oct. 2012), http://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/research/public_policy_
institute/econ_sec/2012/new-ways-promote-retirement-saving-AARP-pp-econsec.pdf.
393
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estimates that the elimination of pension eligibility and vesting waitingperiods would increase retirement savings by 10 percent overall, and by 15
percent for low-income workers.400
2. Help Participants Get Better Returns on Their
Retirement Savings
In addition to getting workers to save more, government policies
could encourage workers to do a better job with their investments. In that
regard, the qualified default investment alternatives (QDIA) regulations have
already helped move millions of participants away from low-yield, stablevalue bond funds and towards better-diversified investments like target-date
funds.401 The U.S. Department of Labor could clarify those QDIA
regulations402 and also make it easier for plan sponsors to include annuities
in their line-up of QDIA investment alternatives.403
The government could also do a better job of regulating the fees and
expenses associated with retirement plans. In that regard, high fees can
significantly reduce the size of retirement nest eggs. 404 The U.S. Department
of Labor’s new fiduciary conflict-of-interest rule should help.405 Managing
retirement savings is a challenging task,406 and, as a result, many Americans
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF, GAO-16-408, RETIREMENT SECURITY:
LOW DEFINED CONTRIBUTION SAVINGS MAY POSE CHALLENGES, supra note 191, at
36–37.
401
See supra notes 254–261 and accompanying text.
402
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-578, 401(K) PLANS:
CLEARER REGULATIONS COULD HELP PLAN SPONSORS CHOOSE INVESTMENTS FOR
PARTICIPANTS (2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672140.pdf.
403
Jeffrey Brown, Opinion, Income As the Outcome: Reframing The 401(k)
Plan, FORBES.COM (Feb. 17, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/.
404
See, e.g., Jonathan Barry Forman, The Future of 401(k) Plan Fees, 2007
N.Y.U. REV. OF EMP. BENEFITS & EXEC. COMP. 9-1. See also Sean Collins, Sarah
Holden, James Duvall & Elena Barone, The Economics of Providing 401(k) Plans:
Services, Fees, and Expenses, 2015, 22(4) ICI RES. PERSP. (July 2016),
https://www.ici.org/pdf/per22-04.pdf (showing that the fees paid by 401(k) plan
participants for investing in mutual funds have fallen substantially since 2000).
405
See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.
406
For example, pension plan participants need to decide whether to keep their
money in the retirement plan, roll it over to an IRA, or take a lump sum distribution.
Moreover, participants and former participants face a dizzying array of investment
alternatives, including savings accounts, money market accounts, mutual funds,
exchange-traded funds, individual stocks and bonds, and annuities. See e.g., Sally
Herigstad, 6 Surprising IRA Investment Option, BANKRATE.COM,
400
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seek investment advice from financial advisers.407 Often, however, the
compensation that those financial advisers receive can vary depending on the
investment products that the savers choose.408 That opened the door to
conflicted advice that could put the rewards for the adviser ahead of the best
interests of the savers. That conflicted advice can easily result in lower
investment returns (net of fees). For example, a recent study by President
Barrack Obama’s Council of Economic Advisors estimated that conflicted
advice led to returns that are about one percentage point lower each year,409
and that, over a 30-year retirement, a retiree receiving such conflicted advice
would lose an estimated 12 percent of her savings.410 Eventually, the new
fiduciary conflict-of-interest rule should result in better advice at lower costs
for pension plan participants and IRA holders, and that should translate into
higher returns on their retirement savings.411
Another way to help retirees get better returns on their retirement
savings would be to encourage retirees to keep their savings in their
relatively low-cost pension plans, as opposed to rolling their balances over
into relatively higher-cost IRAs. Because there are economies of scale,
pension plans tend to have much lower fees per participant than IRAs.412
Unfortunately, the vast majority of retirees move their defined-contribution
plan savings to IRAs soon after they retire. For example, according to a
recent Vanguard study, after five years less than 20 percent of participants

http://www.bankrate.com/finance/retirement/6-surprising-ira-investment-options7.aspx (last updated Sept. 23, 2016).
407
Choosing a financial adviser is itself a challenging task. See, e.g., Know Your
Financial Adviser, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://files.
consumerfinance.gov/f/201311_cfpb_flyer_senior-financial-advisors.pdf
(last
visited July 22, 2016).
408
See, e.g., Memorandum from Office of Senator Elizabeth Warren, supra note
356.
409
COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, The Effects of
Conflicted Investment Advice on Retirement Savings 2 (2015),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/cea_coi_report_final.pdf.
410
Id. at 3. Given that some $1.7 trillion of IRA assets are invested in products
that generate payments to financial advisers that generate conflicts of interest, the
Council of Economic Advisers estimated that conflicted advice cost those savers
about $17 billion a year. Id. at 3.
411
See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.
412
See, e.g., Forman, The Future of 401(k) Plan Fees, supra note 404, at 9-6.
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remained in their defined contribution plans.413 Better financial education
could help encourage participants to keep their savings in those low-cost
pension plans, and plan sponsors could also be encouraged to make it easier
for participants to take partial distributions as needed, rather than lump sum
distributions.414 Pertinent here, the 2015 ERISA Advisory Council made
suggestions for plan sponsor education and a model notice that employers
could use to encourage plan participants to keep their retirement savings in
their pension plans rather than rolling their retirement savings into IRAs or
taking lump sum distributions.415
3. Encourage Workers to Work Longer
The government could also encourage workers to remain in the
workforce longer.416 Working longer increases retirement savings and
reduces the number of years that retirement savings need to cover, thereby
increasing annual income when workers actually retire.417 For example,
because Social Security provides actuarial increases in benefits to those who
Jean A. Young, Retirement Distribution Decisions Among DC
Participants—An update, VANGUARD (2015), https://institutional.vanguard.com/
iam/pdf/CRRRDDCP.pdf?cbdForceDomain=false.
414
Id.
415
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE AND PENSION
BENEFIT PLANS, Model Notices and Plan Sponsor Education on Lifetime Plan
Participation (Nov. 2015), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/aboutebsa/about-us/erisa-advisory-council/2015ACreport1.pdf.
416
Forman, Supporting the Oldest Old: The Role of Social Insurance, Pensions,
and Financial Products, supra note 161, at 406–07; Alicia H. Munnell, Natalia
Sergeyevna Orlova & Anthony Webb, How Important is Asset Allocation to
Financial Security in Retirement?, B.C. CTR. FOR RET. (Working Paper No. 201213, Apr. 2012), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/wp-2012-13.pdf.
417
See, e.g., Jack VanDerhei & Craig Copeland, The Impact of Deferring
Retirement Age on Retirement Income Adequacy, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. (Issue
Brief
No.
358,
2011),
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_062011_No358_Defr-Ret.pdf; Joseph Quinn, Kevin Cahill & Michael Giandrea, Early
Retirement: The Dawn of a New Era?14, TIAA-CREF INST. (Policy Brief, July
2011), http://www1.tiaa-cref.org/ucm/groups/content/@ap_ucm_p_inst/documents/
document/tiaa02030420.pdf; Alicia H. Munnell, How Much to Save for a Secure
Retirement, B.C. CTR. FOR RET. RES., (Issue in Brief No. 11-13, Nov. 2011),
http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/IB_11-13-508.pdf; Barbara Butrica,
Karen E. Smith & C. Eugene Steuerle, Working for a Good Retirement, URBAN INST.
RET. PROJECT (Discussion Paper No. 06-03, 28 fig.2, 2006),
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311333_good_retirement.pdf.
413
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delay taking their benefits,418 the government could encourage people to
delay taking their benefits until they reach their full retirement age or, better
still, until age 70.
For that matter, the government could increase all of the statutory
ages associated with retirement.419 For example, the 10 percent early
distribution penalty on premature withdrawals applies only to distributions
made before an individual reaches age 59½,420 and the early retirement age
for Social Security is age 62.421 It could make sense to increase both early
retirement ages to 65. It could also make sense to increase both the normal
retirement age for Social Security (currently age 66 but gradually increasing
to age 67)422 and the normal retirement age for pensions (typically age 65)423
to age 70. Finally, it could make sense to increase both the delayed retirement
age for Social Security (currently age 70)424 and the required minimum
distribution age for pensions (age 70½)425 to age 75 or beyond.426 In passing,
however, policymakers need to bear in mind that some policies to raise
retirement ages may have undesirable distributional consequences.427
See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Forman, Supporting the Oldest Old: The Role of Social Insurance,
Pensions, and Financial Products, supra note 161, at 406–08; Risky Business:
Living Longer Without Income for Life, supra note 2, at 33–34.
420
See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
421
See supra note 16 and accompanying text
422
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
423
ERISA generally defines “normal retirement age” as the earlier of the time
specified in the plan or age 65. I.R.C. § 411(a)(8) (2014); ERISA § 3(24), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(24) (2008).
424
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
425
See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
426
See also Richard L. Kaplan, Reforming the Taxation of Retirement Income,
32 VA. TAX REV. 327, 357 (2012); Jacob A. Mortenson, Heidi R. Schramm &
Andrew Whitten, The Effect of Required Minimum Distribution Rules on
Withdrawals from Traditional Individual Retirement Accounts (May 6, 2016),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2764435 (finding that 52 percent of IRA owners subject to
the required minimum distribution rules would take an IRA distribution less than
their required minimum if they were unconstrained).
427
See supra Part IV.D. See also ANNE L. ALSTOTT, A NEW DEAL FOR OLD AGE
95–98 (2016) (suggesting that retirement age could be linked to lifetime income in
a way that favors those workers with relatively lower lifetime earnings over those
with relatively higher lifetime earnings); Henry Aaron, Recent Social Security
blogs—some corrections, BROOKINGS (Apr. 15, 2016), http://www.brookings.edu/
research/opinions/2016/04/15-recent-social-security-blogssome-corrections-aaron
(explaining how raising the full benefit age for Social Security is simply an across418
419
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The federal government could also amend the required minimum
distribution rules to make it easier to use retirement savings to buy deferred
income annuities.428 In that regard, new regulations from the IRS have
already eased the required minimum distribution rules to allow plan
participants to spend up to $125,000 on deferred income annuities that are
qualifying longevity annuity contracts (QLACs).429 Also, the Obama
Administration recently called for legislation that would completely exempt
an individual from the required minimum distribution rules if her tax-favored
retirement plan accumulations do not exceed $100,000.430 All in all, the
minimum distribution rules could be reformed to prioritize lifetime income
provision over Treasury revenue-collection.431
4. Preserve Benefits until Retirement
Government policies could also be designed to get workers to
preserve their retirement savings until retirement, for example, by
discouraging premature pension withdrawals and loans.432 While defined
the-board cut in benefits for all new claimants, regardless of their incomes or life
expectancies); Peter Coy, How to Raise the Retirement Age for People Who Want to
Work, BLOOMBERG (June 16, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2016-06-16/how-to-raise-the-retirement-age-for-people-who-want-towork
(discussing ways to take work capacity into account).
428
I.R.C. § 401(a)(9) (2014); Natalie Choate, New! Longevity Insurance for
IRAs, MORNINGSTAR ADVISOR (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.morningstar.com/
advisor/t/52769065/new-longevity-insurance-for-iras.htm.
429
See supra notes 158–160 and accompanying text.
430
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, General Explanations of the Administration’s
Fiscal Year 2017 Revenue Proposals, supra note 388, at 143. The author favors a
much higher cap. Forman, Supporting the Oldest Old: The Role of Social Insurance,
Pensions, and Financial Products, supra note 161, at 411–412.
431
Mark J. Warshawsky, Reforming Retirement Income: Annuitization,
Combination Strategies, And Required Minimum Distributions, GEORGE MASON U.
MERCATUS
CTR.,
(Dec.
2015),
http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/
WarshawskyCombination-Retirement.pdf; Brown, Income As the Outcome:
Reframing The 401(k) Plan, supra note 403; U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, Private
Retirement Benefits in the 21st Century: Achieving Retirement Security 18 (2016),
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/documents/files/uscc_achieving_ret
irement_security_0.pdf.
432
See, e.g., Forman & Mackenzie, Optimal Rules for Defined Contribution
Plans: What Can We Learn from the U.S. and Australian Pension Systems?, supra
note 371, at 650; Orlova et al., supra note 333, at 3; Richard L. Kaplan, Retirement
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benefit plans typically provide lifetime annuities for retirees and their
spouses, defined contribution plans are leaky: they often allow participants
to withdraw all or a portion of their individual accounts, and many plans
allow participants to borrow against their accounts.433 All in all, a significant
portion of these premature distributions and loans are dissipated before
retirement.434 Accordingly, it could make sense to further limit or even
prohibit premature distributions and loans from defined contribution plans
and IRAs. Also, the process for rolling over defined contribution balances
can be cumbersome and could be simplified.435
Also, plan sponsors who make annuity investments available within
a plan do not always have good options to remove the annuity investment
option from the plan when it is no longer suitable (which can happen, for
example, when the plan changes its investment offerings or its record
keeper).436 The Obama Administration recently recommended legislation
that would allow plan participants to roll over any unauthorized lifetime

Funding and the Curious Evolution of Individual Retirement Accounts, 7 ELDER L.J.
283, 293–303 (1999).
433
See supra notes 236–241 (distributions), 57 (hardship distributions), and 56
(loans) and accompanying text.
434
See, e.g., Lucas, Plug the Drain: 401(k) Leakage and the Impact on
Retirement, supra note 226; Copeland, Lump-Sum Distributions at Job Change,
supra note 227; Hurd & Panis, The Choice to Cash Out, Maintain, or Annuitize
Pension Rights upon Job Change or Retirement, supra note 59.
435
See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-30, 401(K) PLANS:
LABOR AND IRS COULD IMPROVE THE ROLLOVER PROCESS (2013),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/652881.pdf; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
GAO-16-408, RETIREMENT SECURITY: LOW DEFINED CONTRIBUTION SAVINGS MAY
POSE CHALLENGES, supra note 191, at 29–31 (discussing universal rollover and
finding that eliminating cash-outs and instead rolling funds into IRAs or other
retirement plans would increase average projected retirement annuities by 16
percent). The ERISA Advisory Council is looking at how to facilitate plan-to-plan
transfers and account consolidations. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON
EMP. WELFARE AND PENSION BENEFIT PLANS, Participant Plan Transfers and
Account Consolidation for the Advancement of Lifetime Plan Participation (Issue
Statement 2016), https://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/2016-participant-plan-transfersand-account-consolidation-scope-statement.pdf.
436
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, General Explanations of the Administration’s
Fiscal Year 2017 Revenue Proposals, supra note 388, at 142; STAFF OF THE J.
COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING
TO TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT SAVING AND CERTAIN RELATED LEGISLATIVE
PROPOSALS, supra note 37, at 85–88.
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income investments to an IRA or other retirement plan—and so preserve
these assets within the tax-favored retirement system.437
5. Revise the Rules that Are Used to Calculate Lump
Sum Distributions
The Treasury and the IRS could also revise the rules that are used to
calculate lump sum distributions. As we have seen, when a plan sponsor
offers to replace a lifetime pension benefit with a lump sum, the minimum
lump sum that is offered must be an amount that is actuarially equivalent to
the promised lifetime pension benefit.438 Basically, that means that the
minimum lump sum must have a value equal to the present value of the
participant’s lifetime stream of pension benefits. Unfortunately, the
applicable regulations permit the use of that actuarially-equivalent lump sum
amount even though that amount is almost invariably less valuable than the
promised lifetime pension benefit. In fact, that minimum lump sum amount
would almost never be sufficient to buy an insurance annuity as generous as
the promised lifetime pension benefit. As Part IV.C above showed, the
typical retail lifetime annuity has a 12 percent “load” factor built in, and the
payouts from actuarially fair annuities would be around 15 percent higher
than what can actually be purchased in current retail annuity markets.
Similarly, in its recent study of lump sum risk transfers, the U.S. Government
Accountability Office estimated that if a 65-year-old female participant were
to accept a lump sum offer and then use that lump sum to purchase a retail
annuity, her monthly annuity benefit would be 24 percent smaller than her
lifetime pension benefit would have been (also estimating a 17 percent
reduction for 65-year-old males).439
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, General Explanations of the Administration’s
Fiscal Year 2017 Revenue Proposals, supra note 388, at 142. See also Institutional
Retirement Income Council, In-Plan Guaranteed Lifetime Income: Debunking
Portability Myths (2016), http://iricouncil.org/docs/Debunking_Portability_
Myths.pdf.
438
See supra notes 211–220 and accompanying text.
439
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-74, PRIVATE PENSIONS:
PARTICIPANTS NEED BETTER INFORMATION WHEN OFFERED LUMP SUMS THAT
REPLACE THEIR LIFETIME BENEFITS, supra note 268, at 25; See also Mark Miller,
Six Ways Pension Annuities Almost Always Beat a Lump Sum,
WEALTHMANAGEMENT.COM (Mar. 9, 2012), http://wealthmanagement.com/dataamp-tools/six-ways-pension-annuities-almost-always-beat-lump-sum; U.S. DEP’T
OF LABOR, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE AND PENSION BENEFIT PLANS,
Model Notices and Disclosures for Pension Risk Transfers, supra note 324, at 17–
437
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In essence, in making a lump sum distribution, the plan sponsor
shifts risk to the participant but does not fully compensate her for taking on
that risk. The plan sponsor saves money, but it is generally a bad economic
deal for the participant. Arguably, the right economic answer is that the plan
sponsor should pay a premium to participants who take lump sum
distributions. For example, instead of computing the lump sum as an amount
equal to 100 percent of the actuarial present value of the participant’s lifetime
pension benefit, perhaps, the plan sponsor should have to pay a premium of,
say, 15 percent on top of that present value; that is, the plan sponsor could
be required to pay a lump sum distribution equal to 115 percent of the present
value of the participant’s lifetime pension benefit.
At bottom, in the typical lump sum distribution offer, the interests of
plan sponsors and participants are in direct conflict, and that raises some
interesting issues. In our voluntary pension system, plan sponsors are
relatively free to design pension plans to their liking. That is the nature of
the settlor function.440 On the other hand, when a plan sponsor administers
its plan it acts as a fiduciary and so must operate in the best interest of the
participants (and beneficiaries).441 In short, a plan sponsor’s decision to offer
lump sum distributions, as a matter of course—or as part of a pension risk
transfer transaction, is a matter of plan design that is viewed as a settlor
function rather than a fiduciary function, but when the plan sponsor
implements lump sum distributions, it acts as a fiduciary.442
The first set of issues relates to the plan sponsor’s ability to offer
lump sum distributions. For example, as Part III.E.3.b above showed,
amending a plan to offer participants a new lump sum benefit is pretty clearly
a settlor function (not a fiduciary function). Accordingly, the plan sponsor is
generally free to amend the plan to offer the lump sum distributions and is
generally free to define the terms of that offer. Within certain regulatory
limits the interest rate and the mortality table to be used in computing the
lump sum will be identified in the plan amendment. As these selections
involve the settlor function, a plan sponsor can select permissible interest
18 (showing estimates that if a 65-year-old male participant were to accept a lump
sum offer and then use that lump sum to purchase a retail annuity, his monthly
annuity benefit would be around 10 percent smaller than his lifetime pension benefit
would have been [an $897 per month annuity versus a $1000 per month pension]
and also estimating a 14 percent reduction for 65-year-old female [an $861 per
month annuity versus a $1000 per month pension]).
440
See supra notes 294–295 and accompanying text.
441
ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2008); I.R.C. § 401(a) (2015).
442
See supra notes 294–295 and accompanying text.
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rates and mortality tables that are advantageous to it. Under the current rules,
for example, a plan sponsor can gain a financial advantage for itself by
selecting a so-called “lookback” interest rate from up to 17 months earlier—
when that interest rate is higher (and so results in lower lump sums) than the
rate that prevails at the time the lump sum offer is made.443 Similarly, until
new mortality table regulations come into effect for 2017 or later,444 a plan
sponsor can gain a financial advantage for itself by selecting the currentlyrequired mortality table with its relatively shorter life expectancies (that
result in fewer months of pension benefits and so lower lump sums).445
The second set of issues relates to the plan sponsor’s implementation
of lump sum distributions. Here, the plan sponsor must act as a fiduciary.
That makes it a real challenge for the plan sponsor, as its interests are
economically adverse to the interests of its participants: the plan sponsor
typically expects to save money by encouraging its plan participants to take
lump sums that are almost invariably less valuable than the participants’
lifetime pension benefits.
The author believes that a plan sponsor breaches its fiduciary duties
to its participants if it downplays the very real reductions in value that occur
when participants elect to take lump sum distributions rather than retaining
their lifetime pension benefits. Acting as a fiduciary, the plan sponsor should
be fully forthcoming with all the information that the participants (and
beneficiaries) need to make informed decisions. It will never be enough for
a plan sponsor to offer an unblemished picture of the pension risk transfer
options: the plan sponsor should reveal the naked truth about lump sums,
warts and all. The government has ample authority to require that plan
sponsors make full disclosures about how the proffered lump sums truly
compare with the participants’ lifetime pension benefits.446
All in all, the author believes that the Treasury and the IRS should
revise the relative value regulations that are used to compute lump sums.447
Plan sponsors could be required to use the most up-to-date mortality tables
for lump sum calculations.448 Plan sponsors could also be required to take
See supra notes 298–299 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 218–220 and accompanying text.
445
As the I.R.C. § 411(d)(6) anti-cutback rule protects a participant’s accrued
benefits, a plan sponsor can never amend its plan to offer a lump sum alternative that
actually cuts benefits.
446
See, e.g., supra note 84 and accompanying text.
447
See also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-74, PRIVATE
PENSIONS: PARTICIPANTS NEED BETTER INFORMATION WHEN OFFERED LUMP SUMS
THAT REPLACE THEIR LIFETIME BENEFITS, supra note 268, at 51.
448
See, e.g., Noel Abkemeier, et al., Risky Business: Living Longer Without
443
444
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into account the value of any subsidies or other supplements provided by the
plan. For example, if the plan offers an enhanced early retirement subsidy,
revised relative value regulations could require that that subsidy be taken
into account when computing the amount of a lump sum distribution.449
Finally, the Treasury and the IRS might consider requiring plan sponsors to
pay a premium (say 15 percent) on top of the actuarially-determined present
value (although legislation might be needed before this requirement could be
imposed).
At the very least, the relative value notices required by the IRS and
any notices of plan benefits required by the PBGC or the U.S. Department
of Labor could make plan sponsors clearly disclose the very real reductions
in value that occur when a participant elects to take a lump sum in lieu of
retaining her lifetime pension benefit. While the present actuarial valuation
rules permit plan sponsors to offer lump sums that are based on out-of-date
interest rates and mortality tables, the applicable notices could require the
prominent disclosure of the “right” interest rates and mortality tables. The
notices could also explain how hard it is to invest a lump sum to provide
equivalent lifetime income and how difficult it is to use a lump sum to
purchase a retail annuity that replicates the participants’ lifetime pension
benefit. The model lump sum risk transfer notice recommended by the 2015
ERISA Advisory Council addresses these concerns, for example by noting
that “[a]n annuity purchased in the insurance market will generally provide
less income than your plan’s pension.”450
B.

REFORM THE TAX TREATMENT OF ANNUITIES AND DEFERRED
INCOME ANNUITIES

The current tax treatment of annuities has some features that
encourage individuals to buy them and some features that do not. On the
whole, the deferral of taxation on annuities until benefits are actually
received is a very valuable tax benefit, especially when compared to, say, a
regular bank account where the interest income is taxed on an annual basis

Income for Life: Legislative and Regulatory Issues, AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES (Oct.
2015), http://actuary.org/files/LegReg_IB_102215.pdf [hereinafter AM. ACAD. OF
ACTUARIES].
449
Id. at 6–7.
450
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE AND PENSION
BENEFIT PLANS, Model Notices and Disclosures for Pension Risk Transfers, supra
note 324, at 35.
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at ordinary income tax rates.451 As Table 2 above showed, the exclusion of
investment income on annuity and life insurance was listed as a $23.4 billion
tax expenditure in the U.S. Government’s Fiscal Year 2017 Budget, and over
the years, including this “inside buildup” in taxable income has been a
common tax-reform proposal.452
In that regard, under a comprehensive income tax (i.e., a
theoretically pure income tax), individuals would pay tax on the sum of the
wages, interest, dividends, and other forms of economic income that they
earn.453 Portions of the premiums paid for annuities are invested and earn
interest, dividends, and other types of investment income. That investment
income—the inside buildup—is generally not taxable until the annuitant
begins receiving annuity distributions.454 Under a comprehensive income
tax, investors would be taxed on those investment earnings annually, just like
investors in bank accounts, taxable bonds, and mutual funds, and it could
make sense to extend comprehensive income tax treatment to annuities (and
life insurance) by taxing the inside buildup in those policies. According to
I.R.C. § 61(a)(4) (2015).
See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFF., Options for Reducing the Deficit: 2014 to
2023 126 (2013), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/
44715-OptionsForReducingDeficit-3.pdf; DAVID F. BRADFORD, BLUEPRINTS FOR
BASIC TAX REFORM 178 (2d ed., revised 1984); CONG. RES. SERV., Tax
Expenditures: Compendium of Background Material on Individual Provisions, S.
Rep. No. 45, 112th Cong., 2d Sess. 321–27 (2012), http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/CPRT-112SPRT77698/pdf/CPRT-112SPRT77698.pdf (discussing the
exclusion of investment income on life insurance and annuity contracts); Jonathan
Barry Forman, Reconsidering the Tax Treatment of Pensions and Annuities, 18(1)
CHAP. L. REV. 221, 231–233 (2014). But see Michael A. Schuyler, Tax Treatment
of Inside Buildup In Life Insurance Products, INST. FOR RES. ON THE ECON. OF
TAX’N (1994), http://iret.org/pub/FI-09.PDF (arguing against taxing inside buildup).
453
See generally HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE
DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938); Robert M.
Haig, The Concept of Income—Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAX 1, 7 (Robert M. Haig, ed., 1921); see generally COMPREHENSIVE
INCOME TAXATION (Joseph A. Pechman, ed., 1977); WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED:
INCOME OR EXPENDITURE?: A REPORT OF A CONFERENCE SPONSORED BY THE FUND
FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH AND THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Joseph A.
Pechman, ed., 1980); Henry Aaron, What is a Comprehensive Tax Base Anyway?,
22 NAT’L TAX J. 543 (1969); BRADFORD & THE U.S. TREASURY, supra note 452.
454
A similar deferral of tax occurs on investments in whole-life insurance
policies. A whole-life insurance policy provides life insurance coverage throughout
the insured’s whole life, as opposed to term-life insurance which provides coverage
for a specified period. CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 452, at 126.
451
452
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the Joint Committee on Taxation, including the investment income from
annuities (and life insurance) in taxable income would have raised $24
billion in Fiscal Year 2015 and $210 billion over ten years.455
Perhaps a better approach would be to continue the current exclusion
for the inside buildup in annuities, but only for lifetime annuities. This
approach—which was suggested by the President’s 2005 Advisory Panel on
Federal Tax Reform—would continue to encourage annuities that provide
lifetime income but discourage the use of annuities and variable annuities
merely for tax avoidance.456
The federal government might also consider other ways the tax
system could be used to encourage investors and plan participants to select
lifetime annuities and deferred income annuities. As explained in Part
II.D.2.c above, current law allows a life annuitant to recover a portion of
each annuity payment tax-free but only until she recovers her investment in
the contract—typically, as she reaches her life expectancy; thereafter, each
annuity payment received is fully taxable. The current rule provides some
balance, as it typically allows annuitants who die before they recover their
annuity investment to deduct the unrecovered portion in the year they die.
Still, if the federal government wants to encourage individuals to buy
lifetime annuities and deferred income annuities, it could consider allowing
individuals to keep excluding a portion of each annuity payment from
income even if they live beyond their life expectancy. After all, it certainly
seems odd that taxes increase on those who “live too long.”457 Alternatively,
or, perhaps, in addition to extending the exclusion ratio for more years, the
federal government might also allow individuals to deduct any unrecovered
annuity investments even if they die before the annuity starting date. After
all, it seems strange that only those individuals who live past the annuity
starting date are allowed to deduct their unrecovered annuity investments;
and that rule almost certainly discourages the purchase of deferred income
annuities.458 All in all, the benefits from changing these tax rules to better
encourage the purchase of lifetime annuities and deferred income annuities
CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 452, at 126. See also Table 2, supra
(showing the Office of Management and Budget’s slightly different tax expenditure
estimates: $23 billion in Fiscal Year 2017 and $371 billion over ten years).
456
The President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, Simple, Fair, and
Pro-Growth: Proposals to Fix America’s Tax System, 123 (Nov. 2005),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Report-Fix-TaxSystem-2005.pdf.
457
See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
458
See supra notes 172–176 and accompanying text.
455
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would probably outweigh the revenue losses that would result from those
changes.
The federal government might even provide additional tax benefits
for individuals who receive income from lifetime annuities and lifetime
pensions, for example, by completely exempting lifetime income payments
from income taxation or favoring them with a reduced tax rate.459 In that
regard, investments always involve choices, and tax rates can influence those
choices. Under current law, annuity (and pension) income is subject to
ordinary income tax rates of up to 39.6 percent, but capital gains and
dividends are typically taxed at just 0, 15, or 20 percent.460 Those preferential
tax rates for capital gains and dividends can be very attractive, even to
investors who would prefer the lifetime income that comes from investing in
annuities (or pensions).461 Accordingly, as long as there are preferential tax
rates for capital gains and dividends, it might make sense to extend those
preferential tax rates to the income that comes from lifetime annuities and
lifetime pensions. Policymakers could, of course, target the benefit towards
less affluent retirees by limiting the preferential rates to, say, no more than
$30,000 a year of annuity or pension income per retiree.
C.

THE GOVERNMENT COULD MANDATE OR ENCOURAGE
ANNUITIZATION

Since 2010, the IRS and the U.S. Department of Labor have made a
concerted effort to promote lifetime income options for retirement plans.462
For example, in 2012, the Treasury and the IRS released a package of
proposed regulations and rulings intended to make it easier for pension plans
to offer partial annuities, longevity annuities, and other lifetime income
See, e.g., Retirement Security Needs Lifetime Pay Act of 2009, H.R. 2748,
111th Cong. (2009) (a bill introduced by former Representative Earl Pomeroy [DN.D.] to encourage guaranteed lifetime income payments by excluding from income
a portion of such payments); Çebi, supra note 338, at 7; AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES,
supra note 448, at 8.
460
See supra notes 120–121 and accompanying text.
461
See, e.g., William J. Bernstein, A Limited Case for Variable Annuities,
EFFICIENT FRONTIER, http://www.efficientfrontier.com/ef/701/annuity.htm (last
visited July 27, 2016) (giving some numerical examples that show how investments
in variable annuities compare with free-standing stock market investments over
time).
462
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SECURITY ADMIN., Lifetime
Income Options for Participants and Beneficiaries in Retirement Plans (2010),
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/cmt-1210-AB33.html.
459
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choices;463 and in 2014, the IRS promulgated final regulations that ease the
minimum distribution requirements to allow plan participants to spend up to
$125,000 on qualified longevity annuity contracts (QLACs).464 This subpart
discusses a variety of other ways that the government could promote
annuitization. In that regard, however, policymakers need to bear in mind
that some policies to mandate or encourage annuitization might have
undesirable distributional consequences.465
1. The Government Could Mandate Annuitization
One approach would be for the government to mandate that retirees
use at least a portion of their retirement savings to purchase annuities or
similar lifetime income guarantees.466 Under this approach, participants in
tax-favored plans and IRA holders could be required to annuitize at least a
portion of their tax-favored retirement savings—unless they could show that
they have adequate lifetime income streams from other sources.
2. The Government Could Require that Pension Plans
Offer Annuities as an Investment and/or Distribution
Option
Alternatively, the government might only want to encourage
annuitization. For example, the government could require plan sponsors to
include annuities or other lifetime income mechanisms in their investment
options and/or in their distribution options.467 The government might also
See, e.g., id.; EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS,
SUPPORTING RET. FOR AM. FAMILIES (2012), http://benefitslink.com/articles/
CEA_report_2_2_2012.pdf.
464
See supra notes 158–160 and accompanying text.
465
See supra Part IV.D. See also Webb, The United States Longevity Insurance
Market, in SECURING LIFELONG RETIREMENT INCOME: GLOBAL ANNUITY MARKETS
AND POLICY, supra note 142, at 75–76 (noting that mandating annuitization could
adversely affect a meaningful number of households).
466
See, e.g., MACKENZIE, supra note 117, at 191–200; Jeffrey R. Brown,
Automatic Lifetime Income as a Path to Retirement Income Security (unpublished
manuscript prepared for the American Council of Life Insurers, Aug. 7 2009),
http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/taxpolicy/files/2009/Brown_Automatic%20Lifetime%20Income_With%20Cover.pdf,
Perun, supra note 327.
467
See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 51, at 38–39;
Jeffrey R. Brown, Understanding the Role of Annuities in Retirement Planning, in
463
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encourage pension plans to offer beneficiaries more flexibility, for example,
by offering partial annuitization options and not just all-or-nothing
annuitization choices.468 The government might even require plans to default
participants into annuities or trial annuities, unless participants affirmatively
elect otherwise.469
OVERCOMING THE SAVINGS SLUMP 178, 199–200 (Annamaria Lusardi, ed., 2008);
Kathryn J. Kennedy, How Can Lifetime Income Be Made a Desirable Retirement
Plan Distribution Option?, 2013 N.Y.U. REV. OF EMP. BENEFITS & EXEC. COMP. 11; AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, Risky Business: Living Longer Without Income for
Life: Legislative and Regulatory Issues, supra note 448. at 7; U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-433, DOL COULD TAKE STEPS TO IMPROVE
RETIREMENT
INCOME
OPTIONS
FOR
PLAN
PARTICIPANTS
(2016),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/678924.pdf.
468
See, e.g., Beshears et al., supra note 383, at 17 (finding that “most consumers
prefer partial annuitization of their retirement nest egg over either 0% or 100%
annuitization”); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Modifications to Minimum Present
Value Requirements for Partial Annuity Distribution Options Under Defined Benefit
Pension Plans 81 Fed. Reg. 62,359 (Sept. 9, 2016) (recently issued regulations that
make it easier for defined benefit plans to offer both a partial lump sum and a partial
annuity).
469
See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 51, at 39–40;
MACKENZIE, supra note 117, at 200–203; J. Mark Iwry & John A. Turner, Automatic
Annuitization: New Behavioral Strategies for Expanding Lifetime Income,
BROOKINGS (Retirement Security Project Paper No. 2009-2, 2009),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/07_annuitization_
iwry.pdf (discussing various default strategies); William G. Gale, J. Mark Iwry,
David C. John & Lina Walker, Increasing Annuitization in 401(k) Plans with
Automatic Trial Income, BROOKINGS (Retirement Security Project, Paper No. 20082, 2008), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/06_annuities_
gale.pdf (recommending defaulting retirees into receiving at least 24 consecutive
monthly payments from an annuity or similar lifetime income product); Çebi, supra
note 338, at 7; John J. Kalamarides & Srinivas D. Reddy, The Ease of Automation
and Guaranteed Lifetime Income, PRUDENTIAL FIN., INC. 7 (June 2016),
http://research.prudential.com/documents/rp/RSWP021-Ease-of-Automation.pdf
(“A majority of plan participants who understand guaranteed lifetime income
solutions say being defaulted into them leads to better-than-average retirement
outcomes.”); David Blanchett, Default Participants in Defined Contribution Plans
into Annuities: Are the Potential Benefits Worth the Costs?, 4(1) J. OF RET. 54
(2016). Australia is also looking at having its superannuation funds default plan
participants into a “comprehensive income product for retirement” (CIPR) option.
See, e.g., Australian Government, The Treasury, Financial System Inquiry Final
Report 91, 117 (Nov. 2014), http://fsi.gov.au/files/2014/12/FSI_Final_
Report_Consolidated20141210.pdf.
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3. The Government Could Sell or Guarantee Annuities
The federal government could even get into the market of selling
annuities.470 As already mentioned, the Social Security system implicitly
allows workers to buy actuarially fair lifetime annuities merely by delaying
retirement beyond age 62,471 but the government might also let individuals
and couples buy a limited amount of explicit inflation-adjusted lifetime
annuities—perhaps enough to keep them out of poverty throughout their
retirement years.472 Alternatively, the federal government could guarantee
annuities sold by private companies.
4. The Government Could Make It Easier for Plan
Sponsors to Offer Annuities and Deferred Income
Annuities
As Parts III.B.2 and III.C.2 above explained, plan sponsors that offer
annuities have fiduciary responsibilities with respect to the selection and
monitoring of annuity providers. Plan sponsors can avoid those fiduciary
duties if they instead only make lump sum distributions and leave it to the
terminating employees to buy their own annuities directly (in after-tax
dollars) or, alternatively, indirectly through a rollover IRA (using pre-tax
dollars).473 The U.S. Department of Labor has a long way to go in
overcoming plan sponsor concerns about offering in-plan annuities without
fear of breaching their fiduciary duties.474 In general, it would be good to
reduce these regulatory barriers.
See, e.g., Forman supra note 161 at 414–417 and sources cited therein; ELLIS
note 199, at 119.
471
See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text.
472
In 2016, the poverty level for a single individual was $11,880, and the
poverty level for a married couple was $16,020. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM.
SERVS, OFF. OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION, POVERTY
GUIDELINES (2016), https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines.
473
See, e.g., supra note 235 and accompanying text.
474
See, e.g., Utkus, supra note 262 (“Concerns about barriers to in-plan
annuities have led the Department of Labor to clarify its rules for in-plan annuity
selection. So far, the rule clarification hasn’t changed employer sentiment.”);
McGee, supra note 60, at 13; Brown, supra note 403; AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES,
supra note 448, at 5–6; VOYA, Legislative Update (June 2015),
https://investments.voya.com/idc/groups/public/documents/retirement/132351.pdf;
Steve Vernon, Foundations in Research for Regulatory Guidelines on the Design &
470
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In particular, it might make sense to let plan sponsors rely on
insurance regulators and industry standards to oversee and monitor annuity
providers. That is the way it works in many other countries,475 and it could
probably work in the United States, as well. For example, the U.S.
Department of Labor’s Employee Benefits Security Administration (or
alternatively, the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Federal Insurance Office)
could post a list of approved annuities and annuity providers that plan
sponsors could use.476 Alternatively, the U.S. Department of Labor could at
least host a website that would serve as a clearing house of information about
annuity providers and annuity products.477
Also, better guidance on the process of selecting qualifying
longevity annuity contracts (QLACs) and other deferred income annuities
would increase their utilization.478 For that matter, it could make sense for
the government to “jump-start” the market for deferred income annuities by
offering them in the federal government’s Thrift Savings defined
contribution plan.479

Operation of Retirement Income Solutions in DC Plans, STANFORD CTR. ON
LONGEVITY (Sept. 2014), http://longevity3.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/
2014/09/Foundations-for-Regulatory-Guidelines-2014-Final-.pdf.
475
See supra notes 380-381 and accompanying text; Robert J. Toth, Jr. & Evan
Giller, Regulatory Recommendations for the Department of Labor to Facilitate
Lifetime Income, 3(4) J. OF RET. 28, 29–31 (2016), http://www.iijournals.com/
doi/pdfplus/10.3905/jor.2016.3.4.028.
476
Insurers interested in having their annuity products on the “qualified” list
could be required to formally apply for listing and meet certain solvency and
consumer-protection standards. See also Abraham & Harris, supra note 153, at 22
(suggesting that the government find a way to “certify financial products—including
longevity annuities—that meet established standards for reliability, cost, and
quality”).
477
Toth & Giller, supra note 475, at 29–31.
478
Ed McCarthy, Are Retirement Plan Sponsors Too Afraid of Longevity
Annuities?, WEALTHMANAGEMENT.COM (Feb. 10, 2016) http://wealthmanagement.
com/retirement-planning/are-retirement-plan-sponsors-too-afraid-longevityannuities.
479
Abraham & Harris, supra note 153, at 22.
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5. The Government Could Promote Education about
Lifetime Income Options
The government could promote lifetime income options both
through its own educational efforts and also by making it easier for plan
sponsors to provide financial education and retirement planning advice.
a. Government Efforts
At the very least, the government could promote better financial
education about annuities and other lifetime income options.480 In that
regard, one way to encourage retirees to choose annuities and other forms of
lifetime income is to promote financial education that frames the retirement
decision in terms of lifetime consumption rather than in investment-oriented
language that simply encourages individuals to accumulate large lump
sums.481
Information about replacement rates would help workers better
understand how to convert their account balances into lifetime income
streams.482 The U.S. Government Accountability Office recommends that
the U.S. Department of Labor retirement planning tools should build in more
flexibility so that users can better understand how account balances translate
into replacement rates that meet their personal needs.483 The U.S.
Department of Labor already hosts a Lifetime Income Calculator that can be
used to estimate monthly pension benefits for a typical retiree.484 For
Çebi, supra note 338, at 7.
Robert Gazzale, Sandy Mackenzie & Lina Walker, Do Default and Longevity
Annuities Improve Annuity Take-Up Rates? Results from an Experiment, AARP
PUB. POL’Y INST. (Research Report No. 2012-11, Oct. 2012), https://www.tiaacrefinstitute.org/public/pdf/institute/events/pdfs/Do%20Default%20Longevity%20
Annuities%20Improve%20TakeUp%20Rates.pdf; Beshears et al., supra note 383,
at 12–13, 13–14; Jeffrey R. Brown, Jeffrey R. Kling, Sendhil Mullainathan &
Marian V. Wrobel, Why Don’t People Insure Late-Life Consumption? A Framing
Explanation of the Under-Annuitization Puzzle, 98(2) AM. ECON. REV. 304 (2008);
Brown, supra note 403.
482
U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-242, RETIREMENT
SECURITY: BETTER INFORMATION ON INCOME REPLACEMENT RATES NEEDED TO
HELP WORKERS PLAN FOR RETIREMENT, supra note 382.
483
Id. at 38.
484
Lifetime Income Calculator, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., EMP. BENEFITS SEC.
ADMIN., http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/lifetimeincomecalculator.html (last visited
July 22, 2016): The calculator uses the safe harbor assumptions described in the
480
481
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example, for a 65-year-old participant retiring on July 22, 2016 with a current
account balance of $100,000, the calculator projects that she can expect to
receive $486 a month for the rest of her life ($5832 per year = 12 × $486 per
month).485 According to the Advanced Annuity Calculator at
Immediateannuities.com, a 65-year-old man buying a $100,000 lifetime
annuity on July 22, 2016 would receive $531 per month for the rest of his
life ($6372 per year = 12 × $531 per month), while a 65-year-old woman
would receive $498 per month for the rest of her life ($5976 per year = 12 ×
$498 per month).486
ANPRM [Advance notice of proposed rulemaking] for estimating future
contributions, investment earnings, and inflation:
 Contributions continue to Retirement Age at the Current Annual
Contribution amount increased by 3 percent per year.
 Investment returns are 7 percent per year (nominal).
 An inflation rate of 3 percent per year is used for discounting the
projected account balance to today’s dollars.
In converting the account balances into lifetime income streams, the calculator
uses the safe harbor annuity conversion assumptions described in the ANPRM:
 A rate of interest equal to the 10-year constant maturity Treasury
securities rate for the first business day of the last month of the
period to which the statement relates (equal to 1.63% as of
December 3, 2012 for statement periods ending December 31,
2012).
 The applicable mortality table under section 417(e)(3)(B) of the
Internal Revenue Code in effect on the first day of the last month of
the period to which the statement relates. This is a unisex table (i.e.,
the annuity values are the same for males and females).
 No insurance company load for expenses, profit, reserves, etc.
485
U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN, supra note 484, click on
“Go to the Calculator”; enter Retirement Age: 65; Current Account Balance:
$100,000; Current Annual Contribution: $0; Years to Retirement: 0; Statement Date:
enter today’s date; and click on “Calculate,” and get Lifetime Income/Month for
Participant With No Survivor Benefit: $486). The results also show the $439 per
month that the participant (and spouse) would receive under a joint and survivor
annuity (and the $220 [50 percent] that would be paid to the surviving spouse),
assuming that the participant and the spouse are the same age. Id
486
Advanced Annuity Calculator, IMMEDIATEANNUITIES https://www.
immediateannuities.com/annuity-calculators/ (last visited July 22, 2016) (Male:
enter My Age Today: 65; My Gender: Male; State of Residence: DC; Income Start
Date: Immediately; $ Investment: $100,000; click on “Calculate,” and get Estimated
Monthly Income: $582; Female: enter My Age Today: 65; My Gender: Female;
State of Residence: DC; Income Start Date: Immediately; $ Investment: $100,000;
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In addition to the Lifetime Income Calculator, the U.S. Department
of Labor could provide (or endorse) more extensive calculators that could be
used by participants to evaluate the choice between lifetime pension benefits
and lump sum distributions. Both present-value-of-an-annuity and principalsum-to-annuity calculators could be hosted. Ideally, these calculators would
allow participants to use a variety of assumptions about life expectancy and
rates of return, rather than just the fixed assumptions in the current Lifetime
Income Calculator.487
The U.S. Department of Labor could also design (or endorse) an
individualized Life Expectancy Calculator to help participants get a better
idea how long they and their spouses can expect to live. To calculate life
expectancy, these individualized calculators typically ask about an
individual’s age, education, work, smoking habits, exercise regime, and
family health.488 At the very least, the U.S. Department of Labor could link
to the very simple life expectancy calculator that the Social Security
Administration hosts on its website.489 The U.S. Department of Labor could
also prominently display or link to individual and joint life expectancy
tables.490 In addition to providing life expectancy tables for the average

click on “Calculate,” and get Estimated Monthly Income: $531). The Advanced
Annuity Calculator can also be used to find payments for couples. For example,
when a 65-year-old male is coupled with a 65-year-old female, the results show that
the 65-year-old couple would get a joint life annuity providing Estimated Monthly
Income of $444 per month ($5328 per year = 12 × $444 per month). See also Should
I Buy an Income Annuity?, CANNEX.COM, http://www.cannex.com/
public/antcvp01.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2017); What is My Return with an Income
Annuity? (IRR), CANNEX.COM, https://www.cannex.com/usa/english/tool_
irr_public.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2017).
487
See U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN supra note 484.
488
See, e.g., Dean P. Foster, Choong Tze Chua & Lyle H. Ungar, How Long
Will you Live?, WHARTON.UPENN.EDU, http://gosset.wharton.upenn.edu/~foster/
mortality/ (last visited July 22, 2016) (click on “Our longer version of the life
calculator”).
489
Retirement & Survivors Benefits: Life Expectancy Calculator, SOC. SEC.
ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/planners/benefitcalculators.html (last visited July 22,
2016).
490
See, e.g., SOC. SEC. ADMIN, supra note 132; Elizabeth Arias, United States
Life Tables, 2011, 64(11) NAT’L VITAL STATS. REP. 1, 9 tbl.1 (2015),
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr64/nvsr64_11.pdf; CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL, Life Tables, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/life_tables.htm (last
updated Dec. 8, 2015); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., General Rule for Pensions and
Annuities 26 tbl.V (Ordinary Life Annuities, One Life), 27–42 tbl.VI (Ordinary Joint
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population, it could make sense to provide life tables for individuals who are
healthier than the average population.491
b. Plan Sponsors
Plan sponsors are not required to provide retirement planning advice,
and concerns about fiduciary liability often keep them from doing so.492 Even
when employers provide financial education and retirement planning advice,
they may not spend much effort explaining annuities and other lifetime
income options.493 The costs of providing such retirement planning advice
may also be a problem, particularly for smaller employees. Somehow, the
government could make it easier for plan sponsors to provide such financial
education and retirement planning advice. In that regard, the U.S.
Department of Labor is already considering changes that would require that
the periodic benefit statements provided to defined contribution plan
participants about their account balances also show how those account
balances would be expressed as estimated streams of payments.494

Life and Last Survivor Annuities, Two Lives) (Publication No. 939, 2013),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p939.pdf; Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9 tbls.V & VI
491
See supra note 176.
492
See, e.g., AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, supra note 448, at 2; see also
Transamerica Center for Retirement Studies, The Current State of Retirement: A
Compendium of Findings About American Retirees 48 (Apr. 2016),
https://www.transamericacenter.org/docs/default-source/retireessurvey/tcrs2016_sr_retiree_compendium.pdf (survey showing that more than 60
percent of most recent employers did little or nothing to help pre-retirees transition
into retirement).
493
For example, a recent survey of 406 large employers found that just 26.8%
of those who offered financial/retirement education said they discussed annuities
with their employees and plan participants. INT’L FOUND. OF EMP. BENEFIT PLANS,
Financial Education for Today’s Workforce: 2016 Survey Results 20 ex.17 (2016),
https://www.ifebp.org/pdf/financial-education-2016-survey-results.pdf.
494
U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., Fact Sheet: Lifetime
Income Illustration (May 7, 2013), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/fsanprm.pdf;
Pension Benefits Statements, 78 Fed. Reg. 26,727 (May 8, 2013) (to be codified at
29 C.F.R. pt. 2520), http://webapps.dol.gov/FederalRegister/PdfDisplay.aspx?Doc
Id=26998 (Advance notice of proposed rulemaking issued under ERISA § 105, 29
U.S.C. § 1025 (2006)). See also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 374,
at 21–23.
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IMPROVE ANNUITY REGULATION AND MARKETS
1. Strengthen the Regulation of Annuities

As already explained in Part III.A above, annuities are generally
regulated under state insurance laws, and all states have state-based guaranty
funds that provide at least $100,000 of protection for each annuitant in case
the insurance company that sold the policy becomes insolvent.
Unfortunately, the current state-by-state insurance regulatory system is
antiquated, costly, and inefficient.495 One way to cut down on regulatory
costs might be to allow insurance companies to avoid costly state-by-state
regulation by instead electing an optional federal charter.496 Another
approach would be to make the state-based guaranty funds that backstop
annuities stronger. A more uniform standard, or even a federal guaranty fund,
would be preferable to the current system.497 All in all, these kinds of
improvements in annuity markets would make annuities more attractive to
plan sponsors and to individual purchasers.498
2. Allow Annuity Providers to Advertise Their State
Guarantees
A related problem with retail annuities in the United States is that
state laws generally prevent insurance companies from mentioning their
state-based guarantees in their sales material.499 That, too, could be changed.
The no-advertising rule seems to be designed to limit the moral hazard
among insurance companies that might occur if insurance companies took
greater investment risks because they could rely on the state-based insurance
guarantees.500 While we should be concerned about the solvency of insurance
companies, allowing insurance companies to advertise their state-based
495
See, e.g., Pamela Perun, Putting Annuities Back into Savings Plans, in EMP.
PENSIONS: POLICIES, PROBLEMS, AND POSSIBILITIES 143, 157 (Teresa Ghilarducci &
Christian E. Weller, eds., 2007), http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/
content/images/PerunPuttingAnnuities%20BackintoSavingsPlans.pdf.
496
Id. at 156–159 (citing numerous insurance industry association proposals).
497
Id. at 157–159.
498
Id. at 158 and sources cited in 158 n15.
499
AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, supra note 448, at 5; Abraham & Harris, supra
note 153, at 20 (also noting that Alabama and Michigan are two states that do not
have a no-advertising rule).
500
AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, supra note 448, at 5.
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guarantees would increase consumer confidence in annuities and so
encourage more individuals to buy them.501 Moreover, competitive pricing
of annuities would also improve, as consumers would feel less need to pay
higher premiums to buy annuities from insurance companies with higher
financial rankings.502 In short, purchasers would get better prices for their
annuities. In that regard, while the Annuity Shopper reports that the average
monthly benefit for a $100,000 immediate fixed annuity for a 65-year-old
man in December 1, 2015 for a 65-year-old man was $545 per month ($6540
per year),503 policy quotes from the individual companies cited there ranged
from $528 per month to $560 per month.504 Simple single-life annuities such
as the one for a 65-year-old male are probably the most competitive annuity
product offered by insurance companies, but there is even more price
variation on some of the more complicated annuity products reported on in
a typical issue of the Annuity Shopper, and, no doubt, we would see even
more price variation if we also reviewed the annuity prices charged by those
insurance companies that are not included in the Annuity Shopper surveys.
As all similar annuities come with the same state-based guarantee, we should
be concerned anytime a purchaser has to pay much more than it would cost
to cover the cost of an actuarial fair annuity plus a small premium to cover
an insurance company’s risks and profits.
3. Broaden the Range of Permissible Lifetime Income
Products
In addition to promoting annuities, it could make sense to broaden
the range of permissible lifetime income products. One approach is to
develop more products that pool risk among participants, as opposed to
products that necessitate high premiums to compensate insurance companies
for their guarantees and profits. In that regard, for example, TIAA’s College
Retirement Equities Fund (CREF) has been offering low-cost variable
annuities that pool risk among participants for years.505 Participants choose
See, e.g., Beshears et al., supra note 383, at 14.
See, e.g., MOSHE MILEVSKY, LIFE ANNUITIES: AN OPTIMAL PRODUCT FOR
RETIREMENT INCOME 27–30 (The Research Foundation of CFA Institute, 2013),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2571379 (discussing the relationship between annuity
pricing and insurance company credit rating).
503
See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
504
Id.
505
Poterba & Warshawsky, supra note 350, at 191–198 (discussing the history
and development of individual annuities offered by TIAA); Forman & Sabin, supra
501
502
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from various funds to invest in; and later on, they choose from among a
variety of distribution options, including one-life and two-life annuities.506
When a retiree selects a lifetime annuity, the annuity payments depend on
both the investment experience of the chosen accounts and the mortality
experience of the other participants, but the way these annuities are designed,
the mortality risk falls on the annuitants and is not guaranteed by TIAA. 507
There are many other ideas for lifetime income products that could
share longevity risk among participants.508 For example, so-called “definednote 126, at 798; Roman L. Weil & Lawrence Fisher, TIAA/CREF: Who Gets What?
An Analysis of Wealth Transfers in a Variable Annuity, 47(1) J. OF BUS. 67 (1974),
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2352084.pdf. See, e.g., TIAA GLOBAL ASSET
MANAGEMENT, supra note 354.
506
Forman & Sabin, supra note 126, at 798
507
Id.
508
See, e.g., Catherine Donnelly, Actuarial Fairness and Solidarity in Pooled
Annuity Funds, 45(1) ASTIN BULL. 49 (2015); Catherine Donnelly, Montserrat
Guillén & Jens Perch Nielsen, Bringing cost transparency to the life annuity market,
56(1) INS.: MATHEMATICS AND ECON. 14 (May 2014); Raimond Maurer, Olivia S.
Mitchell, Ralph Rogalla & Vasily Kartashov, Lifecycle Portfolio Choice with
Stochastic and Systematic Longevity Risk, and Variable Investment-Linked Deferred
Annuities, 80(3) J. OF RISK AND INS. 649 (2013), http://online library.wiley.com/
doi/10.1111/j.1539-6975.2012.01502.x/epdf; Raimond Maurer, Ralph Rogalla &
Ivonne Siegelin, Participating Payout Life Annuities: Lessons from Germany 43(2)
ASTIN BULL. 159 (2013) (noting that participating life annuities offer guaranteed
minimum benefits for life and an additional non-guaranteed surplus based on
investment return, mortality, and costs); Catherine Donnelly, Montserrat Guillén &
Jens Perch Nielsen, Exchanging uncertain mortality for a cost, 52(1) INS.:
MATHEMATICS AND ECON. 65 (Jan. 2013); Chao Qiao & Michael Sherris, Managing
Systematic Mortality Risk With Group Self-Pooling and Annuitization Schemes,
80(4) J. OF RISK AND INS. 949 (2013), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/
10.1111/j.1539-6975.2012.01483.x/epdf; Robert L. Brown & Tyler Meredith,
Pooled Target-Benefit Pension Plans (Institute for Research on Public Policy, Study
No. 27, Mar. 2012), http://irpp.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/research/faces-ofaging/new-research-article-2/IRPP-Study-no27.pdf; Andreas Richter & Frederik
Weber, Mortality-Indexed Annuities: Managing Longevity Risk via Product Design,
15(2) N. AM. ACTUARIAL J. 212 (2011); Michel Denuit, Steven Haberman & Arthur
Renshaw, Longevity-Indexed Life Annuities 15(1) N. AM. ACTUARIAL J. 97 (2011);
Roberto Rocha & Dimitri Vittas, Designing the Payout Phase of Pension Systems:
Policy Issues, Constraints and Options, WORLD BANK (Policy Research Working
Paper No. WPS5289, 2010), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/
899971468339618157/pdf/WPS5289.pdf;
Michael
Z.
Stamos,
Optimal
consumption and portfolio choice for pooled annuity funds, 43(1) INS.:
MATHEMATICS AND ECON. 56 (Aug. 2008); John Piggott, Emiliano A. Valdez &
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ambition plans”—like those in operation in the Netherlands—offer a way to
share risk among plan participants.509 Also, elsewhere, the author has
suggested we could pool risk among participants with so-called “tontine
annuities”510 and “tontine pensions.”511 So-called “variable annuity pension
plans” are another product that could help promote retirement income
security.512 Another idea would be to modify ERISA to permit employers to
offer longevity plans—supplemental defined benefit plans where
participation begins at age 45 or later and benefits commence at age 75 or
later.513
E.

OTHER IDEAS

At some point the government also needs to solve the underfunding
problems of both Social Security and the PBGC.514

Bettina Detzel, The Simple Analytics of a Pooled Annuity Fund, 72(3) J. OF RISK
AND INS. 497 (2005).
509
See, e.g., Niels Kortleve, The “Defined Ambition” Pension Plan: A Dutch
Interpretation, 6(1) ROTMAN INT’L J. OF PENSION MGMT. (2013),
http://www.rijpm.com/admin/article_files/2Kortleve_The_Defined_Ambition_F2.pdf; Bart van Riel & Eduard Ponds, Sharing
Risk: The Netherlands’ New Approach to Pensions, B.C. CTR. FOR RET. RES. (Issue
in Brief No. 7-5, Apr. 2007), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2007/04/ib_20075-508.pdf; A. Lans Bovenberg, Roel Mehlkopf & Theo Nijman, The Promise of
Defined Ambition Plans: Lessons for the United States, REIMAGINING PENSIONS:
THE NEXT 40 YEARS 215–246 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Richard C. Shea, eds. 2016);
John A. Turner, Hybrid Pensions: Risk Sharing Arrangements for Pension Plan
Sponsors and Participants (Feb. 2014), https://www.soa.org/files/research/projects/
research-2014-hybrid-risk-sharing.pdf; Martin Bauer, supra note 130, at 31.
510
See, e.g., Forman & Sabin, supra note 126, at 790–801.
511
See, e.g., id., at 802–804.
512
Grant Camp, Kelly S. Coffing & Ladd E. Preppernau, Making the case for
variable annuity pension plans (VAPPs), MILLIMAN (Oct. 7, 2014),
http://us.milliman.com/basic-vapp-benefits/ (“A VAPP is a defined benefit (DB)
pension plan where the benefits adjust each year based on the return of the plan’s
assets, resulting in stable funding requirements.”).
513
William Most & Zorast Wadia, Longevity Plans: An Answer to the Decline
of the Defined Benefit Plan, 28(1) BENEFITS L. J. 23 (2015),
http://www.milliman.com/uploadedFiles/insight/2015/longevity-plans.pdf.
514
AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, supra note 448, at 10–12.
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CONCLUSION

Pensions, annuities, and similar lifetime income products provide
the best way to protect against longevity risk. Over the years, the
responsibility for creating such secure retirement income streams has shifted
from employers to individuals. This Article showed how changes in the U.S.
laws and regulations governing pensions and annuities could help promote
secure, lifetime income policies. More specifically, this Article showed how
the laws governing annuities could be changed to make voluntary
annuitization more attractive and how the laws regulating pensions could be
changed to incentivize pension plan sponsors to offer more annuity options
and to encourage employees to elect those options.

